CTC

TRENDS

National Training Center (NTC)

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3QFY00 and 4QFY00

with Techniques and Procedures that Work!

CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED (CALL)
U. S. ARMY TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND (TRADOC)
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National Training Center (NTC)
TRENDS
3QFY00 and 4QFY00

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USER'S GUIDE

CTC TRENDS, NTC 3QFY00 and 4QFY00

WHAT IS THIS DOCUMENT?

CTC Trends, NTC contains observations and associated tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) for two quarters (3QFY00 and 4QFY00*)*. The CALL Lessons Learned Division, CTC Branch, collects these observations and TTP from the respective Observer/Controller (O/C) teams and compiles them in this publication every six months. Organized by the Battlefield Operating System (BOS), the trends reflect both *Positive Performance* and *Needs Emphasis* observations based on quarterly assessment. Trends and TTP from NTC's Leader Training Program (LTP) and senior NCOs are included when available.

WHO IS THIS DOCUMENT FOR?

CTC Trends, NTC is for tactical field units to use as a reference for training emphasis at Home Station, in preparation for their next NTC rotation.

CTC Trends, NTC is for TRADOC doctrine writers to identify successful techniques and procedures to include in updates of doctrinal publications.

CTC Trends, NTC is for CTC Operations Groups to use as an historical audit trail of reported observations and TTP from the NTC.

HOW DO I USE THIS DOCUMENT?

The trends are organized by BOS. The name of the applicable BOS is indicated at the bottom of each page as a reference.

Given in parenthesis at the beginning of each observation is the branch focus of the O/C team that submitted the observation to CALL (i.e., Armor, Mech, Aviation, Engineer, etc.).

BOS "index" codes are annotated throughout the document. These codes are based on the battlefield structure and definitions presented in **TRADOC Pam 11-9, *Blueprint of the Battlefield***. The *blueprint* provides a common structure of the functions performed by the Army. It serves as a common reference system for analyzing and integrating operations at the strategic, operational and tactical levels of war. The observations and trends in this publication are at the tactical level. In "TA.5", for example, the TA refers to the tactical level of war; the number A5" is the Intelligence BOS number.

NTC TRENDS AND TTP
3d and 4th Quarters, FY 00

Organized by BOS, these are the trends submitted by NTC O/Cs and pulled from unit Take Home Packages (THPs) and After Action Reviews (AARs) for 3d and 4th quarters, FY00. As appropriate and/or available, they provide doctrinal references and tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) for the needed training emphasis. Each trend is annotated with *Blueprint of the Battlefield* codes for use in long-term trend analysis.

INTELLIGENCE BOS

(Trends are numbered sequentially for cross-reference and are <u>not</u> in any priority order.)

<u>Positive Performance</u>

<u>TREND 1</u>
SUBJECT: Force Protection Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB)

OBSERVATION (Brigade Staff): S2s consistently develop IPB products to support stability and support operations (SASO) during reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI), as well as force protection during force-on-force operations.

DISCUSSION:
1. This includes intelligence estimates and situation templates (SITEMPs) of enemy courses of action (COAs) oriented on the rear area threat.
2. Units are beginning to be consistent in addressing the rear area threat in the reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) plan by tasking collection assets to monitor rear area NAIs.
3. Guerilla activities are often listed as information requirements (IR) and sometimes even as priority information requirements (PIR) during initial phases of any given operation.

SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Sustain rear area IPB products and integration of rear area threat into the R&S collection plan.

(TA.5.2.1 Collect Information on Situation)

<u>TREND 2</u>
SUBJECT: BDA Tracking with a Situational Battle Chart vs. Standard Charts

OBSERVATION (Brigade Staff): S2s assess BDA using charts based on the SITEMP for the respective mission.

DISCUSSION: This helps the S2 be very specific in his BDA tracking and enemy disposition, and assists with predictive analysis of future enemy actions. Overall, this is a good tool that helps the command maintain the "running estimate."

SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES: S2s should continue to use situational BDA charts. The following is an example for an MRB defense:



(TA.5.2.2.5 Conduct Post-Attack Target Damage Assessment)

TREND 3
SUBJECT: Use of Terrabase and Secondary Imagery Dissemination System (SIDS) Programs

OBSERVATION (Light/Abn): Task force S2s make good use of the Terrabase and SIDS terrain analysis programs.

DISCUSSION:

1. Task force S2s use Terrabase and SIDS programs extensively for terrain analysis. Task forces use them to identify line of sight (LOS) for communications, select observation posts (OPs) for scouts, plan defensive positions, and identify locations of enemy weapon systems and obstacles.
2. Terrabase and SIDS products are provided to the BN staff, companies, and platoons to assist them in their planning.
3. Usually only the S2 and assistant S2 are trained to use Terrabase or SIDS. This often results in a backlog of products, or one of these critical planners is preoccupied preparing Terrabase products.

SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES: Continue to use Terrabase and SIDS for terrain analysis. Train more personnel in the S2 section to use the programs for greater flexibility.

(TA.5.3.2 Evaluate Physical Environment Information)

TREND 4
SUBJECT: Task Force S2 Development of Situation Templates (SITEMPs)

OBSERVATION (Light/Abn): Task force S2s produce detailed and accurate situation templates (SITEMPs).

DISCUSSION:

1. Battle staffs receive a clear picture of enemy capabilities and courses of action during the initial stages of planning.

2. Company commanders receive a clear picture as to how the enemy is arrayed and where contact can be expected. This enables companies and platoons to refine intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) products to the appropriate levels.

SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES:

1. Continue to develop an initial SITEMP IAW **FM 34-130, *Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield,*** and refine it as updated information becomes available.
2. **CALL Newsletter No. 96-12**, ***Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield***, Figure 2-2, page II-7, describes a system for quickly producing SITEMPs.
3. Distribute copies of the completed SITEMP to the task force to ensure common understanding.

(TA.5.4 Prepare and Disseminate Intelligence Reports)

Needs Emphasis

TREND 1
SUBJECT: Commander's Critical Information Requirements (CCIR) Development

OBSERVATION (Brigade Staff): Brigades routinely produce a laundry list of CCIR on several operations orders (OPORDs).

DISCUSSION:

1. **FM 101-5, *Staff Organization and Operations,*** page 5-7, states that CCIR should be limited to ten or less to enhance comprehension.
2. Subordinate units frequently do not complete brigade taskings, such as battlefield restoration, occupation of screen lines, graphics turn-in, obstacle details, or the movement of Class IV/V forward in the defense.
3. Staffs fail to track some CCIR during preparation. If a critical event is not accomplished, then the commander must be informed so that he can reallocate resources or make other necessary adjustments to the brigade plan.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. CCIR should directly affect the success or failure of the mission, and they are time sensitive since they drive decisions at decision points. The staff should recommend these as part of their mission analysis, but it is the commander who "decides what information is critical based on his experience, the mission, and the higher commander's intent" (FM 101-5, page 5-8).
2. CCIR must be continually evaluated and refined as the brigade transitions from planning to preparation to execution. A technique to refine these is for the staff to publish intelligence summaries (INTSUMs) and operations summaries (OPSUMs).
3. Re-evaluate CCIR development and the roles of the staff and commander in refining it during continuous operations. Consider adjusting the agenda for the daily battle update brief (BUB) to include recommending changes to the CCIR based on the results of the reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) fight and preparation activities.

(TA.5.1 Develop Tactical Intelligence Requirements)

TREND 2
SUBJECT: Reconnaissance and Surveillance (R&S) Rehearsals

OBSERVATION (Brigade Staff): Units inconsistently conduct R&S rehearsals.

DISCUSSION: Rehearsals have a positive impact on the execution and tracking of observers, especially with a compressed planning timeline. R&S rehearsals, however, are not published in the unit planning timeline and often receive no command emphasis.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Conduct R&S rehearsals as part of the official planning timeline.

(TA.5.1 Develop Tactical Intelligence Requirements)

TREND 3
SUBJECT: Reconnaissance and Surveillance (R&S) Rehearsal Format

OBSERVATION (Brigade Staff): Units do not have a format/agenda to guide the R&S rehearsal.

DISCUSSION:

1. Even when units conduct R&S rehearsals, the format/agenda is often nonexistent or disjointed at best and, therefore, results in a backbrief by major players versus a true rehearsal.
2. All of the key players do not always attend. Often only an S3 representative, chief of recon (COR [as applicable]), brigade S2, BRT (as applicable), military intelligence (MI) company commander, and the combat observation lasing team (COLT) platoon leader consistently attend. Participation by task force (TF) S2s is often sporadic.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Below is a recommended format for the R&S rehearsal:

INTRODUCTION (Orient terrain board to map, graphics, etc.)

PHASE I (PRIOR TO LD)

COR/S3 - SCHEME OF MANEUVER/DPs

S2 - ENEMY ACTIONS/PIR

EACH TF/BOS R&S ELEMENT/BOS REPRESENTATIVE
- INFILTRATION
- NAIs/SORs/RELATED PIR
- METHOD OF REPORTING (PRIMARY/ALTERNATE)
- TARGET HAND-OFF PROCEDURES
- FIRE SUPPORT/CASEVAC/RESUPPLY

PHASE II (LD TO BREACH)

REPEAT ABOVE SEQUENCE

2. All key players should attend the rehearsal; i.e., fire support officer (FSO), signal officer (SIGO), S4, chemical officer (CHEMO), aviation (AVN) liaison officer (LNO), air defense officer (ADO), brigade reconnaissance troop (BRT) commander, TF S2s or representatives, military police (MP), military intelligence (MI) commander.

(TA.5.1 Develop Tactical Intelligence Requirements)

TREND 4
SUBJECT: Integration and Synchronization of Reconnaissance and Surveillance (R&S) Plans

OBSERVATION (Armor): R&S is not an integrated staff effort.

DISCUSSION:

1. Assets are often either overtasked or undertasked.
2. The plan is unsynchronized.
3. Poor links are established between named areas of interest (NAIs) and targeted areas of interest/decision points (TAIs/DPs).
4. R&S plans are too often issued late and are incomplete.
5. Priority intelligence requirements (PIR) are not well defined.
6. The S2 is often left to conduct R&S planning in a vacuum (without input from the rest of the staff).
7. Although PIR are often based on the commander's guidance, the R&S plan does not necessarily tie together NAIs and specific information requirements (SIR)/specific orders and requests (SOR) that would answer PIR throughout the depth of the battlefield.
8. R&S planning does not incorporate and synchronize all collection assets available to the unit.
9. R&S guidance is not usually issued to anyone in the unit. The plan is often not disseminated until the OPROD is published.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Assign responsibility to complete the plan.
2. Issue guidance early.
3. R&S plans must be an integrated battle staff effort (driven by the S2 or chief of reconnaissance).
4. Plan with the proper tools (NAI/TAI, PIR/SIR, DP link).
5. Rehearse/coordinate with higher and adjacent units.
6. Update the plan and issue fragmentary orders (FRAGOs).
7. The S2 must develop and use the event template to assist in synchronizing the abilities of all collection assets, as well as establishing triggers for both direct and indirect fires.
8. Conduct R&S rehearsals. Integrate and coordinate.
9. Conduct R&S planning IAW **FM 34-2**, ***Collection Management and Synchronization Planning,*** and **FM 34-2-1**, ***Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Reconnaissance and Surveillance and Intelligence Support to Counterreconnaissance***. Although there is no standard format for the R&S plan, Appendix A in both of the above mentioned references, as well as Appendix C, **FM 34-8-2**, ***Intelligence Officer's Handbook***, provides an excellent common framework for what should be included in an R&S plan.

(TA.5.1 Develop Tactical Intelligence Requirements)

TREND 5
SUBJECT: Reconnaissance and Surveillance (R&S) Plan

OBSERVATION (Mech): The R&S plan is not an integrated staff effort.

DISCUSSION: Although the S2 attempts to develop a synchronized R&S plan, it often lacks staff coordination at the fundamental level. Without the staff's support, the task force fails to allocate and plan for the use of available assets. This causes the following effects:

- An unfocussed plan that either overtasks or underutilizes battalion assets.
- Unfocused reconnaissance objectives that do not support the unit's scheme of maneuver.
- Unsynchronized and uncoordinated R&S plans that do not support decision points or incorporate fires.
- Collection assets not receiving timely and focused R&S guidance early on in the mission, allowing the enemy to seize the initiative.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. All staff or BOS elements must participate in the R&S mission analysis and course of action development IAW **FM 34-2**, ***Collection Management and Synchronization Planning,*** and **FM 34-2-1**, ***Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Reconnaissance and Surveillance and Intelligence Support to Counterreconnaissance***.
2. Other considerations are:
   - The commander must give clear and concise guidance on what he needs to know in the form of priority intelligence requirements (PIR) or intelligence requirements (IR) and a commander's intent for what he wants the R&S plan to accomplish.
   - Elimination of the belief that R&S planning and execution is solely "S2 business."
   - The S2 must understand the capabilities and limitations of all assets in the task force. The scout platoon and ground surveillance radars are not the only collection assets available. Company/teams, CSS, fire support, ADA, chemical assets, and higher headquarters elements can often provide the task force with intelligence.
   - Treat R&S as an operation of its own and not as an annex to the task force OPORD.
   - Designate who is in charge of planning and executing R&S (IAW **FM 101-5**, ***Staff Organization and Operations***).
   - Receive and issue R&S guidance early; don't wait on higher! Refine/update the plan during the MDMP and execution phases.
   - The R&S plan must address depth throughout the battle space. Focus initially on the enemy's reconnaissance/counterreconnaissance elements, then his security zone, main battle area, and rear area of operation.
   - The S3 or XO must integrate the battle staff into R&S planning.
   - The S2 must develop and use the event template to assist in synchronizing the abilities of all collection assets and establish triggers for both direct and indirect fires.
   - The TF must rehearse the R&S plan.

(TA.5.1 Develop Tactical Intelligence Requirements)

TREND 6
SUBJECT: Observation Post (OP) Task and Purpose

OBSERVATION (Mech): Platoon leaders do not assign a task and purpose to each OP.

DISCUSSION: Scouts are sent to OPs without specific instructions as to what they are looking for or why they are doing it. They are simply looking for something in a named area of interest (NAI).

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Scout platoon leaders must not leave the TOC until they have the "five w's" (who, what, when, where, why) for each assigned NAI. They can then translate this into task and purpose for each of their sections.

(TA.5.1 Develop Tactical Intelligence Requirements)

TREND 7
SUBJECT: Task Force Reconnaissance and Surveillance (R&S) Planning

OBSERVATION (Light/Abn): Task force reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) plans lack detail, are not synchronized with maneuver, and do not support intelligence collection IAW FM 34-2-1, *Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Reconnaissance and Surveillance and Intelligence Support to Counterreconnaissance*.

DISCUSSION:

1. Task forces develop R&S plans without situation templates (SITEMPs) or event templates. The result is poor positioning of assets that does not support answering the commanders' priority intelligence requirements (PIR) or confirmation of enemy courses of action (COAs).

2. R&S plans lack observation throughout the depth of the task force battle space and do not include contingency plans to re-position assets.

3. The R&S plan generally does not include observation throughout the depth of the task force battle space. Many task forces incorporate their NAIs into their operations graphics and refer to this as the R&S overlay.

4. Assistant S2s are often made chief of reconnaissance with no planning cell to assist them with developing the R&S plan. They receive little or no guidance from the S2, S3, and/or commander, which is required by **FM 34-2-1, *Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Reconnaissance and Surveillance and Intelligence Support to Counterreconnaissance,*** page 1-5, and **FM 43-8-1**, ***Commanders Intelligence Handbook***.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. IAW **FM 34-2-1**, the task force commander, XO, and S3 should drive R&S plan development with the S2. The task force should establish an R&S planning cell. **CALL Newsletter No. 96-12, *Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield***, page IV-6, gives an example of how such a cell can be organized.

2. Appointing the assistant S2 as the chief of reconnaissance can work, but he cannot do R&S planning alone or in a vacuum without proper guidance and tools. The chief of reconnaissance must have initial guidance from the commander, XO, S3, and S2.

3. The R&S planning cell should have a SITEMP and event template with PIR to focus the R&S plan (FM 34-2-1, page 2-20; **FM 34-3, *Intelligence Analysis***, pages 1-4 and 4-29). PIR should be validated during the wargaming process and must not exceed the unit's capability to manage (FM 34-2-1, page 2-5).

4. The decision support template (DST) can help synchronize the R&S plan with maneuver. R&S operations should be conducted IAW FM 34-2-1, to include producing the R&S overlay and matrix.

5. The S2 and chief of reconnaissance must analyze and evaluate reports from the field. Effective battle damage assessment (BDA) assists the S2 in predictive analysis. The S2 section should also pass a copy of the task force R&S plan with overlays to the brigade staff so the brigade can produce a consolidated collection plan, coordinating and maximizing the efforts within the brigade combat team (BCT).

(TA.5.1 Develop Tactical Intelligence Requirements)

TREND 8
SUBJECT: NBC Reconnaissance

OBSERVATION (Brigade Staff): Brigades do not adequately conduct NBC reconnaissance.

DISCUSSION: Fox reconnaissance is a division asset attached to a brigade combat team (BCT) to support the brigade fight. The brigade staff, however, does not fully integrate it into the brigade plan. This asset is usually assigned no clear task and purpose and is left out of the brigade reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) plan. This results in Fox reconnaissance being undertasked, and the brigade has one less set of eyes with which to collect enemy information.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Integrate NBC recon by tasking it in the brigade R&S plan. This will facilitate effective use of the Foxes and provide the BCT with an additional reconnaissance capability.

(TA.5.2 Collect Information)

TREND 9
SUBJECT: Reconnaissance and Surveillance (R&S) Operations

OBSERVATION (Light/Abn): R&S operations are often not rehearsed, and the observer does not understand the implications of the presence or absence of the enemy in assigned NAIs.

DISCUSSION: Information gathered by the R&S effort is not tracked or adjusted when necessary. As a result, the task force is not abreast of the enemy situation, friendly forces are not properly postured, and the task force is surprised by enemy contact.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Appoint a chief of recon at task force level. Give the chief of recon a small planning staff and the authority to task and receive reports from all elements of the task force for R&S missions.
2. Once the R&S plan is developed, it needs to be rehearsed to the same detail as any other battle. The scout platoon leader, S3, fire support officer (FSO), and S2 need to work closer together to establish named areas of interest (NAIs) and targeted areas of interest (TAIs) that support the commander's intent.
3. **FM 7-20**, ***The Infantry Battalion***, discusses the development of a decision support template (DST), assigning specific unit responsibility for observing and reporting activity in NAIs and TAIs and the identification of decision points.
4. FM 7-20 also identifies the requirement for an R&S matrix to further assign responsibility for observation.
5. It is imperative that these products are made to standard during the wargame and rehearsed before execution.

(TA.5.2 Collect Information)

TREND 10
SUBJECT: Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB)

OBSERVATION (Brigade Staff): Brigade signal officers do not conduct and apply IPB during the planning process.

DISCUSSION: There is no attempt to identify facts and assumptions about the battlefield environment and threat that would allow effective signal planning. Omission or insufficient review of the following areas results in signal support plans that do not fully support the commander's operational plan.

- In-depth terrain analysis
- Weather
- Threat evaluation
  - Ability to locate or intercept systems
  - Electronic attack
  - Range capabilities of supporting indirect fires
  - Threat models
- Threat COAs and SITEMP

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Conduct OPD and NCODP sessions, coupled with a mandatory reading list, which will educate signal planners in the conduct of IPB. Demonstrate how the IPB process contributes to complete staff synchronization and the successful completion of several other staff processes.

(TA.5.2.1 Collect Information on Situation)

TREND 11
SUBJECT: Nuclear, Biological, Chemical (NBC) Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB)

OBSERVATION (Armor): NBC is not adequately incorporated into the IPB.

DISCUSSION:

1. Although units tend to have a good understanding of the enemy's intent for special munitions, their terrain analysis for determining how the enemy will employ these munitions is poor.
2. Chemical strike templates lack detail and are not a part of the task force reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) plan.
3. The effort to assign coverage of chemical named areas of interest (NAIs) is poor.
4. Utilization of NBC reconnaissance is poor.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Consult with the engineer staff officer for conducting a thorough terrain analysis.
2. Develop a format for chemical NAIs and a system for observing chemical NAIs.

(TA.5.2.1 Collect Information on Situation)

TREND 12
SUBJECT: Integration of Air Portion into the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB)

OBSERVATION (Armor): Air IPB is not integrated into the S2's situational template (SITEMP) or briefed as part of the OPORD mission analysis.

DISCUSSION: There is often only one type of enemy aircraft and air avenues of approach (AAAs) addressed.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. The S2 is IPB coordinator and should solicit input from the air defense officer (ADO).
2. The IPB should show the synergy of ground and air to accomplish the mission. Include AAAs, air order of battle (AOB), type, and capability.
3. Include air IPB in the SITEMP/MDMP/OPORD brief to allow the company/team the ability to provide combined arms for air defense (CAFAD).

(TA.5.2.1 Collection Information on Situation)

TREND 13
SUBJECT: Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB)

OBSERVATION (Mech): Units do not conduct a thorough IPB as described in FM 34-130, *Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield.*

DISCUSSION: None.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Review the four steps of the IPB process as described in FM 34-130 above.
2. Once a deployment is scheduled and maps are available, a modified combined obstacle overlay (MCOO) can be completed as part of a pre-deployment checklist. The MCOO should be posted on every leader's map to save time in the planning process.
3. Continue the IPB process by using intelligence gathered by collection assets to confirm or deny the template.
4. Leaders must continually send updates to all subordinates. Conduct battle update briefs at scheduled times prior to LD or NLT defend times. Updates should cover only changes to the previous brief.

(TA.5.2.1 Collect Information on Situation)

TREND 14
SUBJECT: Company-Level Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB)

OBSERVATION (Mech): Detailed refinement of the battalion-level IPB is rarely observed at company level and below.

DISCUSSION: Company leaders rarely refine and discuss enemy composition, disposition, and strengths/weaknesses, and the effects the enemy will have on the company during the execution of the mission. For example, during deliberate attack missions, the IPB refinement usually does not address individual enemy vehicle fighting positions and each enemy weapons' maximum engagement line (MEL), even though this information is vital to the success of the company and platoons during the attack. A probable line of contact depicting each enemy element is rarely refined and used to establish proper movement techniques and formations.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. The IPB process must be completed in order for the commander and platoon leaders to create and implement proper movement techniques and formations and direct fire plans (offensive and defensive).
2. Refer to Chapter 2, **FM 71-1**, ***Tank and Mechanized Infantry Company Team***.

(TA.5.2.1 Collect Information on Situation)

TREND 15
SUBJECT: Aerial Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB)

OBSERVATION (Light/Abn): Air defense officers (ADO) rarely conduct a thorough aerial IPB of the task force area of operations (AO).

DISCUSSION:

1. ADOs do not update information received from the ADA battery headquarters at brigade.
2. ADOs seldom receive help from the battalion S2 to provide input for the situation template (SITEMP).

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Recommend the ADO work more closely with the task force S2 at home station to develop a detailed aerial IPB, which is then integrated into the ground IPB.
2. The aerial IPB should be added to the SITEMP, providing the ADO a tool to identify named areas of interest (NAIs) for air defense radar to observe air avenues of approach (AAAs).
3. The ADO further develops his plan by identifying targeted areas of interest (TAIs) in the offense and aerial engagement areas in the defense to focus the Avengers and Stinger teams.
4. Recommend that units conduct OPFOR tactics and general knowledge training prior to deployment.
5. References:
   a. **FM 34-120,** ***Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield***.
   b. **FM 44-44,** ***Avenger Platoon, Section and Team Operations***.

(TA.5.2.1 Collect Information on Situation)

TREND 16
SUBJECT: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB)

OBSERVATION (Light/Abn): Units too often do not develop a clear NBC IPB.

DISCUSSION:

1. Battalion chemical officers frequently do not develop their IPB in conjunction with the battalion S2's IPB and the brigade chemical officer's NBC annex to the OPORD.
2. Chemical officer MOPP analysis and NBC vulnerability analysis are inadequate, and chemical officers cannot develop a clear picture of the enemy threat to the battalion commander during mission analysis.
3. As a result of inadequate NBC IPB, unit chemical officers do not understand the use of chemical agents on the battlefield.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Develop an NBC IPB format at home station. Use **FM 3-100,** ***Chemical Operations Principles and Fundamentals***, and the Chemical Leader's Handbook as guides.
2. The battalion chemical officer and battalion S2 must cooperate on developing an NBC IPB for the commander.
3. Use leader training program (LTP) training to understand how the OPFOR uses chemical agents on the NTC battlefield.

(TA.5.2.1 Collect Information on Situation)

TREND 17
SUBJECT: Obstacle Intelligence (OBSTINTEL)

OBSERVATION (Engineer): Throughout most campaigns, the staff engineer does not work with the brigade (BDE)/task force (TF) staff to incorporate obstacle reconnaissance requirements into the overall R&S plan.

DISCUSSION: OBSTINTEL is included in the reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) plan without the required detail, or is tasked to a collection asset which is not capable of providing the intelligence due to equipment or positioning. (Example: Tasking a combat observation lasing team [COLT] to collect OBSTINTEL. COLTs are not likely to have the expertise to provide the critical OBSTINTEL-type of anti-personnel (AP) mines present, soil suitability for plowing, or reduction requirements for antitank ditches. The COLTs are also typically not positioned for detailed close observation of obstacles.)

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Engineers provide increased input to the BDE/TF R&S plan. The staff engineer and S2 develop specific named areas of interest (NAIs) and priority intelligence requirements (PIR) that assist the commander in making key decisions, such as commitment to a zone of penetration, designation of a proposed point of breach, or task organization of reduction assets.

2. The staff engineer synchronizes the reconnaissance effort with the BDE/TF R&S plan and establishes the system for reporting key engineer intelligence directly to the engineer battle captain and/or the engineer S2 in the TOC.

3. If BDE/TF assets are not available or capable of collecting the required intelligence, then engineers should be tasked to augment the reconnaissance effort. Regardless of task organization (engineer reconnaissance assets in DS or operational control), the appropriate engineer commander issues clear and complete orders (or guidance as appropriate) to the engineer reconnaissance teams (ERTs) and ensures the team deploys with graphics, maps, reporting matrixes, and a redundant communication plan.

4. Engineer commanders establish a system for tracking the location and activity of the teams and receiving, analyzing, and disseminating this critical information.

5. Engineers need to become more familiar with the capabilities and limitations of alternate intelligence collection assets and plan to exploit them to develop a timely and accurate picture of the obstacles. Examples of intelligence sources often overlooked are aerial observation by helicopters with the screening force, satellite images, land satellite (LANDSAT) overlays of soil composition, Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) images from the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS), and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) coverage.

(TA.5.2.1.2 Collect Physical Environment Information)

TREND 18
SUBJECT: Underutilization of 96B Personnel in the S2 Section

OBSERVATION (Brigade Staff): 96Bs are generally not employed to conduct basic level intelligence tasks.

DISCUSSION: Habitually, 96Bs in S2 sections are underutilized in helping the S2 to prepare IPB products and providing analysis of the enemy's current situation.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Devote home station training time to cover OPFOR tactics, order of battle, and basic analytical skills, and to developing situation templates (SITEMPs) that pertain to the brigade intelligence team.

2. Use past OPFOR defensive graphics and offense executive summaries to teach 96Bs to develop SITEMPs. The S2/AS2/S2 NCOIC can provide initial guidance, such as boundaries and some motorized rifle company (MRC) center of mass positions to initiate the template. Once the analysts complete the template, the S2 uses actual OPFOR graphics and executive summaries from past rotations as the answer sheet to check the analysts' work.

(TA.5.3 Process Information)

TREND 19
SUBJECT: Intelligence Processing

OBSERVATION (Mech): Commanders and task forces often lack situational awareness because the S2 fails to conduct predictive analysis.

DISCUSSION:

1. This is a result of not processing intelligence reports and not knowing the threat. Soldiers often receive reports, but fail to understand their significance. Usually, it is hours after the initial report of information before follow-up occurs.

2. Other losses of information occur during TOC/section shift change briefs. Frequently, S2's leave products where the rest of the section cannot find them. The result is a section that cannot perform its basic function – predicative analysis.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Develop a section SOP and load plan that covers the storage of products from current and past missions and enforce it.

2. Use a log or journal to track reports. Maintain vigilance on the amount of time a report sits before a follow-up occurs.

3. Train subordinates on the significance of reports by using the commander's priority intelligence requirements (PIR) and commander's critical information requirements (CCIR).

(TA.5.3 Process Information)

TREND 20
SUBJECT: Threat Analysis

OBSERVATION (Light/Abn): Company schemes of maneuver are normally developed without a solid understanding of how the enemy fights.

DISCUSSION:

1. Units arrive with limited knowledge of basic capabilities and limitations of the opposing force.

2. At company level, there is usually little or no refinement of the situation template (SITEMP)/event template developed by the task force S2.

3. Company/teams do not clearly understand Krasnovian doctrine and the use of combat multipliers.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. The commander needs to conduct a detailed threat evaluation. At a minimum, he should describe the enemy strength in detail, how he will use the terrain, and how each of his weapon systems will be employed.

2. Refine the S2 SITEMP to identify individual vehicle/infantry positions.

3. Identify enemy assets that pose the greatest threat to the company. Develop the scheme of maneuver based on the most likely enemy course of action (ECOA).

4. When threat products are produced, they need to be briefed in detail at both the OPORD and rehearsal.

5. Units must include enemy analysis in officer professional development (OPD) classes at home station. Conduct tactical exercises without troops (TEWTs) which focus on how the enemy will fight against them, and explain in detail what the contact will look like.

(TA.5.3.1 Evaluate Threat Information)

TREND 21
SUBJECT: Scout Platoon Knowledge of Enemy Doctrine and Capabilities

OBSERVATION (Light/Abn): Platoons are continually sent forward without a situation template (SITEMP) and little or no information about enemy vehicles, weapon systems, or order of battle/timelines.

DISCUSSION: Platoons do not understand the enemy's capabilities and limitations nor the task and purpose of enemy elements.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Platoons need to be fully incorporated with reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) planning.
2. The scout platoon leader needs to ensure he is briefed by the S3 on the disposition of friendly forces and the scheme of maneuver for the task force as stated in **FM 17-98**, ***Scout Platoon***.
3. The platoon leader should be briefed by the S2 to ensure he understands the following enemy factors:
   - Where is he?
   - What is he doing?
   - How strong is he?
   - What kind of equipment does he have?
   - What are his capabilities?
   - Where is he vulnerable?
   - Where are his kill zones and fire sacks?
   - What are his intentions?
   - What can he do in response to friendly actions?
4. The platoon leader must disseminate information gathered from the S3 and S2 to all subordinates in the platoon's operations order (OPORD). **FM 17-98** recommends that the platoon leader use a walk-through rehearsal during his briefing of paragraph three of the (OPORD).

(TA.5.3.1 Evaluate Threat Information)

TREND 22
SUBJECT: Enemy Courses of Action (ECOA)

OBSERVATION (Light/Abn): Scouts often plan their infiltration and observation against a single ECOA.

DISCUSSION: Scout platoons are often destroyed while attempting to force their infiltration or occupation of observation posts (OPs).

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Task force scouts should be familiar with and post the enemy situation template (SITEMP).
2. Ensure the reconnaissance and surveillance plan is flexible and synchronized to cope with unplanned enemy disposition.

(TA.5.3.1 Evaluate Threat Information)

TREND 23
SUBJECT: Use of Situation Templates

OBSERVATION (Light/Abn): Task force observers do not use SITEMPs to confirm or deny enemy courses of action (ECOAs).

DISCUSSION: Scout platoons are deployed without a clear understanding of the enemy SITEMP. Information collected by task force observers is not compared with the SITEMP to confirm or deny particular ECOAs. Observers are not redirected as needed to observe planned alternate named areas of interest (NAIs) to support the maneuver plan.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: S2 sections should post and use their SITEMP and brief observers so that they have a clear understanding of each anticipated ECOA. Observers could then, when being redirected to an alternate NAI, be proactive in their actions to ensure all information needed is gathered (**FM 17-98**, ***Scout Platoon***).

(TA.5.3.1 Evaluate Threat Information)

TREND 24
SUBJECT: Engineer Battlefield Assessment (EBA)

OBSERVATION (Engineer): EBA does not consider terrain and enemy capabilities.

DISCUSSION: Assistant brigade engineers (ABEs) often use some means of an automated EBA spreadsheet to develop baseline data for the mission analysis briefing. The EBA generated from this spreadsheet covers only friendly capabilities. Terrain and enemy capabilities are not analyzed in depth, resulting in little information being gained from the end product for use during the mission analysis brief and the remainder of the planning process.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. The ABE should focus his mission analysis efforts on how terrain and friendly/enemy engineers will shape the battlefield. While the automated EBA spreadsheet is a good start, the ABE must then take those hard numbers and work closely with the S2 to better focus the staff planning process through development of the refined situation template (SITEMP). The ABE contributes to the SITEMP by addressing in detail the effects of terrain on friendly and enemy maneuver, obstacle effort, and reconnaissance.
2. The ABE ensures that enemy obstacle emplacement systems, such as the mobile obstacle detachment (MOD), UMZ, and BM-21 rocket-delivered scatterable mines (SCATMINEs), as well as conventional obstacles, are templated throughout the width and depth of the battlefield based on each enemy course of action (COA) and detailed analysis of the terrain.
3. The ABE should address friendly capabilities in terms of overall mobility or countermobility capability (numbers of lanes or meters of obstacle effort instead of numbers of mine clearing line charges [MICLICs] or line platoons) and link this capability to resources required (e.g., Class IV/V packages).

(TA.5.3.2 Evaluate Physical Environment Information)

TREND 25
SUBJECT: Terrain Analysis (Signal)

OBSERVATION (Brigade Staff): Terrain analysis proves to be challenging.

DISCUSSION:

1. Convoy operations planning does not always factor in terrain analysis. This results in inaccurate time/distance calculations, network installation delays, and degraded customer support.
2. Remote Access Units (RAU) deployments are not always based upon accurate terrain analysis. Team chiefs sometimes do not have enough situational awareness to analyze the terrain and select a tactically positioned site that provides the required mobile subscriber radio telephone terminal (MSRT) coverage.
3. Node center and remote team sites are sometimes planned without conducting accurate reconnaissance of the terrain. The result is delayed network installation and degraded force protection.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Battalion network planners down to team chiefs need to continue terrain analysis training.
2. Utilize all assets to analyze terrain during the planning process.
3. Train platoon and team leadership to conduct accurate terrain analysis and site selection during site reconnaissance operations.
4. Planners should focus on providing enough information for platoons and teams to make accurate terrain analysis.
5. Planners should rely on personnel "on the ground" conducting site reconnaissance to further refine signal site locations.
6. Ensure time/distance calculations take into consideration terrain analysis when deploying assets.

(TA.5.3.2 Evaluate Physical Environment Information)

TREND 26
SUBJECT: Terrain Analysis and Analytical Products

OBSERVATION (Armor): Terrain analysis products lack needed detail.

DISCUSSION:

1. Terrain analysis is often a "check the block" function.
2. Analysis of terrain effects on courses of action (COAs) is poor.
3. Tools are not used (Terrabase, Microdem, Mr. SIDS).
4. Obstacles are not templated, or are templated only for a single enemy COA.
5. Plans are formulated on faulty SITEMPs.
6. The S2 and engineer are often not on the "same sheet of music."

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Conduct tactical exercise without troops (TEWT)/right seat rides for the S2/engineer.
2. Conduct detailed analysis combined with home station preparation of products.
3. Disseminate products to company/team and platoons.
4. Template multiple enemy COA including use of obstacles.
5. Take advantage of available tools.

(TA.5.3.2 Evaluate Physical Environment Information)

TREND 27
SUBJECT: Terrain Analysis

OBSERVATION (Mech): Engineer company executive officers (XOs), as task force planners, are not conducting engineer battlefield analysis (EBA) to standard.

DISCUSSION:

1. Engineers have little detailed discussion of the terrain and how it will affect both friendly and enemy maneuver plans.
2. The S2 often gives a general description of terrain that defines the area of operations, but the S2/engineer team seldom briefs terrain effects in enough depth to assist the commander and staff in understanding the environment to any useful degree.
3. While most engineer units are deploying with Terrabase or Terrabase II capabilities, their training level is rudimentary.
4. The end result is that the commander is ill-prepared for the challenges that the terrain poses for his unit.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. XOs should conduct EBA as described in Appendix A of **FM 5-71-2,** ***Armored Task Force Engineer Combat Operations***.

2. The engineer should brief the effects of terrain using a modified combined obstacle overlay (MCOO) and the observation, concealment, obstacles, key terrain, avenues of approach (OCOKA) format during mission analysis and OPORD briefs to the company commanders.

3. Units must become proficient in the use of terrain analysis tools prior to deployment. They must develop standard products that will be produced for each type of mission. These products must be produced as early in the mission analysis process as possible.

a. If possible, line of sight (LOS) projections should be produced at 1:50,000 scale on acetate and distributed to other staff sections and subordinate units for their use in parallel planning.

b. As additional information becomes available on courses of action (COAs) to be considered, the products must be refined.

c. Include refined terrain products with the engineer annex to further assist subordinate commanders in their continuing planning process.

(TA.5.3.2 Evaluate Physical Environment Information)

TREND 28
SUBJECT: Development of Multiple Enemy Courses of Action (ECOAs)

OBSERVATION (Brigade Staff): S2 sections frequently do not adequately develop multiple enemy SITEMPs to support the planning process.

DISCUSSION:

1. S2 sections concentrate their efforts on developing one enemy COA in detail as opposed to considering multiple COAs. As a result, BCTs often produce plans that demonstrate little flexibility and lack R&S focus.

2. The battle staff often becomes transfixed and stalled on minor issues in a given enemy COA, whereas a couple of SITEMPs with associated critical events would have provided the staff with a clearer framework in which to wargame and possibly prevent them from wasting precious time.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. S2s support the planning process by developing multiple SITEMPs at the appropriate echelon. If time does not permit, then the S2 should develop additional ECOAs in the form of cartoons or sketches.

2. The S2 should develop the associated OPFOR *critical event template* for each COA to facilitate the wargame process.

(TA.5.3.4.1 Develop Enemy Intentions)

TREND 29
SUBJECT: Lack of Event Templating

OBSERVATION (Brigade Staff): During the course of the campaign, the S2 planner did not develop enemy event templates to support the planning process.

DISCUSSION:

1. Not developing event templates has the following negative effects:
   - Does not allow for flexibility in the BLUFOR plan.
   - Does not facilitate the R&S focus.

- Does not allow the staff to adequately see the enemy during wargaming.
- Does not help the staff conduct predictive analysis during mission execution.

2. It is crucial to prepare for the wargame to set successful conditions for the R&S refinement and targeting processes.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Prior to wargaming, the S2 must produce/analyze the following items:

- Multiple and distinct enemy courses of action (ECOAs)
- Event template with OPFOR critical events (includes, at a minimum, named areas of interest [NAIs], time phase lines and avenues of approach).
- A simple event analysis matrix is a useful tool in helping to identify those unique indicators particular to each ECOA. **FM 34-130, *Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield,*** page 3-54, Figure 3-2-11, provides a good textbook example of an event matrix. Below is an example of a matrix that might be used to support an event template at NTC:

NAI	Estimated Time	ECOA #1 Indicators (N. Wall Penetration)	ECOA #2 Indicators (S. Wall Penetration)	ECOA #3 Indicators (VOD Penetration)
1,2,3	H-12	Air Inserted Inf (Hill 824)	Air Inserted Inf (Hid. Valley)	Air Inserted Inf (Hill 760)
4,5,6	H-12	Truck Inserted Inf (Iron Triangle.)	Truck Inserted Inf (Hill 876)	Truck Inserted Inf (Bike Lake Pass)
10,11	H + :30	P-Chem (Hill 760)	P-Chem (Racetrack)	P-Chem (781-824 Gap)
7,8,9	H-Hour	ED (P-Nut / Chod)	ED (Iron Triang.)	ED (P-Nut / Chod)
7,8,9	H-Hour	FD (Iron Triangle)	FD (P-Nut / Chod)	Bike Lake Pass / VOD
7,8,9	H + 45	MB (Iron Triang.)	MB (P-Nut / Chod)	Bike Lake Pass / VOD

(TA.5.4 Prepare and Disseminate Intelligence Reports)

TREND 30
SUBJECT: Situation Template (SITEMP) Development

OBSERVATION (Brigade Staff): SITEMPs are often not developed in sufficient detail to adequately support the military decision-making process (MDMP).

DISCUSSION:

1. All enemy combat multipliers are often not depicted.
2. During friendly defensive operations, templates merely depict movement of enemy forces vice clearly showing how the enemy would maneuver on the battlefield.
3. During offensive operations, the OPFOR defensive template does not reflect range fans of direct fire weapon systems and how those systems are tied into obstacles and terrain to shape the battlefield.
4. There is little analysis of how fire sacks are shaped by intervisibility (IV) lines.
5. Enemy reconnaissance and their infiltration routes are not depicted in adequate detail to focus counterreconnaissance efforts.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. S2s must create templates that incorporate all enemy battlefield operating systems (BOS) and how they will be used to support a specific course of action (COA).

2. They must reflect how the enemy employs his weapon systems based upon terrain to build engagement areas, regardless of whether they are offensive or defensive templates.

3. Use a checklist when building SITEMPs to avoid omitting key items.

4. Integrate all staff members in order to review their related areas, such as the air defense officer (ADO) checking air avenues of approach and aerial battle positions.

5. Template likely enemy reconnaissance infiltration routes and observation posts prior to deploying to the National Training Center to save valuable time during the military decision-making process.

(TA.5.4 Prepare and Disseminate Intelligence Reports)

TREND 31
SUBJECT: Situation Template (SITEMP) Preparation

OBSERVATION (Mech): S2s often lack assistance from the other BOS when preparing the SITEMP.

DISCUSSION: With only a few exceptions, most battle staff personnel do not assist the S2 with intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB). Consequently, S2s rush to finish their products by taking short cuts or ignoring other BOS representatives. This results in products that often lack critical information and detail.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: All staff officers should assist the S2 within their respective area of expertise in developing the SITEMP.

(TA.5.4 Prepare and Disseminate Intelligence Reports)

MANEUVER BOS

(Trends are numbered sequentially for cross-reference and are <u>not</u> in any priority order.)

<u>Positive Performance</u>

<u>TREND 1</u>
SUBJECT: Establishing Observation Posts (OPs)

OBSERVATION (Mech): Scout sections demonstrate proficiency at establishing OPs.

DISCUSSION: Soldiers know what the standard is and execute accordingly. This reflects good section rehearsals and repetitive training.

SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES: Continue to train on OP operations.

(TA.1.1.1 Position/Reposition Forces (Units and Equipment)

<u>TREND 2</u>
SUBJECT: Mounted and Dismounted Movement

OBSERVATION (Light/Abn): Platoons execute missions with good movement techniques.

DISCUSSION: None.

SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES:
1. Traveling techniques and formations must be used on all missions.
2. The platoon's use of terrain and the ability to land navigate must be maintained to ensure they arrive at their assigned positions in a timely manner. Uses of the terrain and movement techniques (traveling, traveling overwatch, and bounding overwatch) are essential elements that need to be rehearsed before every mission. **FM 17-98**, ***Scout Platoon***, states that, if possible, the team leader should tell and show his squads:
   - The enemy situation as he knows or suspects it to be.
   - The next overwatch position (objective for the bounding element).
   - The route of the bounding element to that position.
   - What he wants the team to do after the bounding element gets to the next position.

(TA.1.1.1.2 Move on or under Surface)

<u>TREND 3</u>
SUBJECT: Movement Techniques

OBSERVATION (Light/Abn): Mortar platoons employ correct tactical formations based on METT-T.

DISCUSSION: None.

SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES: Continue to rehearse movement techniques and emergency missions based on rapid movement of forces. Leaders should practice the techniques outlined in **ARTEP 7-90-DRILL**, ***Battle Drills for the Infantry Mortar Platoon, Section, and Squad***. Individual squad as well as platoon techniques of movement are discussed in detail in Chapter 3.

(TA.1.1.1.2 Move on or under Surface)

TREND 4
SUBJECT: Boresighting and Gunnery Skills

OBSERVATION (Light/Abn): Units are greatly improving in their lethality.

DISCUSSION: Tank companies and anti-armor platoons are routinely boresighting during the preparation phase. This results in companies and platoons that, when positioned correctly on the battlefield, are able to destroy the enemy with great effect.

SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES:

1. Sustain the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) that companies and platoons currently use to conduct multiple integrated laser engagement system (MILES) boresighting.
2. Use the MILES classes that are offered at the National Training Center during reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI). This will give the soldier a better understanding of how the MILES system works and allow him to better maintain the system and keep his vehicle in the fight.

(TA.1.2.1 Employ Direct Fire)

Needs Emphasis

TREND 1
SUBJECT: Striker/Combat Observation Lasing Team (COLT) Positioning for the Deep to Close Fight

OBSERVATION (Brigade Staff): While brigade planners adequately plan Striker/COLT positions to support the brigade deep fight (RAGs, BRAGs, and CARs), they rarely address the deep-to-close transition.

DISCUSSION:

1. Poorly planning this transition results in the BCT's loss of momentum in an attack, a struggle to position observers in movements to contact, and loss of redundancy in the defense.
2. Deep-to-close transitions are proving to be as critical, if not more than, the deep plan, as BCTs rarely get to second echelon forces in the posture they desire. This is especially the case in hasty and deliberate attacks where brigade staffs rarely use COLTs to initiate and observe suppression and obscuration fires for the breaching force.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Brigade planners must use COLT/Strikers to "pull" task forces through the "trouble spots" on the battlefield. In the attack, this occurs at the point of penetration. At least two COLTs must be dedicated to refine targets in the objective area, with a primary focus at the projected point of penetration.
2. COLTs should initiate the suppression and obscuration fires for the task force conducting the breach at a trigger determined by the breach force.

3. The transition from the COLT to the task force observer occurs when the task force observer is ready to take it. Usually this occurs after the breach and local security is established on the far side. Cross-talk on a common net (usually the brigade fire support net) is essential.

(TA.1.1.1 Position/Reposition Forces (Units and Equipment)

TREND 2
SUBJECT: Observation Post (OP) Site Selection

OBSERVATION (Mech): OP site selection is poor.

DISCUSSION:

1. Sites overlap, not for redundancy, but because of poor planning.
2. Many OPs are in poor locations to observe the assigned named area of interest (NAI).
3. The task force cannot support many of the OPs with casualty evacuation (CASEVAC), resupply, and communications.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: A tentative OP location given by the task force TOC is one technique. The scout platoon should use the experience of scout NCOs and the judgment of the scout platoon leader in OP site selection. If the OP site nominated by the task force is not appropriate, the scout platoon must adjust the nomination and select OP sites to accomplish the commander's intent. An excellent tool often overlooked is the engineer's Terrabase program. This program will give the scout platoon leader the best possible tentative OP locations. The bottom line is that section sergeants must be empowered to adjust OP locations to achieve the commander's intent.

(TA.1.1.1 Position/Reposition Forces (Units and Equipment)

TREND 3
SUBJECT: Engineer Company Offensive Maneuver

OBSERVATION (Engineer): Engineer companies struggle to control their maneuver from line of departure (LD) to the objective during offensive operations.

DISCUSSION:

1. Engineer company commanders typically do not address how the company will maneuver in paragraph three of the company OPORD and, when discussed, the maneuver plan is usually not derived from an analysis of operational risks as determined by the enemy SITEMP.
2. Engineer companies rarely rehearse.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Engineer company commanders must address company maneuver from the LD to the objective. Company leaders should take every opportunity to practice maneuvering the company independently *and* as part of the combined arms team. An example would be to practice maneuvering to the next TAA as if it were the next breach site, instead of simply conducting a tactical road march.

(TA.1.1.1 Position/Reposition Forces [Units and Equipment])

TREND 4
SUBJECT: Observation Post (OP) Site Selection

OBSERVATION (Light/Abn): Poor site selection degrades the scout platoon's execution of reconnaissance.

DISCUSSION:

1. Inadequate selection of initial observation positions results in task force scouts not being able to execute the assigned task and purpose.
2. Scouts do not refine initial observation positions to get a better view of the battlefield.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Use whatever tools are available (i.e., Terrabase) to reconnoiter all planned OPs before occupation.
2. Ensure that all named areas of interest (NAI) and targeted areas of interest (TAI) can be observed during periods of daylight and limited visibility.
3. If the task and purpose cannot be met from the planned position, move it to a position where it can contribute to the fight.
4. Refer to **FM 7-92**, ***The Infantry Reconnaissance Platoon and Squad (Airborne, Air Assault, Light Infantry)***, for a discussion of several night-vision devices and their capabilities.
5. Refer to **FM 17-98, *Scout Platoon***, for characteristics of an OP position for long-range observation.

(TA.1.1.1 Position/Reposition Forces (Units and Equipment)

TREND 5
SUBJECT: Movement Techniques and Formations

OBSERVATION (Mech): Units do not change formations and movement techniques as necessary.

DISCUSSION: The most popular method of movement is the section column with 15-25 meters separating vehicles using the traveling technique. Although this ensures there will be no break in contact, it also endangers the section in several ways, including minefields, kill sacks, and indirect fire. Intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) identifies when to transition formations and techniques to successfully enter the sector/zone, occupy positions, and accomplish the assigned task.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Conduct a thorough IPB to identify probable areas of enemy contact.
2. Create appropriate graphic control measures to trigger transition to new formations and techniques.

(TA.1.1.1.2.1 Move while Mounted)

TREND 6
SUBJECT: Fire and Maneuver

OBSERVATION (Armor): Platoons and companies do not understand the basic fundamentals of fire and maneuver.

DISCUSSION: Elements in contact do not fully develop the situation. Instead, they continue to move into heavier enemy contact.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Company commanders and platoon leaders must practice actions on contact (establishing a base of fire element while a maneuver element moves to a position of advantage).

2. Train IAW the building block approach – certify leaders, section/platoon situational training exercise (STX), company STX, gunnery table XII.

(TA.1.2 Engage Enemy)

TREND 7
SUBJECT: Actions on Contact

OBSERVATION (Armor): Units too often do not know what action to take upon contact with the enemy.

DISCUSSION:
1. Units tend to stop when first engaged.
2. Units are not trained to react to or find dismounted weapons.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. Expand home station training to include dismounted systems.
2. Train for enemy fire from adjacent unit sector.

(TA.1.2 Engage Enemy)

TREND 8
SUBJECT: Engagement Area Development

OBSERVATION (Mech): Task forces consistently have problems with engagement area development in the defense.

DISCUSSION: As a result of inadequate engagement area development, critical steps in the development of the task force defense are overlooked or omitted.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Task forces have an outstanding process for the "seven steps of the defense" listed in their task force tactical SOP (TACSOP). Follow this SOP to ensure that critical events and actions are accomplished even when time constraints significantly influence the preparation process for the defense.

(TA.1.2 Engage Enemy)

TREND 9
SUBJECT: Actions on Contact

OBSERVATION (Mech): Units are not able to rapidly transition from movement to maneuver upon contact with the enemy.

DISCUSSION: The leadership has difficulty visualizing the enemy forms of contact IAW terrain, and this prevents the company from executing a company/team react-to-contact drill or massing direct and indirect fires.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. During rehearsals, focus on the fundamentals described in **FM 71-1, *Tank and Mechanized Infantry Company Team***, Chapter 3, pages 3-17 to 3-27.
2. Be prepared to react to certain decision points as established during the planning process.
   a. Review the seven forms of contact to allow the company to transition from movement to fire and maneuver at the appropriate time and place on the battlefield.

b. Study how the enemy fights IAW terrain, and then focus company/platoon movement and maneuver during the planning phase to counter the actions.

3. Lessons learned need to be sustained and improved during home station training and react-to-contact drills.

(TA.1.2 Engage Enemy)

TREND 10
SUBJECT: Engagement Area Development

OBSERVATION (Mech): Company/teams experience difficulty building engagement areas, particularly in applying the seven steps of engagement area development.

DISCUSSION: None.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Integrate the tasks and considerations of engagement area development (**FM 71-1**, ***Tank and Mechanized Infantry Company Team***, Chapter 4) into the company TACSOP. A checklist of company and platoon tasks to be completed, under headings of each of the seven steps of engagement area development, may help the company and platoons accomplish all the required tasks.

(TA.1.2 Engage Enemy)

TREND 11
SUBJECT: Scout Platoon Actions on Contact

OBSERVATION (Mech): Scout platoons too often do not react when coming in contact with the enemy.

DISCUSSION:

1. When making contact with the enemy, sections seldom bound within section or try to maneuver to the flanks.
2. Sections do attempt to break contact, but use a traveling column formation.
3. Sections in contact rarely report the contact or follow through with a recommendation. This is the greatest cause of attrition within scout platoons.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Refer to **FM 17-98, *Scout Platoon***, Chapter 8, for information on the seven forms of contact and how to react to them. Incorporate this guidance into unit SOPs and train to proficiency.
2. Reaction is based on METT-T. Actions on contact, therefore, should be covered during the OPORD development and rehearsal.

(TA.1.2 Engage Enemy)

TREND 12
SUBJECT: Engagement Area Development

OBSERVATION (Engineer): Units struggle to develop engagement areas in line with the "seven steps of the defense."

DISCUSSION:

1. Units are challenged to take the commander's guidance and craft a scheme of obstacles that supports the commander's intent.

2. Units are rarely able to mass the effects of direct and indirect fires at obstacles.

3. As a result, the enemy frequently has to react to only one or two forms of contact while penetrating friendly defenses.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Obstacle effects occur because of fires and obstacles, not just obstacles alone. Design obstacle groups using formulas illustrated in **FM 90-7**, ***Combined Arms Obstacle Integration***. The task force engineer should use these formulas during mission analysis to determine basic requirements as part of the EBA and for use in allocating resources. Task forces should formalize use of the "seven steps of the defense" in the task force planning process as part of course of action (COA) development. The success of this process depends on a solid intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) and the command and staff estimate process. This process allows the task force to synchronize the flow of the battle and combine the effectiveness of the battlefield operating system (BOS) elements. The seven steps are:

- Visualize how the enemy will fight. If the enemy isn't going to go to a piece of terrain, then don't waste obstacle effort.
- Determine how and where you want to kill the enemy. Realize up front that if this point is not already someplace he wants to go, it will take substantial effort to make him go there.
- Array battlefield shapers (obstacle groups). Establish intent (location, target, and effect) for obstacle groups. If obstacle groups are not where the enemy wants to go, then how are you going to get him to go there? Don't shape the fight where the fight isn't going to occur. A SITEMP is critical.
- Array indirect fires. Obstacle groups require indirect fires to achieve desired effects. Key for engineer is integration.
- Array direct fires. Battle positions don't determine how obstacle groups are arrayed, but rather engagement areas and obstacle intent to shape the battlefield determine battle positions.
- Site and execute obstacles and prepare positions. This is where engineer platoon leaders on the ground make obstacle integration work and where bottom-up refinement occurs.
- Rehearse.

(TA.1.2 Engage Enemy)

TREND 13
SUBJECT: Engagement Area Development

OBSERVATION (Light/Abn): Engagement area development is incomplete during defensive operations.

DISCUSSION:

1. Battalion task forces have great difficulty in developing engagement areas and synchronizing direct and indirect fires with countermobility efforts. As a result, units are unable to mass combat power to defeat enemy forces that enter an engagement area.

2. Factors that contribute to this shortcoming include:

a. Unclear obstacle responsibility.

- Poor obstacle siting by the task force engineer without consultation with the company commander responsible to cover the obstacle with direct/indirect fires.
- No obstacle security and/or obstacle turnover.
- Obstacles not anchored to the terrain with direct and indirect fires.

b. Direct fire systems are positioned so that they are incapable of covering obstacles.

c. Indirect fires not planned on potential breach sites.

d. Lack of detail and quality of task force combined arms rehearsals and fire support technical rehearsals.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Review **FM 71-1, *Tank and Mechanized Infantry Company Team***, Chapter 3.
2. Home station training should focus on engagement area development with particular attention on integration of direct and indirect fires.
3. Train on obstacle siting, emplacement, and turnover.

(TA.1.2 Engage Enemy)

TREND 14
SUBJECT: Actions on Contact

OBSERVATION (Light/Abn): Squads and platoons demonstrate proficiency in their ability to react to contact (Battle Drill #2). However, once the small unit has made initial contact, there is a lack of ability at company and task force level to mass the effects of sufficient combat power on the enemy to destroy him.

DISCUSSION:

1. During the planning process at task force and company level, ineffective wargames result in a compliant enemy. No true analysis of the enemy's options and capabilities result in leaders assuming the enemy will fight the unit exactly the way desired.
2. During preparation, units generally conduct ineffective rehearsals. Most devolve into backbriefs, without the unit fighting the enemy throughout the depth of the zone or sector. Units then end with a confirmation of the plan that has completely discounted the enemy's options.
3. Company commanders do not refine the task force situation template (SITEMP) to their level. They also do not determine their probable line of deployment and end up making contact using the wrong movement formation and technique. Then, although the squads and platoons individually react appropriately, the company cannot get sufficient combat power into the fight before the enemy does.
4. Task force leaders experience similar challenges in massing their companies on enemy formations and battle positions. Task force tactical operations centers (TOCs) do not have or use an appropriate set of staff battle drills to assist the commander in massing the effects of the task force's combat power. Without these battle drills, staffs generally piecemeal forces/combat multipliers into the fight.
5. Task force commanders and S3s forward in the tactical command post (TAC) (for heavy task forces) or command group (for light task forces) do not have adequate communications or means to get all available assets. As a result, the task force generally loses the initiative to the enemy, thereby losing the close fight.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Continue to train squads and platoons on the ability to execute battle drills, using applicable FMs.
2. Train company commanders on all facets of troop-leading procedures (TLP). Conduct a review of **FM 7-10, *The Infantry Company***, Chapter 2; **FM 71-1, *Tank and Mechanized Infantry Company Team***, Chapter 2; **FM 101-5, *Staff Organization and Operations***, Appendix G; and **CALL Newsletter No. 98-5, *Rehearsals***, for further information on improving company level TLP.
3. Develop an appropriate set of battle drills that allow the TOC to assist the commander and S3 in rapidly massing the effects of combat power on enemy formations/battle positions.
    a. Review the ***JRTC Battle Captain Handbook*** for assistance in this area.
    b. Once battle drills are established, develop home station training plans that require the TOC to assist the TAC/command group in enemy contact.

c. Ensure the TOC conducts rehearsals on these battle drills nested with the task force combined arms rehearsal.

(TA.1.2 Engage Enemy)

TREND 15
SUBJECT: Engagement Area Synchronization

OBSERVATION (Light/Abn): Engineer and fire support efforts are rarely integrated into the maneuver preparation of the engagement area.

DISCUSSION: Common trends include: obstacles are sited and emplaced by engineers without maneuver commander input, obstacles are beyond direct fire weapons range, indirect fires are not planned and rehearsed to cover the obstacles, and clear fire control measures are not emplaced or sufficiently rehearsed. The result is a piecemealing of combat power in an underdeveloped engagement area.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Units should approach EA development as a battle drill and incorporate the seven steps outlined in **FM 71-1**, ***The Tank and Mechanized Infantry Company Team***, pages 4-13 to 4-19.

(TA.1.2 Engage Enemy)

TREND 16
SUBJECT: Engagement Area Development

OBSERVATION (Light/Abn): Defensive preparation and engagement area development routinely begins at the wrong place on the battlefield.

DISCUSSION:

1. Company commanders do not perform detailed enemy analysis to determine how the enemy will attack and the terrain he is likely to use. Therefore, commanders improperly place the point on the battlefield where they want to kill the enemy, resulting in poor vehicle positioning.
2. Commanders determine vehicle battle positions before they site the obstacles. This results in obstacles that are beyond the maximum effective range of the direct fire weapon systems and artillery targets that do not support the obstacle.
3. Defensive rehearsals dwindle to a proof of the engagement area. Instead of driving through the engagement area as the enemy would, allowing platoons to issue fire commands and report enemy contact, we merely determine dead space.
4. Squad leaders direct soldiers to make range cards, but many are not prepared to **STP 21-1-SMCT**, ***Soldier's Manual of Common Tasks, Skill Level 1*** standards. Squad and platoon sector sketches and company fire plans are not executed to the standards specified in **ARTEP 7-8-MTP**, ***Mission Training Plan for the Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad*** (page 5-60, Task: Execute Defense) and **FM 7-10**, ***The Infantry Company*** (page 5-9).
5. Priorities of work are established but not always enforced, resulting in idle soldiers during daylight hours of preparation for the defense.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Review **FM 71-1,** ***Tank and Mechanized Infantry Company Team***, pages 4-13 through 4-19, for the seven steps of engagement area development. Companies must conduct OPDs and terrain walks to reinforce the essential elements of this chapter.
2. The supporting engineer and artillery units have to be involved in these exercises in order to synchronize the combat multipliers.

3. Additional material is found in **CTC Quarterly Bulletin No. 96-7, *Building an Engagement Area: Blueprint for Success.*** Include a priority of work list and the seven steps of engagement area development in the company TACSOP.

(TA.1.2 Engage Enemy)

TREND 17
SUBJECT: Actions on Contact

OBSERVATION (Light/Abn): Company/teams are often unprepared for enemy contact.

DISCUSSION:

1. Units rarely address transition from tactical movement to maneuver. The transition from a traveling movement technique to actions on contact maneuver is difficult.
2. Base of fire and bounding platoons frequently do not support each other.
3. Company commander control tends to degenerate, and units cannot advance while in contact.
4. In the struggle to transition from movement to maneuver, many units become either decisively engaged or destroyed by enemy forces.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. **FM 71-1, *Tank and Mechanized Infantry Company Team***, page 3-17, Figure 3-7, illustrates the basic concept of how to transition from movement to maneuver.
2. Determine how and where the enemy wants to fight and determine the limit of enemy direct fire weapons systems. Set the transition point outside the enemy's direct fire range, and begin the maneuver to destroy him.
3. Terrain model rehearsals, close combat tactical trainer (CCTT), and simulation network (SIMNET) are effective substitutions for maneuver lanes to reinforce these lessons.

(TA.1.2 Engage Enemy)

TREND 18
SUBJECT: Fire Control and Distribution at the Company Level

OBSERVATION (Mech): Companies have difficulty controlling fires when enemy contact occurs.

DISCUSSION: Although commanders routinely state their direct fire control techniques for the company during the operations order and practice engagements during the company rehearsal, the company often encounters problems with execution during limited visibility. The ability to designate targets to platoons throughout the entire engagement area is impeded, resulting in excess ammunition being expended on targets – most targets being engaged multiple times by different weapon systems – prior to rendering that target combat ineffective.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Develop an SOP to allow direct fire target reference points (TRPs) to be observed during limited visibility. This will improve the unit's ability to determine the location of the enemy within the company engagement area.
2. Rehearse engagement criteria and techniques during limited visibility to better enable the platoon leader to identify enemy penetration of their part of the engagement area and place effective fires on the enemy target.

(TA.1.2.1 Employ Direct Fire)

TREND 19
SUBJECT: Direct Fire Planning

OBSERVATION (Light/Abn): Direct fire control measures need improvement at company and platoon levels.

DISCUSSION: Development of direct fire control measures must begin upon receipt of the task force operations order (OPORD) and should continue through mission completion. As the commander begins his analysis, he must determine how to eliminate the enemy threat throughout the depth of his battle space. He must strike a balance between massing effective fires and avoiding target overkill. By establishing fire control measures, the commander can force the distribution of fires and bring all weapon systems to the fight.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Chapter 2, Section 2, of **FM 71-1**, ***Tank and Mechanized Infantry Company Team,*** shows several means for controlling company direct fires.
2. The commander must provide guidance to ensure weapons are maximized, security is maintained, and the greatest threats are destroyed first.
3. Template maximum engagement lines, target reference points (TRPs), and engagement areas to determine where, when, and how to kill the enemy.
4. Leaders should practice fire commands at all rehearsals.

(TA.1.2.1 Employ Direct Fire)

TREND 20
SUBJECT: TOW Employment

OBSERVATION (Light/Abn): The TOW/anti-armor company is habitually relegated to convoy escort or flank security in most light infantry battalions.

DISCUSSION:

1. At the NTC, light infantry battalions employ their anti-armor company using the same tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) as they would for mountainous or hilly terrain. Increased visibility at the NTC results in the TOW company/platoon and the task force truck convoy making simultaneous contact with the enemy.
2. By limiting the role of the TOW company, units are giving away some of their greatest combat power. The thermal sights on the TOW vehicle provide the ability to identify the enemy at greater ranges and provide increased security; however, the vehicle must be stationary to be effective.
3. With the addition of the mounted .50 caliber machine gun, the TOW vehicle is an effective platform to provide suppressive fires for the infantry assault.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. In the open terrain of the desert, use the TOW company/platoon as the advance guard company for the task force during the approach march of a movement to contact. This allows the company/platoon to move forward of the convoy by 2-3 kms and develop the situation before contact with the TF truck convoy.
2. In the attack, maneuver the company to attack/support-by-fire positions to support the infantry assault on the objective.

(TA.1.2.1 Employ Direct Fire)

TREND 21
SUBJECT: Boresighting

OBSERVATION (Light/Abn): Mounted task force scouts often fail to boresight their weapon systems before departing the assembly area.

DISCUSSION: Consequently, the platoon's direct firepower is ineffective. Once elements of the platoon come into direct fire contact with the enemy, they are destroyed.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Confirm boresight daily. Make it a part of PCC and get leader involvement to make sure it happens.

(TA.1.2.1 Employ Direct Fire)

TREND 22
SUBJECT: Occupying a Mortar Firing Position

OBSERVATION (Light/Abn): Platoons have problems occupying positions in a timely manner and seldom use advance parties to reconnoiter the area of emplacement.

DISCUSSION: None.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Platoons should conduct occupations IAW **ARTEP 7-90-MTP**, ***Mission Training Plan for the Infantry Mortar Platoon, Section, and Squad*** (pages 5-11 to 5-15, Task: Occupy a Firing Position). Methods conducted should include emergency, hasty, and prepared occupations.
2. Platoons should conduct both day and night occupations to address all contingencies the platoon may encounter.
3. Platoons should conduct advance party operations. Execution should be IAW **ARTEP 7-90-MTP** (pages 5-75 to 5-78, Task: Reconnoiter a Firing Position).

(TA.1.3.2 Occupy Terrain)

FIRE SUPPORT BOS

(Trends are numbered sequentially for cross-reference and are <u>not</u> in any priority order.)

<u>Needs Emphasis</u>

<u>TREND 1</u>
SUBJECT: Attack Guidance Matrix (AGM)/Target Selection Standard (TSS)

OBSERVATION (FS): Units do not use AGM/TSS during the military decision-making process (MDMP).

DISCUSSION: Failure to develop and use the AGM/TSS has the following consequences:

- Fire direction officers (FDOs) often formulate inadequate fire orders in terms of numbers of projectiles for a particular target description.
- FDOs will not have established priorities for which target types to service.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Prepare the AGM in accordance with **FM 6-20-40**, ***Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Fire Support for Brigade Operations (Heavy)***, Appendix G.
2. Develop an AGM/TSS during MDMP that accounts for all enemy systems under consideration for attack.
3. Reference the commander's intent and guidance to the overall effects desired on a particular system.

(TA.2.1.3 Develop Order to Fire)

<u>TREND 2</u>
SUBJECT: Employment of Reinforcing Artillery

OBSERVATION (FS): The proper employment of reinforcing artillery battalion's fires, specifically Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) fires, continues to challenge units.

DISCUSSION: Most fire support officers (FSO) do not recognize the combat potential and firepower of the MLRS. Additionally, most do not understand the targeting requirements and capabilities of the system. This includes several aspects:

- Minimum safe distance (MSD).
- Trajectory and dud rate correlation.
- Coordination of airspace.
- Aim point shift capability.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES

1. Fire support coordinators (FSCOORDs), FSOs, and maneuver commanders must increase their understanding of the capabilities and limitations of MLRS.
2. With the advent of the divisional MLRS battalion, direct support (DS) battalions and FSOs can train to employ MLRS as a reinforcing unit at home station.

3. Units must integrate MLRS batteries into home station training, at a minimum using notional batteries with surface danger zones (SDZ) employed; manage the appropriate land requirements; and integrate into fire support coordination measure (FSCM) management.

4. Units should also conduct training programs to enhance general knowledge in MLRS operations.

(TA.2.2 Engage Ground Targets)

TREND 3
SUBJECT: Development of Essential Fire Support Tasks (EFSTs)

OBSERVATION (Armor): EFSTs are not well developed.

DISCUSSION:

1. Fire support officers (FSOs) are not receiving commander's guidance.
2. FSOs are not developing EFSTs and subsequent scheme of fires.
3. FSOs are not adequately allocating available assets at the decisive point.
4. FSOs do not identify the required volume and duration of fires necessary to shape the battlefield and mass fires at the decisive point.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Identify task, purpose, method, and effects for each EFST.
2. Assign and position assets.
3. Conduct proper analysis to determine allocation and triggers.

(TA.2.2.1 Conduct Lethal Engagement)

TREND 4
SUBJECT: Observation Plans

OBSERVATION (Armor): Task forces do not develop or execute an observation plan to support essential fire support tasks (EFSTs), the scheme of fires, or the scheme of maneuver.

DISCUSSION:

1. Fire support officers (FSOs) do not synchronize the observer plan with the scheme of maneuver during wargaming.
2. Rehearsals are frequently inadequate.
3. Fire support teams (FISTs) are not getting into position to acquire the enemy before becoming decisively engaged.
4. Refinement at the company/team level does not always occur.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Observation plans must:

- Be constructed in concert with the S2/S3.
- Support the maneuver commander's decisive point and each EFST.
- Address location, security, communications, and route.
- Be synchronized with the scheme of maneuver.
- Be refined and rehearsed at the company/team level.

(TA.2.3 Integrate Fire Support)

TREND 5
SUBJECT: Observation Plans

OBSERVATION (Mech): Task forces do not develop observation plans to support essential fire support tasks (EFSTs), the scheme of fires, or the scheme of maneuver.

DISCUSSION:

1. Fire support officers (FSOs) do not synchronize the observer plan with the scheme of maneuver during wargaming.
2. Observer plans are not refined at company/team level.
3. Rehearsals are frequently inadequate.
4. Fire support teams (FISTs) are not getting into position to acquire the enemy before becoming decisively engaged.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. **FM 6-71,** ***Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Fire Support for the Combined Arms Commander***, states that company/team commanders are the executors of the observation plan. Fire support teams (FISTs) are the maneuver commander's precision target acquisition asset. Success can be achieved with top-down planning, bottom-up refinement, and decentralized execution.
2. Maneuver commanders must maintain the tactical patience necessary to allow observers to get into position and execute their assigned task and purpose in order to set conditions for maneuver.
3. An observer plan must be constructed in concert with the S2 and S3, and should use Terrabase computer programs to assist in position selection. This provides the detect-and-track functions of the targeting process IAW **FM 6-20-10,** ***Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Targeting Process***.
4. The task force fire support officer (FSO) must plan to have observers in position to support the maneuver commander's decisive point and each EFST. Address where they need to be, security, communications, and routes.
5. Consider using forward observers (FOs), scouts, COLTs, and maneuver shooters as observers.
6. Consider employing the reserve company/team FIST as a task force COLT (a doctrinal option described in **FM 6-20-20,** ***Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Fire Support for Battalion, Task Force, and Below***).
7. The observation plan must be synchronized during the wargame with the scheme of maneuver.
8. The plan must be rehearsed during both task force and company/team rehearsals.
9. Initiative, cross-talk, and coordination between FISTs are imperative during execution.

(TA.2.3 Integrate Fire Support)

TREND 6
SUBJECT: Fire Support Integration for the Counterreconnaissance Fight

OBSERVATION (Brigade Staff): Brigade planners do not incorporate fires into the counterreconnaissance portion of the defensive plan.

DISCUSSION:

1. Striker/COLT positions have a task and purpose driven by the defend mission only.
2. Brigades go into the defense with one fire plan only – one that is designed to fight regiments in the attack.

3. Brigade planners are reluctant to address the enemy infantry that will be inserted the night prior to a battle in terms of an essential fire support task (EFST) because they feel that it contributes to an excessive number of EFSTs. The result is that the field artillery battalion gets pulled into the counterreconnaissance fight and pursues BMPs and BRDMs all night with no focus.

4. The end result is that dismounted enemy infantry (an enabler for the breaching force) successfully executes the OPFOR observation plan.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Treat the counterreconnaissance fight and the defense separately.

2. COLTs/Strikers that are not watching deep are ideal to observe templated truck dismounting positions and landing zones.

3. Brigade S2s must guide the targeting process to address the enemy's plan to observe friendly obstacles and breach lanes during the counterreconnaissance fight. Once the counterreconnaissance fight is complete, the fire plan can be deleted and the EFSTs no longer apply.

(TA.2.3 Integrate Fire Support)

TREND 7
SUBJECT: CAS Integration

OBSERVATION (Brigade Staff): Brigades effectively employ close air support (CAS) in support of the brigade deep effort, but rarely leverage this asset in support of the close fight.

DISCUSSION: The effectiveness of this lethal combat multiplier can be enhanced through detailed planning and integration of the air space for CAS ingress and egress, and definition of CAS target boxes to either provide lateral, altitude, or time separation. Firing unit locations, likely enemy ADA systems, and planned indirect fires at the time of CAS execution must be identified to allow simultaneous or near simultaneous engagements with indirect systems and CAS.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Plan airspace coordination areas (ACAs) during COA development that allow the aircraft to maneuver to their fullest potential for both high- and low-flight profiles.

2. Use altitude or lateral separation to integrate airspace for high-level flight profiles and either time or altitude separation for low-level flight profiles.

3. Develop a battle drill to focus the CAS execution to support EFSTs, or use the flexibility of CAS to attack targets or formations to support a refined COA. On the following page is an example of a CAS battle drill with associated actions of the primary participants.

Time relative to CAS at the initial point (IP) (H-Hour):

TIME	ACTION	WHO
H - 20 Minutes	Aircraft en route to IP, confirm number of aircraft and type of munitions	ALO
H - 19 Minutes	Informal targeting meeting	BDE XO, FSO, ALO, S2
	Number of aircraft, munitions, and time on station	ALO
	Enemy disposition in 20 minutes	S2
	Recommend location and targets to attack based on EFSTs or current situation	FSO
	Decide on formation or target(s) to attack	BDE XO
H-15 Minutes	WARNO to FDC (DS or R) for SEAD/Mark mission and ACA aircraft will use	FSE
H-15 to H-10 Minutes	In-brief FAC(A) or fighters	ALO
H-5 Minutes	SEAD/Mark mission issued AMC to FDC (DS or R) [Tactical Trigger]	FSO
H-5 to H-1 Minutes	9 Line to fighters	ALO
H - Hour or designated distance from CTB	Fire SEAD/Mark and activate ACA(s) [Technical Trigger]	FSO
	Lay DS and/or R BN on next target or targets during CAS attack	FSO

(TA.2.3 Integrate Fire Support)

TREND 8
SUBJECT: Integration of Fires into the Reconnaissance and Surveillance (R&S) Plan

OBSERVATION (Armor): Fire support is frequently not integrated into the R&S plan.

DISCUSSION:

1. Task force S3s/S2s are not integrating fire support acquisition assets into observation plans.
2. Units are not developing targeted areas of interest (TAIs) to help shape the battle space and support the scheme of maneuver.
3. Units are not developing zone management plans.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: The R&S plan links the military decision-making process (MDMP) to fire support planning and targeting. It also tasks acquisition assets to find specific enemy formations. The R&S plan requires combined arms operation planning to include fire support planning.

(TA.2.3 Integrate Fire Support)

TREND 9
SUBJECT: Firefinder Radar Zone Management

OBSERVATION (FS): Planning and execution of radar zones (critical friendly zones [CFZs]) to facilitate the maneuver commander's force protection priorities is a problem area for the direct support (DS) field artillery (FA) battalion.

DISCUSSION:

1. The DS FA battalion seldom provides responsive counterfires that support the maneuver commander's priorities for force protection. Planning, rehearsing, and triggering the radar employment plan is rarely synchronized with the reinforcing artillery or division artillery (DIVARTY) assets available and the remainder of the brigade's plan. The crucial missing piece is the linkage of the DS FA battalion tactical operations center (TOC) to the radar during the execution of the zone plan.
2. Synchronizing and coordinating with DIVARTY for redundant AN/TPQ-37 coverage and the deconfliction of zone coverage within the brigade's sector/zone is a problem area. This consistently leads to ineffective radar cueing and zone activation.
3. Digital transmission of radar zones and orientation data are seldom used. This greatly slows down the zone activation and creates unnecessary work.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. During the brigade's wargame of the selected course of action (COA), the brigade fire support element (FSE)/fire support coordinator (FSCOORD) should identify the probable locations of the events or units, obstacles, breach points, or routes critical to success.
2. Develop a top-down radar zone plan so bottom-up refinement can occur.
3. Establish counterfire priorities and make certain they are understood.
4. Once the zones are consolidated and approved at the brigade FSE, the plan must be incorporated into the synchronization and fire support execution matrices (FSEMs) or any other locally used products, such as a scheme of fires worksheet.
5. The DS FA battalion S2/S3 and FA targeting technician must use the higher headquarter's order/matrices as the planning guidance required to perform the bottom-up refinement necessary to develop the radar deployment order (RDO), position areas, and cueing plan for the radar.
6. The DS battalion S3, S2, brigade FSE, task force FSEs, and the FA targeting technician must understand their roles in the triggering, refinement, and verification of the zones to match the scheme of maneuver.
7. Verification of the unit or event location covered by the planned zone is critical to the success of the plan. Accordingly, zones planned for maneuver elements must be planned, verified, and triggered by the supported FSEs.
8. To ensure success, the zone, cueing, and radar movement plans must be integrated into the fire support rehearsal, FA technical rehearsal, FA rehearsal (rock drill), and combined arms rehearsal (CAR). Refer to **CALL Newsletter No. 98-5, *Rehearsals***.
9. Once radar acquisitions are received, the DS battalion TOC's counterfire battle drill must process, clear, and initiate responsive counterfires. FA battalions must develop tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) that incorporate the digital link and work for their unit similar to the process described above. Once they develop TTP, incorporate them into the local SOP.

(TA.2.3 Integrate Fire Support)

TREND 10
SUBJECT: Integration of Fires and Maneuver

OBSERVATION (Mech): Task forces typically experience difficulty developing a logical and executable concept of fires with clearly defined essential fire support tasks (EFSTs).

DISCUSSION: None.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. The commander must state the desired task and purpose (what and why) for each fire support asset (FA, mortars, close air support).

a. The **task** is defined in terms of a desired effect on an enemy formation and its function. For example: "Suppress the southern MRC for 30 minutes with FA preventing it from employing effective direct fire."

b. The **purpose** is defined in terms of a specific friendly maneuver event. For example: "Allow A Mech to occupy SBF Position 1 without taking effective enemy direct fire."

2. The **end state** is the achievement of the purpose defined in quantified terms. For example: "A Mech set in SBF Position 1 with no loss of combat power."

3. Refer to **FM 6-20-10, *Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Targeting Process***, to review the relationship between EFSTs and the targeting process.

a. **Decide** = Task and Purpose

b. **Detect and Deliver** = Method

c. **Assess** = Did we achieve our desired end-state?

4. Refer to **FM 6-71, *Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Fire Support for the Combined Arms Command***, for further discussion of commander's guidance for fire support.

a. **Task** = What

b. **Purpose** = Why

5. The logically sequenced EFSTs comprise the concept of fires and constitute the fires paragraph.

(TA.2.3 Integrate Fire Support)

TREND 11
SUBJECT: Integrating Fire Support

OBSERVATION (Mech): Company/teams have difficulty incorporating fire support into the scheme of maneuver.

DISCUSSION: The fire support plan is not addressed in the necessary detail during the company operations orders (OPORDs) and is not adequately integrated into the company's movement and direct fire plans. This results in very limited success in killing (or affecting) the enemy with indirect fires.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. The commander, in conjunction with the company fire support officer (FSO), should refine the targets assigned to the company based on a thorough intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) and integrate them into the company scheme of maneuver.

2. Rehearse the plan thoroughly.

3. Refer to **FM 6-71**, ***Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Fire Support for the Combined Arms Commander***.

(TA.2.3 Integrate Fire Support)

TREND 12
SUBJECT: Integrating Mortars into the Fire Support Plan

OBSERVATION (Mech): Mortars are often not integrated into the fire support plan.

DISCUSSION: When units issue a fire support matrix with mortar priority of fires and priority targets, they satisfy the concept of mortar integration. However, the matrix does not direct the use of mortars; it simply states some priorities.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Task force commanders should give the mortar platoon a specific task and purpose during each phase of an operation. The platoon's mission must be realistic and clearly understood by both the platoon and the observers who will be calling for fire.

2. The task force fire support officer (FSO) should develop two key products during the planning process: the target list/overlay and the fire support execution matrix. Provide a copy of these products to the mortar platoon for technical data processing. This enables the mortar platoon to compute firing data for each planned target, thereby reducing response time. If multiple firing positions are planned, the sections can compute firing data from each firing position for each target.

(TA.2.3 Integrate Fire Support)

TREND 13
SUBJECT: Observation Planning

OBSERVATION (Light/Abn): Task force planners do not plan and synchronize observation plans to ensure that observers are in position to execute essential fire support tasks (EFSTs).

DISCUSSION: IAW the ***White Paper, Fire Support Planning for the Brigade and Below***, September 1998, the task force fire support officer (FSO) must ensure that the TF observation plan is synchronized to detect, track, and attack targets to support the EFSTs. Observation planning must be top-down driven to ensure there are trained observers with direct observation of technical triggers, tactical triggers, and the targets in support of the task force's fire support plan.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Terrain management tools, Terrabase and SIDs, should be used to identify observation posts (OPs) with line of sight (LOS) to the target area. The task force S3 should task companies to occupy these OPs, task organize the forward observers for insertion with scouts under task force control, or task organize them with another company.

2. The FSO and FS NCO should identify the requirement for a task force OP and include its location in the Fire Support Annex and in the "Tasks to Maneuver Units" in the base operations order (OPORD). A concept sketch with the scheme of maneuver, OP task and purpose, and planned OP location (grid) is also a useful product for company FSOs. Provide copies of the LOS diagram (generated from Terrabase) to the forward observer in relation to the targets for which they are responsible.

3. The OP must have a task and purpose, and the occupation of the OP must be synchronized into the scheme of maneuver during the wargaming process and rehearsed in detail during the task force fire support rehearsal and the combined arms rehearsal.

(TA.2.3 Integrate Fire Support)

TREND 14
SUBJECT: Fire Support Integration at Company Level

OBSERVATION (Light/Abn): The company fire support officer (FSO) and mortar section sergeant are commonly ignored during the company planning process.

DISCUSSION: None.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. The commander must integrate the mortar section sergeant and the FSO into his planning cycle at the earliest opportunity.

2. The commander should be familiar with all indirect fire surface danger zone (SDZ) limitations in order to eliminate both potential violations and incidences of fratricide.

3. Refer to **FM 7-90**, ***Tactical Employment of Mortars,*** and **FM 23-91**, ***Mortar Gunnery***.

(TA.2.3 Integrate Fire Support)

TREND 15
SUBJECT: Fire Support for Scout Platoons

OBSERVATION (Light/Abn): Fire support for scout platoons is not fully integrated into the task force scheme of fires.

DISCUSSION: Scout platoons are continually sent forward without being incorporated into the task force scheme of fires. Field artillery (FA) is the scout platoon's number one combat multiplier and allows them to assist in the destruction of the enemy. Targets along the infiltration routes and targeted areas of interest (TAIs) are needed for the platoon to be effective in calling for indirect fires.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. The scout platoon and the fire supporters need to establish priority targets to destroy or suppress templated enemy locations.

2. Scout platoons must conduct training in call for fire, to include use of triggers and TAIs.

(TA.2.3 Integrate Fire Support)

AIR DEFENSE BOS

(Trends are numbered sequentially for cross-reference and are <u>not</u> in any priority order.)

<u>Needs Emphasis</u>

<u>TREND 1</u>
SUBJECT: Task Force Airspace Coordination

OBSERVATION (Light/Abn): Airspace coordination and planning within the task force is inadequate.

DISCUSSION:

1. During rotations, "blue air" and "red air" are often depicted by the same type of air platform. This presents significant fratricide challenges for the air defense artillery (ADA) platoon and task force.
2. Task forces rarely receive or post friendly air routes, and the air defense officer (ADO) only sporadically passes "blue air" information on platoon internal nets.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Anti-fratricide measures must be in place at all levels.
2. The ADO must coordinate with the task force air liaison officer (ALO)/enlisted terminal attack controller (ETAC) to receive "blue air" flight corridors, altitudes, and pre-planned blue close air support (CAS) station times. This information must be disseminated down to all ADA fire units and to the task force. If there is no Air Force representative at the task force tactical operations center (TOC), the ADO must get the information through the ADA battery TOC. It is possible for units with forward area air defense command, control, communications, and intelligence (FAADC3I) capabilities to further assist in the management and C2 of friendly air movements and track enemy activity.
3. During the battle there must be a positive link established to notify the ADA platoon of immediate CAS missions flying through the task force sector. Review **FM 100-103, *Army Airspace Command and Control in a Combat Zone***.

(TA.3.1 Process Air Targets)

<u>TREND 2</u>
SUBJECT: Radar Employment

OBSERVATION (Brigade Staff): One of the biggest challenges ADA batteries continue to face is the employment of ADA radars.

DISCUSSION:

1. ADA leader knowledge of these systems is extremely low. BCT leaders and battle staffs, therefore, also do not fully understand the capabilities and limitations of these critical assets.
2. Battery commanders typically express that their only experience in "fighting" radars is limited to one or two home station training exercises.

3. The radar employment plan is usually constructed very late and without a lot of detail. It is not normally focused on expected air avenues of approach, nor does it include triggers to move in order to maintain continuity of early warning coverage for the BCT.

4. Radars are often positioned where they cannot achieve their task and purpose. The first position is usually the final position. Triggers to move are not defined (based on either time or event). The result is that units do not provide adequate radar coverage at the critical time and place (forward passage of lines [FPOL], point of penetration, etc.) for the BCT.

5. Organic early warning capability does not significantly enhance what units receive over the defense early warning (DEW). As a result, many units disregard small hand-held terminal unit (SHTU)/handheld terminal unit (HTU) information and rely solely on the DEW net.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Ensure battery commanders have an opportunity to fight ADA radars during their home station train-up.

2. If liaison officers (LNOs) are to serve as primary planners for the batteries, they must be well versed in how to effectively integrate radars into the R&S plan.

3. Improve the depth of understanding of radars across the entire BCT battle staff and leadership. Task force commanders who understand what radars bring to the fight normally fight to get them into their battle space.

4. Take advantage of ability of the Army Missile Defense Warning System (AMDWS) to conduct detailed terrain and line of sight (LOS) analysis of multiple positions throughout the BCT battle space.

(TA.3.1.1 Select Air Targets to Attack)

TREND 3
SUBJECT: Dissemination of Early Warning

OBSERVATION (Light/Abn): Early warning of imminent air attack is not regularly rebroadcast over the task force command net.

DISCUSSION: Although ADA platoons receive excellent early warning from the division early warning (DEW) net and from the ADA battery, early warning "Dynamite" tracks are not rebroadcast over the task force command net on a regular basis. As a result, non-ADA weapon systems are rarely employed against fixed or rotary wing threat aircraft.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. **FM 44-8, *Combined Arms for Air Defense***, provides techniques and procedures that, if followed, will succeed against hostile aircraft.

2. Use the ADA platoon leader in OPD/NCOPDs to teach early warning and proper engagement procedures.

(TA.3.1.1 Select Air Targets to Attack)

TREND 4
SUBJECT: Reaction to Early Warning

OBSERVATION (Light/Abn): Even when early warning is received by the platoon, units are not oriented on the incoming threat avenue of approach (AA) or are not at the correct state of readiness (SOR) to successfully engage the threat.

DISCUSSION: Although ADA platoons receive excellent early warning from the division early warning (DEW) net and from the ADA battery, early warning "Dynamite" tracks are not received by the individual firing unit on a regular basis. Consequently, ADA weapon

systems rarely destroy enemy aircraft on ingress before ordinance release. Often units do not follow their SOPs or do not understand SOR management.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Units must have operational forward area air defense command, control, communications, and intelligence (FAADC3I) equipment, monitor the correct DEW frequency, and conduct the appropriate react-to-contact drills. This drill consists of the firing unit focusing in the direction of oncoming aircraft to detect it at a greater range and enhance its engagement on ingress. ADA platoons must understand states of readiness, and platoon leadership must establish appropriate levels of readiness and enforce their application. **FM 44-44**, ***Avenger Platoon, Section and Squad Operations,*** is an excellent tool available for units that need to develop SOR into their TACSOP.

(TA.3.1.1 Select Air Targets to Attack)

TREND 5
SUBJECT: Employment of Air Defense Artillery (ADA) Assets

OBSERVATION (Armor): ADA assets are not integrated into the task force plan.

DISCUSSION: ADA assets are employed piecemeal. ADA officers do not coordinate with adjacent and subordinate units and do not base the positioning of assets on the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB).

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. ADA officers must recommend priorities of coverage to the commander.
2. Air IPB should be briefed during mission analysis.
3. Adjacent ADA systems must be incorporated into the task force plan to avoid piecemealing of ADA assets.

(TA.3.2.1.2.1 Employ Air Defense Artillery)

MOBILITY/SURVIVABILITY BOS & NUCLEAR/BIOLOGICAL/CHEMICAL (NBC)

(Trends are numbered sequentially for cross-reference and are not in any priority order.)

Positive Performance

TREND 1
SUBJECT: Donning and Wearing Chemical Protective Clothing

OBSERVATION (Light/Abn): Units generally are proficient in donning and wearing chemical protective clothing.

DISCUSSION: Reacting to chemical attack is the most important NBC task at all skill levels. Protection from chemical agents on the battlefield begins with the ability to don and wear chemical protective clothing within the Army standard time limits. Rotational units are usually successful at meeting the standard outlined in **STP 21-1-SMCT**, ***Soldier's Manual of Common Tasks, Skill Level 1***, Task #031-503-1019.

SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES:
1. Integrate skill Level 1 NBC tasks into home station training events such as common task testing (CTT) and collective field training exercises.
2. In the tactical operations center (TOC), shift change briefs or downtime are excellent opportunities to test a unit's ability to don protective masks.
3. The tactical ballistic missile (TBM) drill during RSOI week provides a good opportunity to practice reacting to a chemical attack.

(TA.6.3.1.1.4 Employ Protective Equipment)

TREND 2
SUBJECT: Tactical Operations Center (TOC) Security

OBSERVATION (Mech): TOC junior leaders and senior NCOs are developing and instituting an adequate guard roster and defensive plan.

DISCUSSION: The initiative of the junior leaders and spot-checking by senior NCOs allows the TOC to maintain its operational tempo during the planning and preparation phases of the campaign.

SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES: Continue to develop and institute adequate security plans by following the unit's tactical SOP (TACSOP) and **FM 71-2,** ***The Tank and Mechanized Infantry Battalion Task Force***, Chapter 2.

(TA.6.3.2 Employ Operations Security)

Needs Emphasis

TREND 1
SUBJECT: Executing Mobility/Countermobility/Survivability (M/CM/S) Missions

OBSERVATION (Light/Abn): Light infantry task forces do not execute M/CM/S missions with organic assets.

DISCUSSION:

1. Light infantry task forces rely too heavily on the attached engineer platoon to complete all required M/CM/S tasks for the light task force. During offensive operations, planners do not task infantry units to provide mobility support to the task force.
2. Although light infantry battalions report that company and smaller sized units are trained on deliberate and assault breaching, lane marking, and traffic control, task forces never effectively resource the units to accomplish these mobility tasks by requisitioning and distributing demolitions to rifle companies.
3. During defensive operations, planners do not effectively utilize the infantry manpower available in the unit to enhance task force countermobility efforts. Infantry companies are not tasked to construct obstacles, augment engineer efforts with non-engineer personnel, or execute situational obstacles by utilizing the MOPMS system with remote control units organic to the infantry companies.
4. During execution of the task force survivability effort, planners do not ensure infantry units are supplied with adequate pioneer tools to rapidly construct survivability positions.
5. Engineers are overtasked and spread too thin across the battle area. Engineers are not available to mass at the decisive point of the battle or used to enhance the mobility and survivability of task force assets other than the maneuver elements.
6. The lack of pioneer tools available to the light infantry companies makes it difficult for them to complete their survivability requirements within the time allocated for preparation of defensive positions.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Infantry task force elements need to understand and adhere to the guidance in **FM 7-20, *The Infantry Battalion***, regarding the proper integration of the M/CM/S BOS.
2. Most infantry units conduct home station training on engineer-related tasks, such as explosive breaching, lane marking, and obstacle construction, in conjunction with the habitually supporting engineer unit. This training needs to be validated during operations at the National Training Center by planning and resourcing infantry units to execute these tasks. The result will be infantry units capable of massing their limited engineer resources to more effectively support the maneuver plan.

(TA.6 Mobility and Survivability BOS)

TREND 2
SUBJECT: Combined Arms Breaching Operations

OBSERVATION (Armor): Combined arms breaching operations are not coordinated or synchronized.

DISCUSSION:

1. Units are not incorporating breach tenets into the planning process.
2. Units do not:

a. Develop an obstacle intelligence (OBSTINTEL) collection plan.
b. Synchronize "breach fundamentals."
c. Use reverse breach planning to develop task organization.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Develop an aggressive reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) plan to collect OBSTINTEL.
2. Develop a flexible plan to react to OBSTINTEL.
3. Conduct mounted rehearsals.
4. Include details of actions at the breach in the OPORD.
5. Employ reverse breach planning to drive task organization of reduction assets and composition of breach, support, and assault forces.

(TA.6.1.1.1 Breach Obstacles)

TREND 3
SUBJECT: Brigade-Level Breach Planning

OBSERVATION (Engineer): During offensive operations, the maneuver brigade staff often does not include the breach as a significant phase of the operation.

DISCUSSION: Breach plans do not address the brigade's responsibilities for a task force breach or specify how the brigade intends to synchronize the breaching tenets of suppress, obscure, secure, and reduce (SOSR). As a result, the brigade is unable to set the conditions prior to committing to the breach and is rapidly destroyed by the defending enemy.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Breach planning at the brigade level should focus on five areas:

1. Engineer integration in the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB).
2. Breach organization and mass.
3. Reverse planning process.
4. Actions at the breach.
5. Brigade responsibilities at the breach.

(TA.6.1.1.1 Breach Obstacles)

TREND 4
SUBJECT: Marking Breach Lanes and Bypass Lanes

OBSERVATION (Engineer): Lane marking procedures used by units are often inadequate.

DISCUSSION:

1. Recent rotations have indicated a need to reevaluate doctrinal lane and bypass marking procedures found in **FM 90-13-1**, ***Combined Arms Breaching Operations***, to include entrance, exit, final approach, far recognition markers, and marking materials.
2. Many units use VS-17 panels, which is a doctrinally approved method of marking. However, recent trends indicate problems with identifying VS-17 panels at the breach site. This is because the VS-17 panel is also commonly used as a CASEVAC and fratricide marking system on combat vehicles. With so many VS-17 panels in the area, soldiers often experience difficulty identifying the marking system, causing them to miss the lane entrance.
3. Many units using VS-17 panels do not include directional arrows indicating the entrance or bypass lane boundaries.

4. Variations in marking standards between units often result in confusion due to varied task organizations, especially during heavy/light operations.

5. The spacing of the funnel markers is often so great that a vehicle approaching from an angle will drive in between funnel markers and into the obstacle.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Units should consider the guidelines listed in **FM 90-13-1**, Table 3-2, page 3-16, "Guidelines for Lane-Marking Devices," which discuss visibility requirements.

a. Marking devices need to be visible under a variety of conditions, including night operations, inclement weather, obscurants, and when buttoned up in tracked vehicles. Using the VS-17 panel to mark everything is not productive and should be managed rigorously by all leaders.

b. Units should develop nonstandard marking devices that are easily distinguishable from VS-17 panels. When marking a lane through a complex obstacle, units should have a well-defined marking system to eliminate confusion when approaching and passing through the obstacle.

2. The Army should consider re-addressing the need for a standardized marking system that is available through the logistics system, highly visible at great distances, easily transportable, and distributed Army-wide for use by the entire combined arms team.

(TA.6.1.1.1.1 Breach Minefields)

TREND 5
SUBJECT: Obstacle Turnover and Transfer

OBSERVATION (Light/Abn): Units do not conduct effective obstacle hand-over between constructing units and covering units.

DISCUSSION: Task forces have not demonstrated a standardized obstacle turnover process to ensure that covering maneuver elements take control of individual obstacles after completion by the supporting engineer units.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. The "Obstacle Turnover and Transfer" section of Chapter 5, **FM 90-7, *Combined Arms Obstacle Integration***, states: "Obstacle turnover or transfer ensures that the commander of the owning unit is familiar with the obstacle and understands his responsibilities concerning the obstacle." Additionally, it is essential that maneuver elements maintain situational awareness regarding the obstacles in their battle space.

2. The "Fratricide Prevention" paragraph in Chapter 2, **FM 20-32, *Mine/Countermine Operations***, highlights that obstacle control and effective obstacle turnover are instrumental in the prevention of minefield fratricide at every echelon.

3. Infantry and armor task forces need to standardize and train on obstacle turnover procedures with the supporting engineer units. The following are some considerations for obstacle turnover and transfer as outlined in **FM 90-7** and **FM 20-32**:

a. Description of the obstacle, including location, type, marking, and composition.
b. Information on lanes, including number, locations, marking, and closure plan.
c. Coordination completed or required with the fire support team (FIST).
d. Transfer of graphics and documentation (DA Form 1355 Minefield Record).
e. Guidance on obstacle-protection measures taken or required.

4. Target turnover procedures need to be outlined in the task force tactical SOP (TACSOP). The completion of the turnover needs to be dually reported to the task force tactical operations center (TOC), both on the engineer company/platoon net and on the battalion command net. Effective communications of obstacle turnover operations will ensure the unit maintains awareness of which units have control of the obstacles within the task force sector.

(TA.6.2 Provide Countermobility)

TREND 6
SUBJECT: Employment of Situation Obstacles

OBSERVATION (Armor): Employment of situation obstacles is often ineffective.

DISCUSSION:

1. Situational obstacles are not arrayed against multiple enemy courses of action (COAs) and execution is not tied to decision points.
2. Criteria for execution are not defined.
3. Triggers are not tied to the reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) plan.
4. Obstacle intent is not identified (target, trigger, desired obstacle effect).
5. Obstacles are normally executed based on time, not on an event identified in the decision support matrix (DSM) or decision support template (DST).

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Use the seven steps of defense for each situational obstacle, even in offense.
2. Perform time/distance analysis between named area of interest (NAI) and targeted area of interest (TAI).
3. Integrate fires.
4. Control execution with DSM/DST for triggers.
5. Assign intent during COA development to determine feasibility and triggers.

(TA.6.2.1 Secure/Select Location of Obstacles)

TREND 7
SUBJECT: Obstacle Integration

OBSERVATION (Light/Abn): Units do not understand or practice the doctrinal principals involved in obstacle planning at the task force level and below.

DISCUSSION:

1. Light and heavy task force planners attempt to place individual obstacles in support of task force engagement areas.
2. During countermobility planning, task force DS engineers construct obstacles without involvement of the maneuver units that provide covering direct and indirect fires. The result is obstacles that are improperly integrated into direct and indirect fire plans.
3. The lack of obstacle integration allows the enemy to easily bypass or breach the obstacles, and the task force countermobility effort does not achieve the commander's intent of affecting the enemy's ability to maneuver on the battlefield.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Task force planners need to read, understand, and apply the principals laid out in **FM 90-7, *Combined Arms Obstacle Integration***, Chapter 5, "Obstacle Planning and Execution at the Task Force Level and Below." This doctrinal reference will guide planners through all stages of obstacle group planning.

2. Integration of obstacle planning into all stages of the military decision-making process (MDMP) will ensure that obstacle groups planned by the task force will serve as effective combat multipliers.

(TA.6.2.1 Secure/Select Location of Obstacles)

TREND 8
SUBJECT: Integration of Obstacles with Fires

OBSERVATION (Armor): Obstacle groups are seldom integrated with fires to achieve a desired obstacle effect on enemy maneuver.

DISCUSSION:

1. Obstacle groups lack intent (target, location, obstacle effect).
2. Obstacle group design is insufficient to achieve desired effect.
3. Fires are not integrated to achieve desired obstacle effect.
4. Obstacles are not sited by maneuver company/team commanders.
5. Lanes are not planned.
6. Brigade-directed obstacles are not refined at task force level.
7. Obstacle plans and graphics are not disseminated, often leading to fratricide.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Engineers should not execute without company/team participation, to include siting.
2. The task force commander must give clear guidance.
3. Employ doctrinal densities to create obstacle groups.
4. Refine brigade-directed obstacles. Use a liaison with general support (GS) assets working in sector.
5. The tactical operations center (TOC) must track obstacles and disseminate obstacle graphics.

(TA.6.2.2 Emplace Obstacles)

TREND 9
SUBJECT: Trains Security

OBSERVATION (Light/Abn): During most battles, the combat trains command post (CTCP), unit maintenance collection point (UMCP), and the field trains lack a local security plan.

DISCUSSION:

1. The trains fail to integrate all soldiers into a local security plan.
2. Without proper measures to ensure force protection, the CTCP will not provide the required support for the task force.
3. Battalion CSS assets are extremely vulnerable to attack by both regular military and paramilitary threats.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Establish a CTCP SOP with an annex covering security and survivability. **FM 7-20**, ***The Infantry Battalion***, Chapter 8, Section 8-17, provides adequate information for developing the CTCP SOP.
2. The S4 must ensure trains security. The battalion aids the S4 by establishing preplanned targets in support.

3. Combat trains security is ultimately achieved through passive measures: noise and light discipline and restricted traffic in the area.

(TA.6.3 Enhance Survivability)

TREND 10
SUBJECT: Force Protection of the AN/TPQ-36 Radar Section

OBSERVATION (FS): Radar sections are often employed without any type of additional security assets to protect the radar.

DISCUSSION: The radar section is vulnerable to enemy attack throughout the mission. The AN/TPQ-36 radar is the only weapons-locating radar organic to the brigade combat team (BCT) that provides real-time acquisition of enemy indirect firing systems. The loss of the radar section has a significant adverse impact on the BCT's ability to provide counterfires on enemy indirect firing systems.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. The BCT staff must understand the capabilities and limitations of the AN/TPQ-36 radar.
2. Assets to secure the radar section must be identified and tasked.
3. The security plan for the radar section must be rehearsed.
4. Security procedures must be written into SOPs and checklists at all levels.
5. In the defense, the AN/TPQ-36 radar should be dug in to provide protection for the system and its personnel in order for the radar to stay in position longer.

(TA.6.3.1.1 Protect Individuals and Systems)

TREND 11
SUBJECT: Unit Maintenance Collection Point (UMCP) Security

OBSERVATION (Mech): Security in and around the UMCPs is minimal.

DISCUSSION:

1. Although many task force maintenance SOPs contain thorough security measure procedures, basic security measures in the UMCPs are rarely implemented.
2. Several tanks and Bradleys are often at the UMCP to be fixed, but the crews of these vehicles are rarely postured to protect themselves or the maintenance assets within the perimeter.
3. No effective use is being made of weapon systems on vehicles undergoing repairs at the UMCP to provide security.
   a. Tanks and Bradleys are placed on one side of the perimeter, severely limiting their fields of fire.
   b. Vehicles are placed too close to each other to actually be able to fire at an enemy without killing or injuring the people on the vehicle to the left or right (both the tanks and Bradleys have discarding pedals from their rounds).
4. At times M88 and M113s with M2s are used in the security mode, but there is rarely evidence of a conscious effort to analyze key avenues of approach and place these weapons accordingly.
5. No dismounted reaction forces are established to counter enemy infantry threats.
6. Force protection measures, such as fighting positions, security (guards), and observation posts (OPs), are rarely used or are not to standard. Guards do not know the challenge and password, OPs are positioned where they cannot provide early warning, and guards pull duty while sitting on chairs.

7. Although the UMCP is static in many positions for up to 48-72 hours, only four hasty fighting positions (18-inch one-man positions) were observed at any one location. During battles and stand-to, it is not uncommon to find individuals playing cards or sleeping rather than out in OPs providing early warning or manning weapons.

8. No readiness levels are briefed/posted for the security of the UMCP or upgraded based on enemy/friendly triggers.

9. Very little time is spent on basic troop-leading procedures (TLP) and maintaining force protection.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. When crewmen are not assisting mechanics with making repairs to their vehicles, they must fulfill the security needs of the UMCP. The leadership must have a plan to use these assets to provide security.

2. Conduct an intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) in the area surrounding the UMCP to define the threat to the UMCP, identify likely avenues of approach, and determine the security posture needed at the UMCP. This IPB will assist in determining where to place the OP and key weapons.

3. Ensure that tanks and Bradleys are placed in positions where they will be able to fire without causing injury to those within the UMCP. On open ground, attempt to position key assets on all sides of the perimeter so that a threat on any side can be destroyed.

4. Establish and brief a reaction force, and put one man in charge of that force. The reaction force should know to rally at a certain spot upon a given signal to receive their orders.

5. Prior to the upcoming battle, establish and define the security posture of the UMCP, then upgrade that posture based on the enemy and friendly situation throughout the battle.

6. Develop a checklist or guideline on establishing security in the UMCP and include this in the unit TACSOP. Cover in detail security postures, reaction force, guards, OPs, and positioning of vehicles, and ensure all slice elements are provided a copy.

(TA.6.3.1.1 Protect Individuals and Systems)

TREND 12
SUBJECT: Survivability of Mortar Firing Positions

OBSERVATION (Light/Abn): Mortar platoon defensive positions provide neither overhead protection from enemy artillery nor adequate protection from small arms fire.

DISCUSSION: This is based on either time constraints or minimal material to properly construct a firing position. Platoons request the proper Class IV material, but do not receive it. This typically happens because the task force does not understand how much material is needed for mortar positions in the defense.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Platoon leaders should review **FM 7-90**, ***Tactical Employment of Mortars***, Chapter 7. Section II explains in detail the construction of mortar positions to include diagrams and Class IV requirements. Section III discusses other survivability techniques in the event that the platoon cannot dig adequate mortar positions. The use of defilade positions is imperative for the survival of the mortar platoon. An additional doctrinal reference for proper construction of a mortar firing position is **FM 5-103**, ***Survivability***.

(TA.6.3.1.1 Protect Individuals and Systems)

TREND 13
SUBJECT: Mortar Platoon Security

OBSERVATION (Light/Abn): Mortar platoons do not establish local security.

DISCUSSION:

1. The greatest ground threat to mortars during offensive operations is chance contact with enemy forces that have been bypassed.
2. When mortars support defensive operations, the greatest threats are enemy recon and main forces.
3. Mortar platoons are regularly under surveillance during force-on-force battles.
4. The platoons do not have enough Class IV material on hand, nor do they place out their squad automatic weapons.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Key leaders should establish local security immediately upon setting into action. This may prevent the enemy from observing or surprising the platoon.
2. Refer to:
   a. **ARTEP 7-90-MTP,** ***Mission Training Plan for the Infantry Mortar Platoon, Section, Squad*** *(pages 5-85 to 5-86, Task: Maintain Operations Security*).
   b. **FM 7-90**, ***Tactical Employment of Mortars***, Chapter 7, Section 7-23a, *"Security Measures*".
   c. **FM 7-8**, ***Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad***, Chapter 2, Section XII.

(TA.6.3.1.1 Protect Individuals and Systems)

TREND 14
SUBJECT: Survivability – Individual Fighting Positions

OBSERVATION (Mech): Mechanized infantry platoons and squads have difficulty constructing fighting positions to standard.

DISCUSSION: Soldiers lack sufficient knowledge of the characteristics of the different types of fighting positions.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Units should train the different types of fighting positions and their characteristics at home station. Refer to **FM 7-7J**, ***Mechanized Infantry Platoon and Squad***.
2. Include the information contained in FM 7-7J in the battalion tactical SOP (TACSOP).

(TA.6.3.1.1.2 Prepare Fighting Positions)

TREND 15
SUBJECT: Survivability Packages for Individual Fighting Positions

OBSERVATION (Light/Abn): The content and distribution of unit Class IV survivability packages often do not support infantry squad and platoon requirements.

DISCUSSION:

1. Leaders site platoon battle positions and crew-served weapons and then waste valuable time waiting for Class IV and dig assets to arrive.
2. When using the small emplacement excavator (SEE) in NTC terrain, holes are often too wide for the Class IV that arrives. Class IV pushed forward is rarely in platoon packages and usually lacks stringers of sufficient length to support overhead cover.
3. Experience shows that stringers at the NTC must be eight feet long to adequately support overhead cover built to standards IAW **GTA 7-6-1**, ***Infantry Leader's Reference Card for Fighting Position Construction***. Even when using the fighting position, overhead cover (FPOC), the unstable rocking terrain, combined with the wide holes dug by the SEE, result in a large hole requiring an eight-foot stringer.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Units must review fighting position standards and provide all leaders with GTA 7-6-1.
2. Units must identify and standardize platoon Class IV packages for dismounted fighting positions. Packages must include stringers of adequate length to span fighting positions as outlined in GTA 7-6-1.

(TA.6.3.1.1.2 Prepare Fighting Positions)

TREND 16
SUBJECT: Survivability – Vehicle Fighting Positions

OBSERVATION (Engineer): Units do not construct vehicle fighting positions to standard.

DISCUSSION: Most combat support equipment (CSE) platoons and combat heavy (CH) platoons continually struggle with the execution of vehicle survivability positions, particularly M1, M2, FISTV, and Q-36 radar positions. Standards are not clearly understood by engineer equipment operators or their maneuver counterparts. As a result, vehicle positions are generally too narrow, too shallow, too short, or not adequately camouflaged by removing spoil.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Equipment operators and maneuver unit leaders and soldiers should receive periodic home station training on the proper construction of vehicle fighting positions. This means adequate "stick time" for operators to ensure they are proficient and combined arms training to ensure the equipment operator, vehicle driver, and vehicle commander can readily identify a position constructed to standard.
2. Units should paint depth markers on digging vehicles and publish standards using these markers in tactical SOPs (TACSOPs) and locally produced "smart cards."

(TA.6.3.1.1.2 Prepare Fighting Positions)

TREND 17
SUBJECT: NBC Common Tasks

OBSERVATION (Brigade Staff): Soldiers are not proficient in NBC common tasks.

DISCUSSION: Soldiers are not adequately trained in NBC common tasks. This includes wear of mission oriented protective posture (MOPP) gear, reaction to chemical attack, use of M8 and M9 paper, use of the NBC warning and reporting system (NBCWRS), treating chemical casualties, and conducting immediate decontamination. These areas need much improvement if soldiers are to survive a chemical attack and carry on with their mission.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Units should train their soldiers to proficiently perform NBC common tasks.
2. Refer to STP 21-1-SMCT.

(TA.6.3.1.1.4 Employ Protective Equipment)

TREND 18
SUBJECT: NBC Doctrinal Knowledge

OBSERVATION (Mech): Task force NBC sections lack sufficient doctrinal knowledge.

DISCUSSION: None.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Task force NBC sections must be proficient at all tasks, conditions, and standards as listed in **ARTEP 3-117-40-MTP**, ***Mission Training Plan for Chemical Section and NBC Center***.

(TA.6.3.1.1.4 Employ Protective Equipment)

TREND 19
SUBJECT: Use of NBC personnel

OBSERVATION (Light/Abn): NBC personnel are frequently tasked to perform additional duties that prevent them from performing their NBC duties during the military decision-making process (MDMP).

DISCUSSION: NBC is not properly integrated into the task force plan, and an NBC annex is rarely published. Failure to create NBC courses of action (COAs) results in poor NBC situational awareness and affects the unit down to the lowest level.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: At a minimum, the NBC officer must be allowed to perform the following tasks IAW Chapter 4, **FM 101-5**, ***Staff Organization and Operations***:

- Recommend COAs to minimize friendly and civilian vulnerability.
- Conduct NBC IPB vulnerability analysis.
- Provide technical advice and recommendations on MOPP posture.
- Operate the NBCWRS.
- Plan, supervise, and coordinate NBC decontamination operations.
- Predict downwind vapor hazard and fallout patterns and their effect on operations.

(TA.6.3.1.2 Remove Battlefield Hazards)

TREND 20
SUBJECT: Chemical Decontamination Operations

OBSERVATION (Mech): Units are often unable to successfully plan and execute the task force patient decontamination site (PDS).

DISCUSSION:

1. Medical platoons are often deploying with non-mission-capable (NMC) PDS medical equipment sets (MES). As a result, the task force relies solely on the brigade "on-call" concept of support for all aspects of chemical decontamination. Persistent chemical strikes are predicted and templated, but graphic control measures and proposed sites or pre-positioned assets are either never established or are unclear within the brigade combat team (BCT) or task force.
2. Triggers to establish sites are not established, planned, rehearsed, or synchronized at brigade/task force CSS rehearsals. Often the task forces do not know the location of the brigade PDS sites during tactical operations. These shortcomings result in an increased casualty died-of-wounds (DOW) rate.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Medical platoons must deploy with operational chemical medical equipment sets.
2. The task force must plan for PDS, using graphic control measures and triggers, and must publish the plan in the task force order.
3. Medical platoons should plan to split their PDS equipment between the forward aid station (FAS) and main aid station (MAS). This allows greater flexibility and continuity of support for the task forces.

4. Commit a water buffalo to the medical platoon for responsive PDS setup.
5. SOPs must include trained augmentees and timely transport to active PDS. The sole reliance of the task force on brigade support for chemical decontamination is impractical and is often not effective due to the time-distance factors during an operation.

(TA.6.3.1.2.1 Decontaminate Personnel and Systems)

TREND 21
SUBJECT: NBC Patient Decontamination

OBSERVATION (Light/Abn): Medical platoons are unable to satisfactorily prepare and execute NBC patient decontamination operations.

DISCUSSION: The primary shortcomings of platoons in this area are the lack of training and inexperienced personnel in patient decontamination operations.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. NBC patient decontamination operations need to be identified as a training focus for home station training and thoroughly integrated into the task force TACSOP.
2. Designated individuals (particularly platoon) need to attend and complete the NBC School and integrate training IAW **FM 3-5**, ***NBC Decontamination,*** and **FM 8-10-7**, ***Health Service Support in a Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Environment***.

(TA.6.3.1.2.1 Decontaminate Personnel and Systems)

TREND 22
SUBJECT: Use of Smoke

OBSERVATION (Brigade Staff): Brigades do not adequately employ mechanical smoke.

DISCUSSION:
1. Brigade staffs do not adequately plan the use of mechanical smoke to support the BCT fight.
2. Smoke assets are often task organized under maneuver task forces with no clear brigade commander's intent.
3. As a result, brigades often do not have smoke generated on the battlefield when and where the BCT commander wants it.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. Give more attention to smoke planning during the MDMP.
2. Produce a smoke overlay for each brigade course of action (COA) and ensure smoke support meets the BCT commander's intent.
3. Provide a task and purpose for smoke in the brigade operations order.

(TA.6.3.2.2.3 Employ Smoke/Obscurants)

TREND 23
SUBJECT: Smoke Integration

OBSERVATION (Armor): Smoke assets are not adequately integrated into the scheme of fires.

DISCUSSION:

1. Units have a good understanding of capabilities of smoke assets, such as artillery, generated, and pots, but exhibit a poor effort in identifying potential uses for smoke assets, fully developing a smoke plan, and smoke triggers.
2. Commanders give good guidance for potential missions, but none specifically directed at smoke assets.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Consider using smoke in some form during all phases of operations.
2. Integrate the smoke platoon leader and platoon sergeant early into the planning process.
3. Develop a concept sketch and assign a task and purpose.
4. Integrate and synchronize the plan during the wargame, OPORD brief, and rehearsal.

(TA.6.3.2.2.3 Employ Smoke/Obscurants)

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT BOS

(Trends are numbered sequentially for cross-reference and are <u>not</u> in any priority order.)

<u>Positive Performance</u>

<u>TREND 1</u>
SUBJECT: Direct Support (DS) Operations

OBSERVATION (CSS): Units demonstrate the ability to provide maintenance, supply, and medical support to the brigade.

DISCUSSION: Some units use different methods than others, but all accomplish the mission.

SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES:

1. The forward support battalion (FSB) can use a train-as-you-fight methodology to practice tactical logistics operations at home station.
2. Whether supporting a gunnery exercise with selected assets or training in the field with the entire BCT, the FSB support operations officer can coordinate with the main support battalion or the corps support battalion to practice tactical logistics operations.
3. Simulate time-distance factors to facilitate more efficient FSB support to unit LOGPACs.

(TA.7 Combat Service Support BOS)

<u>TREND 2</u>
SUBJECT: Combat Service Support (CSS) Operations

OBSERVATION (Light/Abn): Company/teams maintain strong CSS operations throughout the planning, preparation, and execution of missions.

DISCUSSION: Casualties are quickly evacuated and battlefield replacements are normally requested in a timely manner. Most combat vehicle losses are regenerated within a 5-hour time span. First sergeants and executive officers often maintain an active dialogue with the S1 and S4 to ensure company/team sustainment.

SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES:

1. Continue to execute aggressive CSS operations in support of the soldier and the mission.
2. Train at home station on casualty and vehicle evacuation.
3. Simulate time-distance factors to facilitate more efficient FSB support to unit LOGPACs.
4. Place additional training emphasis on Class IV management
5. Refer to **CALL Newsletter No. 94-2**, ***Logistics--Supporting the Offense***, and **CALL Newsletter No. 97-14**, ***NTC Goldminers' Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Combat Service Support***.

(TA.7 Combat Service Support BOS)

TREND 3
SUBJECT: Maintenance Platoon Operations

OBSERVATION (Light/Abn): Maintenance platoons expeditiously return combat power to task force commanders.

DISCUSSION:

1. Maintenance platoons make exceptional effort to diagnose and fix non-mission capable (NMC) pacer vehicles.
2. The BMO and team chiefs do an excellent job in assessing and then prioritizing their maintenance efforts with the ultimate goal of repairing the most combat systems possible for the upcoming fight.
3. This prioritization and teamwork provides focus for the mechanics, allowing them to mass their efforts rather than only concern themselves with their own teams. All of this results in an average operational readiness (OR) rate above 80 percent throughout the campaigns.

SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES:

1. Immediately institutionalize in a maintenance SOP the techniques and procedures used to prioritize and focus maintenance efforts. Include with this an established checklist outlining cross-level criteria and factors to be considered (i.e., daylight, time needed, critical events [crew OPORDs, rehearsals, ammo draw, etc.]).
2. At home station, coordinate with cross-attachments to receive cross-training of mechanics on M1s/M2s to familiarize them with the basic troubleshooting and frequent problems associated with these types of combat systems.
3. Get a copy of all technical manuals (TMs) and parts lists for the M1/M2, so that in the future the task force will not be so dependent on M1/M2 mechanics for all M1A1 and M2 maintenance.

(TA.7.3.2 Fix/Maintain Equipment)

TREND 4
SUBJECT: Maintenance of Fire Support Equipment

OBSERVATION (Light/Abn): Mortar crews demonstrated the ability to properly maintain mortar systems and related equipment.

DISCUSSION: Maintenance was performed IAW -10 level checks and platoon SOPs.

SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES: Continue to perform maintenance on this specialized equipment. Section leaders' direct supervision is the key to success in this area.

(TA.7.3.2.1 Perform Preventive Maintenance)

TREND 5
SUBJECT: ADA Equipment Readiness

OBSERVATION (Light/Abn): ADA platoons consistently maintain their combat systems to a high state of readiness.

DISCUSSION: Squad leaders and team chiefs are supervising -10 level maintenance checks before and after combat operations. Platoon leadership is adequately linked into task force unit level logistics system (ULLS) boxes and continues to turn in 5988Es on time. Maintenance contact teams deployed forward to support ADA platoons check to ensure that required Class IX is ordered and that parts are replaced when they are received.

SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES:

1. Continue to integrate into CSS operations of the supported unit.
2. Have battery-level maintenance support contact teams deployed to the AO to ensure timely maintenance actions.
3. Continued focus on maintenance by the platoon leadership will maintain this positive trend.

(TA.7.3.2.1 Perform Preventive Maintenance)

TREND 6
SUBJECT: Far Forward Care

OBSERVATION (Mech): Units demonstrate excellent use of self-aid/buddy aid, combat lifesavers, and medics at company and platoon levels.

DISCUSSION: Successful buddy aid or treatment by a combat lifesaver allows casualties to make it to a Level 1 treatment facility.

SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES:

1. Units should sustain the use of self-aid/buddy aid and combat lifesavers.
2. Ensure that combat lifesavers receive their re-certification training.

(TA.7.4.4.1 Provide Medical Treatment)

TREND 7
SUBJECT: Scout Platoon Internal Casualty Evacuation (CASEVAC)

OBSERVATION (Mech): Scout platoons place an emphasis on evacuating their personnel by internal means.

DISCUSSION:

1. Although responsibility for scout platoon CASEVAC rests upon the battalion/task force, the scout platoon plans for internal evacuation as another means to get soldiers back to the needed level of care.
2. Platoon sergeants coordinate with the company, securing the line of departure (LD) for CASEVAC.

SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES:

1. Incorporate the S1/S4 into reconnaissance and surveillance planning to ensure connectivity between maneuver and combat service support assets.
2. Continue to plan internal evacuation as a contingency.

(TA.7.4.4.2 Evacuate Casualties)

TREND 8
SUBJECT: S4 Planning for Class III and Class V Resupply

OBSERVATION (Mech): Task force S4s consistently plan for a robust Class III and Class V package to maneuver with the CTCP throughout offensive and defensive operations.

DISCUSSION: The quantities of fuel and ammunition are consistently sufficient for the needs of immediate resupply to combat units within the task force.

SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES: Continue to plan for emergency Class III and V packages at the combat trains. S4s should further refine the staff estimate to ensure that only necessary assets are pushed forward to the combat trains.

(TA.7.5.2 Supply the Force)

Needs Emphasis

TREND 1
SUBJECT: Material Readiness

OBSERVATION (Aviation): Units continue to struggle with aviation maintenance.

DISCUSSION:

1. Disjointed aviation intermediate maintenance (AVIM) and aviation unit maintenance (AVUM) coordination, failure to adequately track individual unit's maintenance status, and ineffective maintenance personnel tracking and utilization are key contributing factors to poor aircraft maintenance.
2. Units are not aggressive in requisitioning and tracking. In many instances, parts are not placed on order for two to four days or the incorrect part is ordered. Repair parts often remain at the division support area (DSA) or even the brigade support area (BSA) for over 48 hours due to a lack of tracking.
3. Units arrive with a logistics assistance representative (LAR), but do not use his expertise for maintenance advice or parts pick-up.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Units should arrive at the NTC with a comprehensive maintenance plan that assigns responsibility from fault detection, to parts requisition, to technical inspection (TI).
2. Early coordination with all logistics representatives from the BSA, DSA, and the defense logistics agency (DLA) will help maintenance personnel understand the parts flow into theater and lead to more timely receipt of repair parts.
3. Units should provide a liaison officer (LNO) to the DSA to track parts status and identify their arrival in theater. The LNO can then ensure that critical parts are placed on aircraft or ground transportation into the area of operation (AO) and can notify the unit that parts are en route.
4. Commanders and maintenance supervisors must be aware of the use of maintenance personnel. Commanders must ensure their personnel are tasked properly to meet mission requirements.
5. Forecasting scheduled maintenance requirements and having teams established to meet unscheduled maintenance requirements allow the unit to better react to maintenance problems and have the maximum combat power available for each mission.

(TA.7.3.2 Fix/Maintain Equipment)

TREND 2
SUBJECT: Maintenance Platoon Operations

OBSERVATION (Mech): Maintenance platoons display difficulty in prioritizing maintenance efforts in order to expeditiously return combat power to task force commanders.

DISCUSSION:

1. Maintenance platoons are unable to diagnose and fix non-mission capable (NMC) pacer vehicles.

2. There is a lack of leader involvement in the maintenance process. Battalion maintenance officers (BMOs) are rarely present in the UMCP.

3. Companies do not meet the standard in 5988E turn-in nor do they submit reports when company maintenance sergeants verify deadlining faults.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. The BMO, battalion maintenance sergeant (BMS), team chiefs, and shop foremen should meet on a regular basis to assess and prioritize maintenance efforts.
2. Establish cutoff time for control substitution.
3. Track control substitution and status of recovery missions.
4. Once techniques and procedures used to prioritize and focus maintenance efforts are established, institutionalize them in a maintenance SOP.

(TA.7.3.2 Fix/Maintain Equipment)

TREND 3
SUBJECT: DA Form 5988E Flow

OBSERVATION (Armor and Mech): Units rarely meet established standards for completion and turn-in of DA Form 5988E.

DISCUSSION:

1. DA Form 5988E does not reach the unit level logistics system (ULLS) boxes in a timely manner and are not prepared to standard.
2. Company/teams do not enforce an SOP for completion of preventive maintenance checks and services (PMCS) and turn-in of Form 5988E.
3. Task force maintenance meetings are too often omitted, which further prevents the unit from "seeing themselves."

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Re-examine task force SOPs for the flow of DA Form 5988E. Consult the battalion maintenance technician and sergeant (BMT/BMS) for a plan that will work and then implement the plan. The tracking system must allow the battalion maintenance officer (BMO) to shift priorities.
2. Battalion XOs must hold companies responsible when forms 5988E are not turned in or do not meet the standard. Establish a by-bumper-number tracking chart within the unit maintenance collection point (UMCP), and use it to raise the red flag early when forms 5988E are not picked up or turned in. Once a system is put in place, train that system in the field and in garrison during command maintenance days.
3. The BMO should brief the maintenance estimate during mission analysis and at operations order (OPORD) briefings.

(TA.7.3.2.1 Perform Preventive Maintenance)

TREND 4
SUBJECT: Use of Maintenance Collection Points (MCPs)

OBSERVATION (Mech and Light/Abn): Maintenance collection points (MCP) are not planned, disseminated, or rehearsed during the CSS planning phase for task force operations.

DISCUSSION:

1. During mission execution, company maintenance teams (CMT) are unable to recover non-mission capable (NMC) vehicles to a pre-plotted MCP. As a result, CMTs are leaving NMC vehicles where they break down.

2. Recovery assets are forced to travel to separate locations during and after the battle to police each vehicle. This recovery effort wastes valuable time that should be more effectively used for fault verification, parts ordering, and fixing NMC vehicles.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. The battalion maintenance officer (BMO) must become more involved in CSS planning for the task force.

2. The BMO and all CSS planners should study the operational and CSS graphics and plot MCPs at central locations that support the task force maneuver. Refer to **FM 101-5-1, *Operational Terms and Graphics,*** page 38.

3. In future home station training (from orders drills to company situational training exercises [STXs] and battalion field training exercises [FTXs]), utilize MCPs, and require the CMTs to "recover the vehicle only as far as a collection point or main supply route" (**FM 71-2, *The Tank and Mechanized Infantry Battalion Task Force***, page 7-2).

(TA.7.3.2.2 Recover [Equipment])

TREND 5
SUBJECT: En Route Supportive Treatment During Casualty Evacuation (CASEVAC)

OBSERVATION (Mech): Medics attached to the company/teams do not conduct adequate en route care procedures during CASEVAC.

DISCUSSION: Sustaining treatments, such as ensuring airways are maintained, dressings are still secure and sealed after loading, artificial respirations are maintained, and shock control measures are sustained, are not provided to standard.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Medics must be trained and must understand basic emergency medical treatment (EMT). Sergeant's time training and sick call is an excellent opportunity to teach basic EMT skills.

2. The platoon must enforce and ensure that en route care is conducted to sustain trauma casualties.

3. Incorporate standard en route care procedures in the unit tactical SOP (TACSOP) and use them during home station training exercises.

(TA.7.4.4.1 Provide Medical Treatment)

TREND 6
SUBJECT: Continuing Care for Patients

OBSERVATION (Mech): Continuing care and comfort measures for patients needs improvement.

DISCUSSION:

1. Battalion aid station (BAS) medics do not monitor and record a patient's vital signs or provide for the patient's safety.

2. Patients are not briefed on actions or safety procedures to take in case of an enemy attack by ground or air, or in case of a chemical attack.

3. Medical platoons do not provide sustainment care at the patient holding areas while awaiting patient treatment or patient evacuation.

4. Medics are unable to fill out DD Form 1380 properly.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. While conducting home station MASCAL training, ensure that patient safety briefs are given. Briefing the patient will assist in keeping the confusion to a minimum.

2. Conduct sustainment treatment during MASCAL training at each patient waiting area to understand the effort that will be needed to properly care for injured soldiers.

3. Sergeant's time training is an excellent opportunity to teach the procedures for completing DD Form 1380. Platoon leadership/NCOs must ensure that they are conducting spot checks for accuracy.

(TA.7.4.4.1 Provide Medical Treatment)

TREND 7
SUBJECT: COLT Casualty Evacuation (CASEVAC)

OBSERVATION (Brigade Staff): Brigades rarely have a plan to conduct COLT CASEVAC.

DISCUSSION:

1. The COLT died-of-wounds (DOW) rate is a concern. Brigade planners do very little to plan CASEVAC for the COLTS, and task forces rarely do their part when tasked by brigade to get COLTs from a casualty collection point (CCP) to an ambulance exchange point (AXP).

2. Brigades are willing to insert COLTs by air, but rarely plan and execute air extractions.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Brigade staffs must plan COLT CASEVAC (both air and ground) for every combat mission.

2. When planning ground CASEVAC, fixed responsibilities must be understood for movement to the CCP and movement to the AXP.

3. Brigades without brigade reconnaissance troops (BRTs) must task a task force to move
COLTS to one of the task force CCPs.

4. The entire process should be addressed in the combat service support (CSS) rehearsal.

(TA.7.4.4.2 Evacuate Casualties)

TREND 8
SUBJECT: Casualty Evacuation (CASEVAC) Operations

OBSERVATION (Armor): CASEVAC operations are not synchronized.

DISCUSSION:

1. Task force CASEVAC plans are too often developed by the medical platoon leader without detailed knowledge of either the task force scheme of maneuver or the S4's support plan.

2. Poor linkage with the forward support medical company (FSMC) denies the medical platoon leader understanding of the brigade's CASEVAC plan.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Involve the medical platoon leader in task force wargaming.
2. Ensure that communications exist to the FSMC commander.

3. The medical platoon leader must know the brigade's CASEVAC plan prior to the task force wargame.

4. Distribute the CASEVAC plan with the CSS plan.

(TA.7.4.4.2 Evacuate Casualties)

TREND 9
SUBJECT: Casualty Evacuation (CASEVAC)

OBSERVATION (Mech): Improper evacuation techniques often result in additional losses during the evacuation of wounded soldiers.

DISCUSSION: Ambulance and nonstandard CASEVAC vehicle crews often have poor situational awareness. They drive their evacuation vehicle up to a destroyed vehicle to load the casualty and in so doing, place the vehicle in direct fire contact with enemy forces. This results in destruction of the vehicle and additional casualties.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Units must evacuate casualties to a covered Level 1 care site, from which evacuation vehicles can then safely load and transport them out. Loading from a covered position will preclude engagement of the evacuation vehicle by enemy forces.

(TA.7.4.4.2 Evacuate Casualties)

TREND 10
SUBJECT: Combat Health Support (CHS) for the Task Force Scouts

OBSERVATION (Mech): Units are unable to extract casualties from the scout platoon observation posts (OPs).

DISCUSSION:

1. Units do not report or attempt to extract casualties until six to twelve hours after the time of injury.
2. Lack of coordination results in the inability of evacuation assets to locate scout platoon casualty collection points (CCP).
3. Scout platoon sergeants are not integrated into task force CSS planning or rehearsals.
4. These factors delay the extraction of scout platoon casualties and contribute to the unit maintaining a high died-of-wounds (DOW) rate for their scouts.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Units must develop a detailed combat health support plan (CHSPLAN) that includes templates of enemy locations, projected scout OPs, scout infiltration routes, ground evacuation limit of advance, ambulance routes while scouts are moving into sector, scout CCPs, and frequencies coordinated with the counterreconnaissance force/medical platoon leader. The plan should also include air extraction PZs and ingress and egress routes.
2. Develop a suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD) plan to secure the air corridor.
3. Support priorities must be established for use of nonmedical vehicles with the task force commander and S3. This information must be disseminated so that medical elements can continue to operate without communications and while taking casualties among themselves.
4. Develop far and near recognition signals that identify scout CCPs, which will expedite evacuation when operating without communications.
5. Most importantly, the plan must be understood and rehearsed by all key elements to ensure proper execution of scout evacuation.

6. Units must continue to operate their battalion aid station (BAS) in a split-team configuration to provide far forward Level 1 medical care to the counterrecon force and for the scout platoon.

(TA.7.4.4.2 Evacuate Casualties)

TREND 11
SUBJECT: Casualty Evacuation (CASEVAC)

OBSERVATION (Mech): CASEVAC operations are inadequate at company level.

DISCUSSION: Casualty collection points (CCPs) and a means of evacuation are often not designated.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Review lessons learned and SOPs established during the campaign to provide soldiers immediate care when becoming a casualty IAW **FM 71-1, *Tank and Mechanized Infantry Company Team***, Chapter 7.
2. Dedicate assets to evacuate casualties on the reconnaissance mission. This can be done in a couple of ways:
   a. Coordinate with the heavy company team that offers increased protection for medical assets.
   b. Augment the reconnaissance company with additional medical personnel to provide appropriate medical care to stabilize soldiers in preparation for evacuation.

(TA.7.4.4.2 Evacuate Casualties)

TREND 12
SUBJECT: Casualty Evacuation (CASEVAC)

OBSERVATION (Light/Abn): Units are unable to or do not execute CASEVAC from the casualty collection point (CCP) to the battalion aid station (BAS).

DISCUSSION:

1. The lack or inability of CASEVAC from the CCP to the BAS is the primary reason for high died-of-wounds (DOW) rates.
2. Several factors contribute to this issue: planning and training on the part of the individual companies within the battalion, battle tracking and situational awareness, poor night navigational skills, management of medical assets on the battlefield, communications, evacuation standardization, and rehearsals.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Develop a detailed CASEVAC procedure for the companies within the battalion TACSOP.
2. CASEVAC training should be incorporated into company- and platoon-level training events whenever possible and be as realistic as possible.
3. OPDs and NCOPDs are some other training platforms that can be used to demonstrate evacuation procedures for key leaders. Command emphasis is essential.

(TA.7.4.4.2 Evacuate Casualties)

TREND 13
SUBJECT: Scout Platoon Casualty Evacuation (CASEVAC)

OBSERVATION (Light/Abn): Scouts habitually are not evacuated in a timely manner.

DISCUSSION: Units do not execute their CASEVAC plans. The result for poor CASEVAC planning is a high died-of-wounds (DOW) rate and a negative impact on the unit's morale.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Platoons need to develop a working SOP with a standard rehearsal plan.
2. Too often the CASEVAC plan is a last minute thought that is not disseminated down to the unit assisting the scouts.
3. **FM 17-98**, ***Scout Platoon,*** states that task forces must specifically allocate combat service support (CSS) assets to the scout platoon to assist in the evacuation of wounded scouts.

(TA.7.4.4.2 Evacuate Casualties)

TREND 14
SUBJECT: Chemical Defense Equipment (CDE)

OBSERVATION (Brigade Staff): Units deploy to NTC lacking the necessary CDE to protect the force in a nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) environment.

DISCUSSION:

1. Many units are critically short items of CDE and are unaware of this situation before deployment.
2. Some chemical personnel do not know what CDE their units are authorized in the modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE) or common table of allowances (CTA). Units cannot possibly know CDE status and order equipment until they have established what they are authorized.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. All units assigned and attached to the brigade should check their MTOE and CTA to learn what CDE they are authorized.
2. The BDE should invest money in critically short items. If the unit does not have funds available to fill all shortages, request additional funds from higher headquarters or cross-level with other units.
3. Division chemical sections should provide assistance to deploying brigades to ensure units have the CDE necessary for NBC operations during the rotation.

(TA.7.5.2 Supply the Force)

TREND 15
SUBJECT: Forecasting CSS Requirements

OBSERVATION (Armor): CSS requirements are not being developed or briefed to standard.

DISCUSSION:

1. Units are not forecasting resupply requirements during wargaming.
2. S4s are not identifying triggers for movement of elements or mobile pre-positioning.
3. Planning for tactical resupply is not completed. All requirements while in contact become emergency requirements.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Integrate S4s with the remainder of the staff.
2. The S4 must examine all classes of supply/logistical function for each phase of the operation during wargaming for both task force and company/team level.

3. The company/team must submit a logistics status (LOGSTAT) report in accordance with task force timelines/directions.

(TA.7.5.2 Supply the Force)

TREND 16
SUBJECT: HHC Commander Tracking of Supplies

OBSERVATION (Mech): HHC commanders do not adequately track their on-hand quantities of supplies.

DISCUSSION: Feedback mechanisms are not in place, and HHC commanders do not have total asset visibility.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. HHC commanders are responsible for tracking all classes of supply throughout the depth of the task force's battle space. They should specifically know their on-hand quantities of Class III and Class V in such detail that they know what is on each truck by bumper number, what remains open for potential haul capacity, and what is the current operational condition of the HEMMT fleet.

2. Subsequent to LOGPAC operations, HHC commanders should know the status of forward companies through reports rendered by company supply sergeants.

   a. HHC commanders should refine their command post (CP) tracking mechanism and *heads up display* boards for better tracking of supplies.

   b. Support platoon leaders and supply sergeants should be held responsible for updating supply status information subsequent to the return of every LOGPAC.

   c. HHC commanders should ensure that the CP NCOICs and radio telephone operators (RTOs) know how to collate incoming supply data and ensure current heads-up displays are maintained. Copies (standard or reduced size) should be prepared for the commanders to facilitate their battle tracking/asset visibility if they need to go to the TOC, CTCP, or FSB.

3. Knowledge of on-hand quantities and visibility of push packages (quantities and timelines) from the FSB should allow HHC commanders to have *total asset visibility* in order to accurately anticipate the task force's needs and give task force commanders well-informed recommendations.

(TA.7.5.2 Supply the Force)

TREND 17
SUBJECT: Visibility of Available Assets in the Combat Trains Command Post (CTCP)

OBSERVATION (Mech): The CTCP too frequently has no clear visibility of assets available within the task force.

DISCUSSION:

1. CSS planners are often not able to forecast for future operations because they do not have a system for tracking the on-hand quantity and location of all classes of supply.

2. Without a constant update of the status of all classes, the S4 cannot anticipate requirements for the task force and cannot redistribute Class V within the task force to ensure companies are at their designated unit basic load (UBL) prior to assuming their mission.

3. The S4 is unable to prioritize each of the logistic functions.

4. The S4 is unable to determine the proper configuration of the LOGPAC prior to its departure from the field trains.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. The CTCP must develop tracking charts that depict the status of all classes of supply by company/team, specialty platoon, or attachment. Special emphasis should be placed on tracking Class III and V. Charts can be tracked using a "green, amber, red, black" system based on percentage of UBL on hand. The key to this system is that each color is quantified and everyone understands the meaning of each color. For example, "green" for Class V means that the unit has 90 percent or better of the UBL.
2. Company/team 1SGs must track the percentage of Class V on hand by weapon system. This will enable them to accurately conduct redistribution and report to the CTCP for requirements.

(TA.7.5.2 Supply the Force)

TREND 18
SUBJECT: Class VIII Resupply System

OBSERVATION (Mech): Units are not able to conduct adequate Class VIII resupply.

DISCUSSION:

1. There are no standardized systems in place for filling Class VIII requirements.
2. The ambulance backhaul system is not being used.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Divisions/brigades must establish clear guidance and procedures for medical resupply and practice these procedures during home station training.
2. Normally, the medical platoon should maintain a two-day (48-hour) stockage of medical supplies. As they consume their supplies, they request resupply from the next higher medical element.
3. The medical platoon should submit supply requests to the supporting forward support medical company (FSMC), which in turn fills requests and ships supplies forward. Request for items not available at the FSMC are forwarded to the division or brigade medical supply office (DMSO/BMSO).
4. Medical supplies are normally backhauled to the battalion aid station (BAS) using FSMC ambulances.
5. During combat, a push resupply system should be used. This system is preplanned between the medical platoon and medical company and provides planned amounts of supplies to the BAS at planned intervals without a supply request. The push resupply system should be planned and coordinated before deployment or at least before combat operations begin.
6. The medical platoon leader must ensure that resupply needs are known by the supporting FSMC and the DMSO/BMSO. He should also follow up on the status of his requests.
7. Once Class VIII arrives at the BAS, ambulances of the medical platoon then resupply their combat medics. Slice element medics and combat lifesavers must also be considered in the resupply.

(TA.7.5.2 Supply the Force)

TREND 19
SUBJECT: Resupply of Class V for Mortar Platoons

OBSERVATION (Mech): Resupply of Class V for mortar platoons is inconsistent throughout the campaigns.

DISCUSSION:

1. During force-on-force missions, mortar platoon sergeants (PSGs) are unable to integrate CSS into their rehearsals or fully develop paragraph four of the OPORD.

2. PSGs complete the necessary coordination through the supply system, but requests are cut due to a lack of support vehicles.

3. Mortar platoons are directly impacted on their ability to prepare and execute.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Mortar platoons must develop a working relationship with their support element prior to deployment. Establish and standardize SOPs and develop push packages of Class V.

2. During fire support planning, consider ammunition requirements. It is essential that the mortar platoon leaders or platoon sergeants (PSGs) be present to advise on what types of ammunition will be required. For example, if the mission is defense (day or night), sufficient HE and WP rounds must be on site. This causes the mortar platoon leader and the PSG to maintain contact with the supporting element and advise on any ammunition constraints. The PSG must facilitate this process over the A/L net.

3. Rehearse battlefield resupply of Class V at platoon level. Good techniques are:

   a. Use triggers to help determine when and where Class V resupply will occur.

   b. Push forward the necessary resupply trucks to be under the control of the PSG prior to crossing the line of departure (LD).

(TA.7.5.2 Supply the Force)

TREND 20
SUBJECT: Class IV and V Operations

OBSERVATION (Engineer): Most engineer battalions are seldom able to execute an integrated Class IV/V plan.

DISCUSSION: The engineer battalion tactical SOP (TACSOP) typically outlines the *doctrinal* combined arms responsibilities for packaging and moving Class IV/V barrier materials and for operating Class IV/V supply points, but these responsibilities are rarely addressed specifically in brigade and task force orders. As a result, most engineer battalions end up as the sole executors of the planning, preparation, and execution phases of Class IV/V logistical operations. This lack of participation by other members of the brigade combat team in the execution of Class IV/V operations detracts from the engineer battalion's primary missions of countermobility and survivability during the brigade's defense.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Engineer planners at all levels should campaign for the active support of other members of the combined arms team in support of Class IV/V operations, and the specifics of this support should be addressed in the maneuver order.

2. Class IV/V operations and responsibilities should be addressed in the scheme of maneuver, sub-unit mission, and service support subparagraphs, not relegated to the engineer annex.

3. In addition to the engineer battalion TACSOP, task force and brigade combat team TACSOPs should also specify responsibilities for Class IV/V operations.

(TA.7.5.2 Supply the Force)

COMMAND AND CONTROL BOS

(Trends are numbered sequentially for cross-reference and are <u>not</u> in any priority order.)

<u>Positive Performance</u>

<u>TREND 1</u>
SUBJECT: Communications Operations

OBSERVATION (Mech): Signal officers (SIGO) and the communications sections successfully provide for continuous FM radio communications.

DISCUSSION: None.

SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES: Sustain the training of radio operators and focus more on providing redundancy with the other communications systems available, such as MSRT and tactical facsimile.

(TA.4.1.2 Manage Means of Communicating Information)

<u>TREND 2</u>
SUBJECT: Line of Sight (LOS) Planning

OBSERVATION (Brigade Staff): Valuable knowledge has been gained on LOS planning and the installation of radio transmission links.

DISCUSSION: Signal companies have learned how valuable signal site reconnaissance is to planning LOS links. Often, after profiling several links, discrepancies are found and corrected between the digital system control center (SCC) profile and the terrain as seen by soldiers on-site. For example, in several cases the SCC profile indicated a radio link would have clear LOS, but actually the antenna ended up pointing directly into a mountain. Other times the digital profile indicated the link would not work, but when tested, the link worked.

SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES:

1. Signal companies should continue to conduct training on planning LOS links and training leaders and soldiers on conducting detailed signal site reconnaissance.
2. Teach the S3 section to use the SCC only as a tool, and increase confidence in key leaders conducting signal site recon.
3. Train planners on verifying digital profiles with manual LOS analysis.

(TA.4.1.2 Manage Means of Communicating Information)

<u>TREND 3</u>
SUBJECT: Field Trains Command Post (FTCP) Battle Tracking

OBSERVATION (Mech): FTCPs have developed an accurate and effective method of battle tracking.

DISCUSSION: Through the use of simple yet effective battle tracking charts, map boards, and heads-up displays, HHC commanders are able to have very good situational awareness of the task force's operations through the depth of the battle space.

SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES: Use and employ FTCP radio telephone operators (RTOs), S1/S4 NCOs, and shift NCOs to enable HHC commanders to focus on the fight and receive timely, accurate, and collated data with which to track task force operations.

(TA.4.1.3 Maintain Information and Force Status)

TREND 4
SUBJECT: Maneuver Battle Tracking in the Combat Trains Command Post (CTCP)

OBSERVATION (Mech): The majority of CTCPs maintain clear situational awareness of the battlefield during tactical operations.

DISCUSSION:
1. Both enemy and friendly locations are updated and graphics are posted.
2. Personnel within the CTCP are well trained to track the battle and monitor reports on the command net.

SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES: Ensure that the CTCP participates in all command post exercises (CPXs), JANUS exercises, and field training exercises (FTXs) to maintain a small pool of S1 and S4 personnel that are trained to function in a command post (CP).

(TA.4.1.3 Maintain Information and Force Status)

TREND 5
SUBJECT: Battle Tracking

OBSERVATION (Mech): Task force tactical operations centers (TOCs) begin campaigns with adequate battle tracking systems and steadily improve during subsequent missions.

DISCUSSION: None.

SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES:
1. Sustain current TOC standing operating procedures (SOP).
2. Ensure combat function representation and cross-talk during the battle.

(TA.4.1.3 Maintain Information and Force Status)

TREND 6
SUBJECT: Automation

OBSERVATION (Mech): Task forces deploy with automation set-up to assist in rapid development of final products for the task force operations order (OPORD).

DISCUSSION: None.

SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES: Continue with adequate and redundant automation in the task force TOC.

(TA.4.1.3.3 Publish and Reproduce Information)

TREND 7
SUBJECT: Operations Order (OPORD) Production/Reproduction

OBSERVATION (Mech): S3 sections develop an aggressive planning cell that allows for timely production and reproduction of the OPORD.

DISCUSSION: None.

SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES: Continue with current task organization IAW task force TACSOPs.

(TA.4.1.3.3 Publish and Reproduce Information)

TREND 8
SUBJECT: Non-standard CASEVAC Planning

OBSERVATION (Mech): Units identify additional lift platforms required to evacuate casualties from the battlefield.

DISCUSSION:
1. The HHC commander/1SG is tasked to employ non-standard CASEVAC platforms.
2. Lift platforms are often placed with the forward aid station (FAS)/main aid station (MAS) and company/teams prior to the line of departure (LD).
3. Non-standard CASEVAC assets are used to supplement standard evacuation to ambulance exchange points as well as backhauling casualties from company/team collection points.

SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES: Update/validate unit TACSOP based on outlined TTP, and incorporate litter teams in unit operations.

(TA.4.3 Determine Actions)

TREND 9
SUBJECT: Staff Planning Process

OBSERVATION (Mech): Task force staffs begin the campaign with an adequate planning process and improve during the course of the campaign.

DISCUSSION:
1. TOC SOPs are well understood and practiced by all staff members.
2. Task forces are able to execute parallel planning.

SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES: Continue to adhere to the TOC SOPs and update with lessons learned throughout the campaign.

(TA.4.3 Determine Actions)

TREND 10
SUBJECT: Casualty Evacuation (CASEVAC) Planning

OBSERVATION (Light/Abn): Companies improve in CASEVAC planning during rotations.

DISCUSSION: Initially, CASEVAC planning is usually weak and does not consider the battlefield (i.e., obstacles, engagement areas, routes). As rotations progress, companies begin to

coordinate, rehearse routes, and plan evacuation from the point of injury to the company casualty collection point (CCP), resulting in lower died-of-wounds (DOW) rates.

SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES: Continue to develop company SOPs, to include CASEVAC procedures, and practice them regularly. One technique is to suddenly designate a casualty at every training event, sergeant's time, PT, ranges, etc. Any training event should include CASEVAC training so that it will become second nature.

(TA.4.3 Determine Actions)

TREND 11
SUBJECT: HHC Commanders' Division of Work

OBSERVATION (Mech): HHC commanders normally make judicious use of their executive officers (XOs) and first sergeants (1SGs) during all planning processes.

DISCUSSION:

1. HHC commanders usually prioritize work to be done and fix responsibility for assigned tasks with their XO and 1SG. This clear division of work enables commanders to have time available for a multitude of additional tasks, yet maintain visibility on all critical and essential tasks.
2. The "chemistry" that exists within the HHC command teams (HHC commander, XO, and 1SG) is powerful and highly effective. The team effort of the members, both personally and professionally, enables the company to function efficiently in a highly dynamic and fluid environment.

SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES: HHC commanders should continue the division of work with their XOs and 1SGs for efficient planning of company operations.

(TA.4.4 Direct and Lead Subordinate Forces)

TREND 12
SUBJECT: Commander's Guidance and Intent

OBSERVATION (Light/Abn): Task force commanders issue very clear guidance to the staff.

DISCUSSION:

1. Commanders cover all required elements from **FM 101-5**, ***Staff Organization and Operations***, page 5-10, and ensure the guidance is delivered to the assembled staff both verbally and in writing.
2. Commanders typically use one directed course of action (COA) to assist the task force battle rhythm. The staff is also given the latitude to develop branch and sequel plans.
3. The task force commander's intent is also clear and concise IAW FM 101-5, page 5-9. They deliver it to the staff and subordinate leaders in written form and also brief it at the task force operations order (OPORD) and combined arms rehearsal.

SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES:

1. Ensure the Commander's Guidance Worksheet is included in the TF TOCSOP/plans SOP.
2. Continue to use directed COAs in time-constrained environments.

3. Continue to use both oral and written presentation techniques that enhance subordinate leader understanding of the commander's vision of the battle.

(TA.4.4 Direct and Lead Subordinate Forces)

TREND 13
SUBJECT: Coordinating Combat Health Support

OBSERVATION (Mech): Medical platoons coordinate for additional medical assets from the forward support medical company (FSMC) to support task force missions.

DISCUSSION: Ambulances are pre-positioned forward at the forward aid station (FAS)/main aid station (MAS) prior to the task force line of departure (LD) or not later than (NLT) defend time.

SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES: Continue to request and utilize the evacuation assets from the FSMC when mission dictates.

(TA.4.4.1.2 Coordinate Support)

TREND 14
SUBJECT: Task Force Warning Order (WARNO)

OBSERVATION (Mech): Task forces consistently adhere to issuing WARNOs as soon as possible to subordinate elements prior to each operations order (OPORD).

DISCUSSION: None.

SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES: Continue to adhere to **FM 100-5**, ***Operations***, and task force SOPs.

(TA.4.4.2 Issue Orders)

TREND 15
SUBJECT: Pre-Combat Checks (PCC)/Pre-Combat Inspection (PCI) Checklists

OBSERVATION (Mech): Platoons have thorough PCC checklists in their standing operating procedures (SOP).

DISCUSSION: Junior NCOs use these very effectively to prepare for specific missions. The platoon leader can direct specifics in the operations order (OPORD), and this guidance can be passed to the lowest level.

SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES:
1. Develop standard baseline checklists for each type of mission. Reference these in the OPORD coordinating instructions.
2. Continue to ensure that each soldier carries (or has access to) a copy of the checklist.

(TA.4.4.4 Maintain Unit Discipline)

TREND 16
SUBJECT: Pre-Combat Checks (PCC), Zeroing/Marksmanship

OBSERVATION (Light/Abn): Most companies perform good PCC on a regular basis.

DISCUSSION: Weapons systems are typically zeroed to standard, allowing soldiers to shoot well during engagements.

SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES:

1. Maintain SOPs with pre-combat checks (PCC)/pre-combat inspection (PCI) checklists.
2. Continue to perform zeroing tasks as part of preparation for combat**.**

(TA.4.4.4 Maintain Unit Discipline)

Needs Emphasis

TREND 1
SUBJECT: Convoy Operations

OBSERVATION (Brigade Staff): Command and control is often not maintained during convoy operations.

DISCUSSION:

1. During some convoys, command and control is not maintained (e.g., improper convoy intervals, poor FM communications, not using checkpoint control measures, vehicle breakdowns).
2. Poor land navigation skills contribute to lengthy convoy operations.
3. Equipment falls off vehicles, resulting in loss or damage.
4. Convoy planning does not always consider terrain analysis in time/distance calculations.
5. Delays in convoy operations sometimes result in delayed network installation and reconfiguration. As the rotations progress, convoy operations improve.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Continue to train on conducting tactical convoy operations.
2. Enforce convoy procedures to ensure command and control is maintained. Enforce convoy intervals and breakdown procedures. Plan redundant communications for convoy operations.
3. When planning network installation and reconfiguration, ensure accurate time/distance calculations based upon terrain analysis are used to plan timely installation of systems.

(TA.4 Command and Control BOS)

TREND 2
SUBJECT: Control of Fire Support Operations

OBSERVATION (Light/Abn): The task force fire support officer (FSO) usually fights from the tactical operations center (TOC), and when the TOC loses communication or moves, he loses situational awareness and is unable to support the task force with fire support.

DISCUSSION: When this occurs, the FSO will often move forward on the battlefield with the assistant S3 and S2 in a tactical command post (TAC) to regain communications and join the battle. Unfortunately, these lapses in situational awareness occur at critical points in the battle when essential fire support tasks (EFSTs) must be accomplished. The position of the task force FSO on the battlefield is an important consideration and depends on a number of conditions. Communications capabilities between the TOC/TAC and the task force commander, the level of training of the task force fire support element (FSE), and the relationship between the FSO and the commander all have an impact on where the FSO should fight.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. When possible, the FSO should position forward on the battlefield near his commander. This gives the FSO the ability to see what the commander sees on the battlefield. This is especially true during offensive operations or when operating in restricted terrain where communications may be hindered.

2. In order for the FSO to position forward, it requires a trained FSE that understands the plan, can battle track, clear fires, and control fire support assets. The FSO should establish a time as a part of the FSE's battle rhythm to brief the FSE on the mission (scheme of fires, scheme of maneuver, timeline, additional tasks, and issues). Following the brief, the FSO should give his FSNCO some time to study the plan and then have the FSNCO give him (and the rest of the FSE) a confirmation brief to ensure the FSNCO understands and can execute the plan.

(TA.4 Command and Control BOS)

TREND 3
SUBJECT: Request for Information (RFI) Tracking System

OBSERVATION (Light/Abn): Task force S2s do not have adequate RFI tracking systems.

DISCUSSION: A comprehensive RFI tracking system aids in shift change briefs and ensures information is passed between staff sections.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Create a one-page standard format consisting of the following entries at a minimum:

- RFI tracking number.
- Date/time submitted or received.
- Date/time RFI answered.
- Name of S2 person submitting or receiving RFI.
- Name and section/company submitting or receiving RFI.

(TA.4.1 Acquire and Communicate Information and Maintain Status)

TREND 4
SUBJECT: CSS Reporting

OBSERVATION (Brigade Staff): Reporting within the brigade does not provide the S4 with adequate visibility of on-hand supplies.

DISCUSSION:

1. Brigades currently have a 64 percent total turn-in rate for logistics status (LOGSTAT) reports.

2. These reports sometimes lack critical information, including on-hand quantities of Class III (P), IV, and V.

3. The lack of adequate information to properly track and control critical CSS assets on the battlefield results in inadequate asset visibility, delays in resupply, and inability to focus emergency resupply.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Institute a quality control system. One technique is to have S4 battle captains review LOGSTAT reports to ensure that they are filled out correctly.

2. Use gunnery densities, command post exercises (CPXs), field training exercises (FTXs), sergeant's time, motor stables, and other appropriate training events as vehicles to focus on accurate and timely reporting by subordinate units.

3. Review tactical standing operating procedures (TACSOP) and configure command posts (CPs) to allow for battle tracking. S1/S4 personnel should be organized into shifts which allow for 24-hour operations with effective leadership present at all times. They should also train their second team to maintain the same quality of information gathering during the night shift.

(TA.4.1.1 Communicate Information)

TREND 5
SUBJECT: Civilians on the Battlefield (COB) Reports

OBSERVATION (Brigade Staff): COB reports to the tactical operations center (TOC) are sporadic.

DISCUSSION: Information does not flow well from the units in the field, through battle captains, to the special staff, including the JA.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Create a standard fratricide and COB reporting format in the TACSOP so that all necessary information for a response can be relayed in one message to the special staff.
2. Add a standard distribution for COB/significant legal issue reports.

(TA.4.1.1 Communicate Information)

TREND 6
SUBJECT: Information Flow

OBSERVATION (Brigade Staff): Units experience significant problems with information flow between the BCT TOC, analysis and control team (ACT), and ground surveillance operations center (GSOC).

DISCUSSION:

1. Units are unable to synchronize nonlethal fires to support breaching operations at the point of penetration or at other critical times on the battlefield when the BCT needs this form of contact.
2. The lack of an EW matrix tied to the brigade's decision points and critical enemy events results in a hit-and-miss collection and jamming success rate.
3. Lack of situational awareness causes units to miss triggers in the execution of jamming, electronic warfare support (ES), and moving their light baseline.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. The company commander should research the company SOP and other MI company SOPs and develop a procedure for the ACT/GSOC. See if the SOP works and then be prepared to execute it during the next BCT field training exercise (FTX) or command post exercise (CPX).
2. What must flow down to the common ground station (CGS) and GSOC are changes in PIR/IR, situation of both friendly and enemy units, and new taskings for the MI company's systems. What must flow up are battlefield information, intelligence (derived from that information), spot reports, and position and status of the MI company's systems. The centerpiece of this operation is the ACT.

(TA.4.1.1 Communicate Information)

TREND 7
SUBJECT: Information Flow

OBSERVATION (Brigade Staff): Information did not flow well from the units in the field, through battle captains, to the special staff.

DISCUSSION: Reports often come to the brigade battle captains and are not passed to the special staff for action.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. Create a standard fratricide and civilians on the battlefield (COB) reporting format in the TACSOP so that all necessary information for a response can be relayed in one message to the special staff.
2. Add a standard distribution for COB/significant legal issue reports.

(TA.4.1.1 Communicate Information)

TREND 8
SUBJECT: NBC Warning and Reporting

OBSERVATION (Mech): NBC warning and reporting is ineffective due to the lack of communication between subordinate and higher elements.

DISCUSSION: Communications problems during the battle hinder the passing of timely information regarding chemical strikes and associated downwind hazards. This leaves the task force vulnerable to effects of the chemical strikes.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Identify alternate means of communications among the chemical staffs and commanders.

(TA.4.1.1 Communicate Information)

TREND 9
SUBJECT: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Warning and Reporting System (NBCWRS)

OBSERVATION (Light/Abn): Units rarely report chemical strikes on the battlefield to higher headquarters per standards of the NBCWRS.

DISCUSSION:
1. Units rarely submit NBC 1 reports to higher headquarters IAW STP 21-24-SMCT. This is a skill level 3 common task and a skill level 2 task for 54B personnel.
2. Battalions seldom forward this information to brigade headquarters using an NBC 1 Report or SPOTREP format.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. Refer to NBCWRS procedures found in **FM 3-100,** ***Chemical Operations***, and **FM 3-3,** ***Chemical and Biological Contamination Avoidance***.
2. Home station training must stress NBC tasks during common task training and field exercises.
3. Distribute **GTA 3-6-5**, ***NBC Warning and Reporting System,*** to all soldiers.
4. Platoons and companies should prepare blank NBC 1 reports and have them readily available during force-on-force operations.

(TA.4.1.1 Communicate Information)

TREND 10
SUBJECT: Fratricide Reports

OBSERVATION (Brigade Staff): Fratricide reports to the tactical operations center (TOC) are sporadic.

DISCUSSION: In many cases, fratricides are not reported to the TOC through subordinate units. When they are reported, they lack the necessary detail and normally take over 24 hours to reach the TOC and the judge advocate (JA).

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Make fratricides a commander's critical information requirement (CCIR) to the brigade combat team (BCT) commander, and record and forward the report to the JA for action.
2. Add a fratricide report to the current chapter on fratricides in the tactical standing operating procedures (TACSOP).

(TA.4.1.1.4 Receive and Transmit Friendly Troop Information)

TREND 11
SUBJECT: Reporting of On-Hand Supplies

OBSERVATION (Mech): Company/teams do not adequately report on-hand quantities of supplies.

DISCUSSION:

1. Company/teams typically report what logistical support and supplies they need, but often do not state what quantity of supplies they have on hand. This prevents the task force/battalion S4 from conducting his analysis and directing cross-leveling of supplies in accordance with the commander's guidance or allocating available supplies to the units who need them.
2. Units often end up developing and hauling standard "push packages." These push packages consume limited cargo haul capacity to transport supplies and equipment forward to units that do not need them – only to have the non-issued supplies transported back to the BSA.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Unit SOPs normally identify the requirement to report on-hand quantities. The chain of command and task force/battalion S4 must enforce the reporting standard established in the unit SOP.

(TA.4.1.1.4 Receive and Transmit Friendly Troop Information)

TREND 12
SUBJECT: CSS Reporting

OBSERVATION (Mech): Units do not report supply, maintenance, and personnel status to the combat trains command post (CTCP) in a timely manner.

DISCUSSION: Company/teams, specialty platoons, and attachments to the CTCP are all guilty of untimely and inaccurate reporting. As a result, the CTCP does not have an accurate status of each company in all classes of supply, maintenance, and its personnel strength, and the S4 cannot properly allocate limited resources to assist the commander in accomplishing his mission.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Company/teams must report accurately – by type – the amount of each class of supply on hand, numbers and types of casualties, and combat power by weapon system. This will allow the S4 and his staff in the CTCP to more accurately forecast the needs of the battalion for sustained operations.

2. The battalion has a standard report that is called in to the tactical operations center (TOC). First sergeants should use a similar report when calling the CTCP. At a minimum, all transmissions should include company front line trace, current slant, and Class III and V status. This will assist the CTCP in battle tracking.

3. References:
   a. **FM 12-6,** ***Personnel Doctrine.***
   b. **FM 10-14-2,** ***Guide for the Battalion S4.***
   c. **FM 101-5,** ***Staff Organization and Operations.***
   d. **FM 71-2,** ***The Tank and Mechanized Infantry Battalion Task Force.***
   e. **FM 71-1,** ***The Tank and Mechanized Infantry Company Team.***
   f. **TC 12-17,** ***Adjutant's Handbook.***

(TA.4.1.1.4 Receive and Transmit Friendly Troop Information)

TREND 13
SUBJECT: Signal System Integration

OBSERVATION (Brigade Staff): Units do not fully integrate all signal systems into the mission.

DISCUSSION: This is caused by the S6's lack of asset visibility, poor operator proficiency level, and the staff not fully understanding the capabilities and limitations of organic and external signal assets.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Develop a signal asset tracking system to include other available systems from CS and CSS units and a comprehensive training program that seeks to educate users at all echelons (commanders to equipment operators).

(TA.4.1.2 Manage Means of Communicating Information)

TREND 14
SUBJECT: Signal Soldier Maintenance of Communications Equipment

OBSERVATION (Brigade Staff): Customer support by signal soldiers to ensure the communications architecture is installed, operated, and maintained, is not to standard.

DISCUSSION: During several rotations, brigades/regiments have experienced difficulty with mobile subscriber radio telephones (MSRTs), digital nonsecure voice telephones (DNVTs), digital subscriber voice terminals (DSVTs), blackjack fax machines, enhanced position location reporting system (EPLRS) situational awareness (SA) hosts, combat service support (CSS) automation systems, and other communications equipment. While this equipment is owned and operated by the user, it is the signal soldier that must be the subject matter expert (SME) on communications equipment. Units do not have enough knowledge of their organic communications equipment, and signal soldiers are not always proactive in ensuring the entire communications architecture is operational.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Signal soldiers must have the knowledge to troubleshoot and maintain the communications architecture per **FM 11-43, *Signal Leader's Guide***. Continue to train signal soldiers to become experts on all communications and automation equipment.

2. The signal soldier must also be able to train the users to become self-reliant. Place emphasis on signal soldiers providing proactive signal support to help users decide how to install, maintain, operate, and troubleshoot their equipment.

3. Ensure the system control (SYSCON) and node management teams are actively checking all systems in the communications architecture.

(TA.4.1.2 Manage Means of Communicating Information)

TREND 15
SUBJECT: Mobile Subscriber Equipment (MSE) Communications Networks

OBSERVATION (Brigade Staff): Mobile Subscriber Equipment (MSE) communications networks are seldom planned or designed to support a dynamically phased operation on the modern battlefield.

DISCUSSION: During several battles, signal companies have maintained relatively static networks that do not react to changes in different phases of each battle and do not react to battlefield conditions that trigger network reconfiguration.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Node centers and radio access units (RAUs) must be prepared for rapid movement and must react to each phase of the battle. During the defense, MSE planners must plan additional locations for forward-deployed elements for survivability purposes, and several locations should be identified for short-notice jumps. Close coordination with the brigade S6 section and battle tracking is required to ensure MSE assets react to offensive and defensive operations.

2. Conduct realistic training by planning and executing dynamic networks that support each phase of the mission and cover the width and depth of the battlefield.

   a. Train on developing triggers that support the expansion of the network during offensive operations.

   b. Plan and execute defensive operations that utilize alternate locations and react to battlefield triggers.

   c. Train on battle tracking down to team level to ensure all signal teams have situational awareness and know how and when to reconfigure the network.

(TA.4.1.2. Manage Means of Communicating Information)

TREND 16
SUBJECT: Enhanced Position Locating and Reporting System (EPLRS)

OBSERVATION (Brigade Staff): Units do not make maximum use of EPLRS.

DISCUSSION:

1. Control measures (boundaries, phase lines, mine fields, routes) are not always input into the database.

2. Net control station (NCS) operators can enter predesignated items prior to and during each mission to provide users valuable situational awareness information.

3. The tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) for inputting this information usually includes passing critical information from the brigade tactical operations center to the system control (SYSCON)/battalion command (BATCON) and down to the NCS operator.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Develop standing operating procedures (SOP) and checklists that ensure situational awareness information is put into the EPLRS database.
2. Once the SYSCON/BATCON receives brigade graphics, NCS operators can enter basic operational information.
3. Establish lines of communication to ensure valuable situational awareness information during a mission can be entered into the system in a timely manner.
4. Establish and train on TTP to enter situational awareness information during all deployments of the EPLRS network.

(TA.4.1.2 Manage Means of Communicating Information)

TREND 17
SUBJECT: Use of Super High-Frequency (SHF) Radios

OBSERVATION (Brigade Staff): Signal companies do not come to the NTC prepared to use SHF radios.

DISCUSSION:

1. SHF radios can provide critical connectivity for CPs that set up in locations without line of sight (LOS) to node centers.
2. SHF radio links can improve ultrahigh frequency (UHF) LOS radio interference problems by decreasing the amount of UHF LOS radio links.
3. Companies conduct minimal training on SHF operations and do not attempt to use these radios because it is perceived to be too difficult. Out of six rotations, SHF radio links have been attempted only once.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Conduct training on the installation, operation, and maintenance of SHF radio systems.
2. Utilize SHF radio systems to establish communications for command posts that do not have line of sight to node centers.
3. Utilize SHF radio links when possible to decrease interference in congested areas.

(TA.4.1.2 Manage Means of Communicating Information)

TREND 18
SUBJECT: Use of Combat Net Radio Interface (CNRI)

OBSERVATION (Brigade Staff): Brigade combat teams (BCTs) do not utilize the CNRI systems.

DISCUSSION:

1. Signal companies usually ensure the systems are operational and conduct frequent tests of these systems.
2. Combat net radio operators usually are not trained on how to conduct a CNRI call and do not understand the capabilities of the system.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Conduct user training for the BCT on CNRI capabilities and operation.
2. Incorporate training on CNRI for all combat net radio operators.

(TA.4.1.2 Manage Means of Communicating Information)

TREND 19
SUBJECT: Contingency Planning for Command and Control (C2) Systems

OBSERVATION (Armor): Planning for C2 systems support is inadequate.

DISCUSSION:

1. The C2 plan is seldom wargamed during the planning process, resulting in only one-dimensional planning for C2 assets.
2. Redundant C2 is not incorporated into the plan.
3. Units do not react to failures in the retransmission system and, as a result, scouts cannot communicate.
4. If the tactical operations center (TOC) is destroyed, the combat trains command post (CTCP) is not in a position to take over the fight.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Incorporate "PACE" into each phase of the operation. EXAMPLE (scout mission):

P - Primary means of C2 (retransmission)
A - Alternate means (relay/scout retransmission)
C - Contingency C2 (move to last point of C2)
E - Emergency (runner/send someone back; switch to another net)

(TA.4.1.2 Manage Means of Communicating Information)

TREND 20
SUBJECT: Processing DA Forms 1155 (Witness Statement) and 1156 (Casualty Feeder Report)

OBSERVATION (Mech): Task force S1s seldom have an established procedure for collecting and processing DA Forms 1155 and 1156.

DISCUSSION:

1. Task forces frequently do not have a system to reconcile the number of DA Forms 1155 and 1156 received versus the number of casualties.
2. First sergeants (1SGs) do not ensure that the appropriate form is filled out prior to evacuation or properly completed prior to the next logistics package (LOGPAC).

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Every soldier must be trained on proper procedures for completing DA Forms 1155 and 1156.
2. First sergeants must ensure that they have a complete form on every casualty, to include soldiers returned to duty. The 1SGs must understand the importance of these reports and ensure that every soldier who is wounded has DA Forms 1155 and 1156 processed. The information provided on DA Forms 1155 and 1156 are needed to prepare letters of condolences/sympathy and award recommendations. Replacement operations cannot commence until these forms are gathered in the FTCP.
3. Technique: The S1 places one representative from his section in the MAS and one in the FAS. These individuals are responsible for collecting DA Forms 1155 and 1156 from the casualties. The S1 representatives then return the forms to the S1 at the CTCP. 1SGs bring the forms for the killed in action (KIA) and missing in action (MIA) to the logistics release point (LRP). The S1 collects them all, reconciles the number with each company/team's personnel report and the medical platoon's casualty log, then sends them to the field trains command post (FTCP) for the personnel services NCO (PSNCO) to process.

(TA.4.1.2 Manage Means of Communicating Information)

TREND 21
SUBJECT: Communications Plan Synchronization

OBSERVATION (Mech): Signal officers (SIGOs) do not adequately coordinate with other members of the battle staff during mission analysis to synchronize the communications plan.

DISCUSSION:

1. Lack of coordination results in SIGOs that do not fully understand the task force mission and the goals of each battle staff officer for each phase of the operation.
2. SIGOs are not able to determine the most suitable locations for the tactical operations center (TOC) and the retransmission team.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. SIGOs should use the talents of other battle staff officers to tailor the communications plan to the task force mission.
2. Ensure time is set aside to provide the XO/S3 an opportunity to review the plan before it is briefed. This enables the XO/S3 to help the SIGO focus his plan to meet the task force commander's intent.
3. Refer to **FM 11-43, *Signal Leader's Guide***.

(TA.4.1.2 Manage Means of Communicating Information)

TREND 22
SUBJECT: Control Nodes

OBSERVATION (Light/Abn): Task forces do not effectively transfer control between nodes.

DISCUSSION: Staffs do not effectively transfer control between the TOC and TAC during operations. Initially, the staff does not understand the importance of determining which control node should be established during critical events. There is no format to exchange information between the two nodes, and communications checks are not conducted. Finally, no guidons call is conducted to announce which one has the fight. This frequently results in a combination of the following:

- Both nodes moving simultaneously.
- Radio calls and reports to the node that does not have the fight.
- Inability to communicate with either higher headquarters or subordinate elements.
- A node taking the TF fight without a clear understanding of the current friendly and enemy situations.
- The TOC not established at critical points during the battle.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Establish an SOP for transfer of control in the TOCSOP.
2. Ensure the correct nodes are established at critical junctures of the battle (**FM 101-5**, ***Staff Organization and Operations***, page 5-23).
3. Develop a standard SITREP for passing information from nodes before displacement or upon arrival.
4. Ensure communication checks are made with all higher and subordinate units before assuming control. Make a guidons call with acknowledgment once assuming control of the fight.

(TA.4.1.2 Manage Means of Communicating Information)

TREND 23
SUBJECT: Single Channel Tactical Satellite (TACSAT) Systems

OBSERVATION (Light/Abn): Units lack training on all types of single channel tactical satellite systems.

DISCUSSION: Units often arrive at the National Training Center with a variety of single channel TACSAT systems, and none are used effectively at the task force level. This trend is directly linked to lack of home station training on the equipment. Although many light infantry units do not have single channel TACSAT as part of their MTO&E, they always receive the systems either from their parent brigade or from the home station signal battalion. Typically, these systems are stalwart performers and are often the backbone of a task force's long-range communication plan. Whether or not these systems are on the unit's MTO&E is irrelevant. Light infantry units have been using these TACSAT systems for years, and it is imperative that soldiers are trained to standard on them.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Set time aside for all 31Us to become proficient at installing, operating, and maintaining the various single channel TACSAT systems. The division signal battalion is likely to have many experts who can assist in this effort.

(TA.4.1.2 Manage Means of Communicating Information)

TREND 24
SUBJECT: Ground Tactical Situational Awareness

OBSERVATION (Aviation): Aviation units are not aware of the ground tactical situation.

DISCUSSION:

1. Aviation units are not aware of nor do they brief the ground scheme of maneuver. The aviation task force provides generalizations of the BCT scheme of maneuver and does not provide subordinate commanders with complete BCT graphics, resulting in instances of fratricide.
2. The aviation task force does not conduct forward passage of lines (FPOL) or rearward passage of lines (RPOL) when conducting cross-forward line of troops (FLOT) operations.
3. Because of this lack of awareness, the aviation task force plans air corridors that do not take advantage of friendly positions and BCT combat multipliers (jammers, mortars, etc.) when planning and executing missions. Units rely too heavily on organic capabilities to accomplish missions.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Integration with the ground tactical plan begins with the liaison officer (LNO) at the BCT and continues to the individual crew. The LNO provides the aviation task force with the BCT plan and complete graphics, as well as integrating the aviation commander's plan into the BCT plan through routing and utilization of the BCT combat multipliers. Once the aviation task force receives the BCT plan, the task force must thoroughly brief that plan to the company commanders during the OPORD, provide complete consolidated graphics to the companies, and brief the plan during the rehearsal.
2. Company commanders must ensure all crewmembers have BCT graphics on their flight maps and have all BCT frequencies available in the cockpit for use during contingencies. Additionally, the company commander must brief the overall BCT plan during the company OPORD.
3. For cross-FLOT operations, the battalion/task force must be prepared to conduct passage of lines with the BCT. To better execute the passage of lines, collocating the aviation

tactical command post (TAC) with the BCT TAC or TOC is ideal to facilitate situational awareness throughout the BCT.

4. If necessary, individual crews must be prepared to drop to individual ground maneuver task force nets to share information, update intelligence, and coordinate actions in the close fight.

(TA.4.1.3 Maintain Information and Force Status)

TREND 25
SUBJECT: Tracking Reconnaissance and Surveillance (R&S) Asset Status

OBSERVATION (Brigade Staff): The S2 or designated chief of reconnaissance does not adequately track and maintain the status of collection assets.

DISCUSSION: This lack of a tracking system significantly hampers the unit's ability to monitor its collection plan, identify gaps in coverage, evaluate reporting, and make adjustments/ refinements as necessary.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: The chief of reconnaissance or S2 should prepare a simple chart that includes the named area of interest (NAI) currently monitored by a tasked observer, as well as the observer's communication status. This chart should include all alternate observers as well. The chart and status should be maintained in both the tactical operations center (TOC) and tactical command post (TAC).

NAI	OBSERVER	COMMO	ALT OBSERVER	COMMO
1	TF SCOUT	YES	COLT 2	YES
2	COLT 1	YES	JSTARS	YES
3	OH-58	NO	RETRANS	YES
4	GSR	YES	TF SCOUT	NO

(TA.4.1.3Maintain Information and Force Status)

TREND 26
SUBJECT: Situational Awareness – Signal

OBSERVATION (Brigade Staff): Situational awareness in signal units is inadequate.

DISCUSSION:

1. S6s seldom achieve or gain the information needed to provide situational awareness, a complete picture of signal assets, and how the unit as a whole is supported through communications.

2. Subordinate unit signal officers (SIGOs) do not provide asset visibility or coordinate their communications effort with the brigade SIGO. This leads to an unsynchronized signal plan that causes units to suffer communications outages during critical times during the battle.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Develop a system that produces cross-talk among SIGOs, such as a signal huddle or conference calls at predetermined times of the day, and integrate the S6 into the brigade combined arms rehearsal.

(TA.4.1.3 Maintain Information and Force Status)

TREND 27
SUBJECT: Battle Tracking – Signal

OBSERVATION (Brigade Staff): Unit S6s do not adequately track the battle.

DISCUSSION: Predictive analysis is not conducted to ensure the communications network provides the required support to the commander's operational plan. Unit S6s do not adequately track the commander, tactical command post (TAC), enemy/friendly situation, decision points, and battlefield shapers to quickly adjust the signal plan/network in order to overcome foreseen difficulties/problems and make the needed recommendations.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Develop a system that allows the S6 to quickly and efficiently see the unit, terrain, and enemy in order to adjust the plan/network when needed.

(TA.4.1.3 Maintain Information and Force Status)

TREND 28
SUBJECT: Battle Tracking and Situational Awareness

OBSERVATION (Brigade Staff): Node center sites and remote sites often do not effectively track the battle and have poor situational awareness.

DISCUSSION: Graphics and information from operations orders are not always available down to team level. Key information (including the front line trace of enemy and friendly units and NBC contamination) is not always tracked or disseminated. Significant equipment and casualties occur because of inadequate battle tracking and situational awareness. Units make improvements with each rotation, but additional training is highly recommended.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Continue to focus on battle tracking and developing situational awareness at all levels.
2. Educate key leaders and operations personnel on battle tracking methods, and study FM 101-5-1.
3. Develop standardized methods of receiving information from higher headquarters and disseminating information down to the soldier level.
4. Use every field training exercise to train on these areas.
5. Conduct NCO and officer professional development, emphasizing battle training.
6. Refer to **FM 101-5-1**, ***Operational Terms and Graphics***.

(TA.4.1.3 Maintain Information and Force Status)

TREND 29
SUBJECT: Battle Tracking and Battle Update Briefs

OBSERVATION (FS): Most battalion tactical operations centers (TOCs) have charts to track information, but they are not updated on a consistent basis during the fight.

DISCUSSION:

1. Information is not logged in or properly routed to all key staff members.
2. Units are unable to consistently track the locations and status of the maneuver units on the battlefield.
3. Critical information, such as ammunition status and unit disposition, is not adequately tracked throughout each battle.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. The unit should identify the critical information that must be tracked.
2. Identify specific messages that must be processed in the TOC, and use pre-printed message forms that provide multiple copies.
3. Refer to **FM 6-20-1, *Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Field Artillery Cannon Battalion***, for duties and responsibilities of TOC personnel. Train this at home station.

(TA.4.1.3 Maintain Information and Force Status)

TREND 30
SUBJECT: Tracking of Chemical Slice Units

OBSERVATION (Mech): Staffs lose situational awareness of attached chemical slice elements during the battle.

DISCUSSION: Loss of situational awareness by the tactical operations center (TOC) could result in the attaché unit losing situational awareness on the battlefield.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Integrate chemical slice battle tracking into home station training.
2. Develop tracking charts to track personnel, logistics, and the maintenance status of chemical slice elements.

(TA.4.1.3 Maintain Information and Force Status)

TREND 31
SUBJECT: Split-base Operations/Jump Tactical Operations Center (TOC) Operations

OBSERVATION (Mech): During rotations S2 sections often operate from two different locations.

DISCUSSION: This operation creates unforeseen difficulties on the sections because they have never trained on this task or planned redundancy and manning into it. The result is confusion and loss of situational awareness at key moments in the battle.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Develop tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) and practice them during home station training events.
2. For jump TOC personal, create a second set of charts that fit in a three-ring binder. A recommended list includes a map, extra supplies such as pens and alcohol, battle damage assessment (BDA) chart, reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) asset chart, journal (blank), enemy course of action (ECOA) sketches, and priority intelligence requirements (PIR) list.
3. Address how many people are going forward.
4. Ensure that the jump TOC is staffed to monitor both internal operations and the intelligence (O/I) net and brigade O/I net. Having only one radio means you are only getting half the intelligence.
5. Create a checklist of what the S2 must brief prior to and after the jump.

(TA.4.1.3 Maintain Information and Force Status)

TREND 32
SUBJECT: Battle Tracking in the Unit Maintenance Collection Point (UMCP) Command Post (CP)

OBSERVATION (Mech): UMCPs do not maintain a clear situational awareness of tactical operations on the battlefield throughout the course of each battle.

DISCUSSION:

1. Graphics posted on the map board are not explained to the CP NCOIC and are not updated with key information.
2. CPs do not keep a log of important radio traffic.
3. Battalion maintenance officers (BMOs) do not have a clear picture of the battle and cannot build one because no information is available.
4. CPs do not track the maintenance battle. They do not update the battle board with non-mission capable (NMC) vehicles, their locations, and status throughout the rotations. As a result, the BMO and battalion maintenance technician and sergeant (BMT/BMS) are never able to quickly update their notes when they are away from the UMCP for any period of time.
5. Other than the BMO, maintenance personnel in the UMCP CP do not have the experience necessary to properly track the battle.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Train on CP operations at home station. UMCP CP personnel must be given the knowledge and experience needed to function as a UMCP "battle captain."
2. Establish a UMCP CP for all training exercises and then train CP personnel on how to run a functional CP. Train both in the field and in garrison.
3. As you train the personnel, determine the right configuration for the CP. Once the configuration is set, include a diagram of it in the UMCP tactical SOP (TACSOP) as well as a page outlining the duties and responsibilities of CP personnel.
4. Train on the types of information that must be tracked, such as frontline traces, contaminated areas, family of scatterable mines (FASCAM), enemy positions, and broken-down vehicle locations.
5. Establish tracking charts and a logbook, and provide supplies (such as stickies and push pins) so that the CP has all the essential equipment needed to do the job.

(TA.4.1.3 Maintain Information and Force Status)

TREND 33
SUBJECT: Task Force Tactical Operations Center (TOC) Battle Tracking

OBSERVATION (Mech): Task forces do not adequately track battle information in the TOC.

DISCUSSION:

1. Priority intelligence requirements (PIR), commander's critical information requirements (CCIR), and decision support matrix (DSM) updates are not routinely posted in the TOC.
2. Without PIR/CCIR and DSM updates, predictive analysis is difficult, and the TOC is unable to identify the arrival at decision points during the battle or track the triggers established with key events.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Institute an information management system within the TOC that incorporates PIR/CCIR and DSM information updates. This will focus the staff collection effort and allow the TOC to be predictive in the recommendations forwarded to the task force commander.

(TA.4.1.3 Maintain Information and Force Status)

TREND 34
SUBJECT: Jump TOC Operations

OBSERVATION (Mech): Units do not have a viable jump TOC to enable the task force to sustain operations in the offense.

DISCUSSION: None.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: The signal officer (SIGO) and the task force executive officer (XO) must develop a viable jump TOC.

- Identify vehicles and personnel from the main command post in the planning phase.
- Deploy according to a tactical trigger (friendly element crosses a designated phase line during the task force attack) and establish command, control, and communication.
- The main CP then displaces forward while the jump TOC controls the battle.

(TA.4.1.3 Maintain Information and Force Status)

TREND 35
SUBJECT: Command Post (CP) Battle Tracking

OBSERVATION (Mech): CPs generally do not establish a viable tracking system to maintain updated information for the commander on a daily basis.

DISCUSSION:

1. Most company CPs do not mature into combat multipliers for the commander. Important information, such as combat power, supplies on hand, or priorities of work, are often not tracked or updated.
2. CPs are not proficient in the graphic reproduction or construction of an accurate terrain model.
3. CPs often deploy without a supply of DA Forms 1594.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Improve company CP operations per guidance in **FM 7-10, *The Infantry Company***, Chapter 2, page 2-9.
2. Recommend that company 1SGs establish an annex in the company tactical SOP (TACSOP) that lists specified tasks for CP protocol/activities and articulates required reports and responsibilities for each member of the company headquarters.

(TA.4.1.3 Maintain Information and Force Status)

TREND 36
SUBJECT: Battle Tracking and Clearance of Fires

OBSERVATION (Light/Abn): Task force fire support elements (FSEs) deploy to the NTC untrained at battle tracking and at clearing fires.

DISCUSSION: The task force FSE's ability to battle track and clear fires directly affects the responsiveness and safe employment of fire support assets. Units that do not have a standard

for managing fire support coordination measures (FSCMs) and a well-rehearsed drill for clearing fires greatly increases the conditions for fratricide.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. IAW **FM 6-20-40**, ***Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Fire Support for Brigade Operations (Heavy)***, all command posts (CPs) and operations centers should have a drill to clear fires. They must develop and include a clearance of fires battle drill into the task force and fire support SOPs.
2. The task force should exercise information dissemination within the tactical operations center (TOC) using standardized message formats during all task force level training events.
3. Ensure the situation map in the FSE is updated along with the main battle map in the TOC with the same unit symbol convention.

(TA.4.1.3 Maintain Information and Force Status)

TREND 37
SUBJECT: Tracking of Supply Status

OBSERVATION (Light/Abn): Tracking of supply status in both the combat and field trains is inadequate.

DISCUSSION: The combat trains command post (CTCP) must maintain asset visibility across the task force, and the field trains command post (FTCP) must maintain visibility of available assets throughout the forward support battalion (FSB) to be successful. Without knowing on-hand quantities across the task force, the S4 cannot anticipate needs. Likewise, without knowing available quantities throughout the FSB and corps, the HHC commander cannot accurately predict shortfalls and allow the S4 to establish timely prioritization of available classes of supply. The CTCP generally does not accurately track and forecast unit supply status. This is largely the result of undisciplined logistics status (LOGSTAT) submissions. This inability to "see yourself" prevents proper forecasting and planning of resupply and ultimately prevents the TF from establishing a battle rhythm for their CSS operations.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Companies must be more disciplined in accurately reporting and submitting the LOGSTAT to the battalion S4.
2. The CTCP must maintain visibility of on-hand quantities at the company and specialty platoon levels as well as quantities packaged for emergency resupply.
3. Translating on-hand quantities to "bubble charts" remains a necessary step to paint the overall TF logistical picture.

(TA.4.1.3 Maintain Information and Force Status)

TREND 38
SUBJECT: Battle Tracking/Information Management

OBSERVATION (Light/Abn): The task force has challenges with information management.

DISCUSSION: The tactical operations center's (TOC's) ability to manage information and perform TOC functions for the commander improves throughout the campaign, but still requires refinement. A full discussion of these requirements is found in **FM 101-5**, ***Staff Organization and Operations***, Chapter 1, and **CALL Newsletter No. 95-7**, ***Tactical Operations Center***. The following comments highlight the challenges that TOCs experience:

- Adjacent unit tracking is sporadic. Also, no clear system exists for responsibility on plotting information on the map. Sometimes it is the S2, the XO, the battle captain, or even the shift NCO.
- Battle tracking charts in the TOC are somewhat effective. The task force has appropriate charts in the current operations cell of the TOC, but they generally are not updated.
- Staff huddles and shift change briefs are effective when used, but shift change briefs are frequently not conducted. The use of these huddles allows the battle captain and XO to integrate all combat function representatives into the fight.
- TOCs experience severe challenges integrating and synchronizing resources for the commander. Although huddles are used, not all combat function representatives are present (engineers are frequently in the TOC and ADA personnel only sporadically in light task forces).

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: The following recommendations will assist the TOC to correct the above identified challenges:

- Recommend the use of the "map NCO" to post information and icons on the maps (**CALL Newsletter No. 95-7**, Section III, page 2). Adjacent unit tracking should also be addressed in the TOCSOP, defining the exact information required from those units.
- The TOC should identify one person to update the battle tracking charts on each shift. Clearly define the duties and responsibilities of the person in the TOCSOP.
- The XO must ruthlessly enforce the shift change briefs to ensure TOC personnel are prepared to control the fight for the commander. Train battle captains on conditions that would dictate conducting a huddle.

(TA.4.1.3 Maintain Information and Force Status)

TREND 39
SUBJECT: Battle Tracking

OBSERVATION (Light/Abn): Fire Direction Center (FDC) personnel have problems in receiving updated situation reports (SITREPs) from higher.

DISCUSSION:

1. Either they are not proactive in gaining this information, or it is not being sent down from the fire support officer (FSO) at the tactical operations center (TOC).
2. Computer records are not kept up to date along with data records.
3. Situation maps (SITMAPs) are not updated.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Train all FDC personnel in proper battle tracking techniques and in updating SITMAPs. Refer to **ARTEP 7-90-MTP**, ***Mission Training Plan for the Infantry Mortar Platoon, Section, and Squad,*** (pages 5-72 to 5-74, Collective Task: *Operate a Fire Direction Center*).
2. All important information should be logged on to DA Form 1594 and posted on the SITMAP for all leaders to observe and post on their graphics.

(TA.4.1.3 Maintain Information and Force Status)

TREND 40
SUBJECT: Target Refinement and Dissemination

OBSERVATION (Brigade Staff): Brigade fire support elements (FSEs) rarely have a system in place to accept target refinement and prevent target duplication.

DISCUSSION:

1. This process must be done in a manner that allows the observer and firing units ample time to ensure that their subordinates understand the refinement and to conduct technical rehearsals.

2. The brigade consolidated target list is often passed to the direct support field artillery battalion just hours prior to the brigade's line of departure (LD) time.

3. Task force fire support officers (FSOs) do not refine targets based on the top-down fire planning methodology. They plan additional targets with the assumption that the resource has been allocated if additional targets make the consolidated target list.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Brigades must enforce the target refinement cutoff time that is published in the fire support annex of the OPORD. This will allow the targeting officer time to deconflict target duplication, refine targets based on the latest information from the brigade S2, and disseminate the brigade consolidated target list to the direct support field artillery battalion and task force FSEs prior to the brigade fire support rehearsal and field artillery technical rehearsal.

(TA.4.2 Assess Situation)

TREND 41
SUBJECT: Target Refinement

OBSERVATION (Light/Abn): Artillery battalions deploy to the NTC with unclear standards for refining targets at the brigade, task force, and company levels.

DISCUSSION: This shortcoming creates friction that adversely affects the timeliness and effects of fire support. IAW **FM 6-20-40**, ***Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Fire Support for Brigade Operations (Heavy)***, target refinement must occur to link the observer to a firing unit in support of essential fire support tasks (EFSTs). Targets must be planned with well-defined tasks and purposes to enable a clear focus of fires. Refinement must be made based on the current situation template (SITEMP), terrain, suitability of observation posts (OPs), and the scheme of maneuver. Target refinement must be linked with the task force collection plan to confirm or deny enemy courses of action (COAs) and to ensure EFSTs are accomplished.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Target refinement (for targets, groups, and series) must be outlined in the unit standing operating procedures (SOP) and must specify the level that refinement is made. This may be based on the current mission. In the defense, the company fire support team (FIST) responsible for executing a target should refine the target. The task and purpose of the target will remain the same in order to accomplish the EFST. Target refinement in the offense should not be made any lower than the task force level and disseminated down to company FIST for execution.

(TA.4.2 Assess Situation)

TREND 42
SUBJECT: Information Analysis

OBSERVATION (Engineer): During most campaigns, engineer battalion tactical operations centers (TOCs) do not adequately create tools to analyze information and make recommendations to the engineer battalion commander or BCT commander.

DISCUSSION:

1. Engineer company TOCs do not adequately submit the required commander's cards, survivability matrixes, directed obstacle matrixes, obstacle overlays, situational obstacle matrixes, and timelines.

2. Engineer battalions do not adequately provide quality control and consolidate graphics.

3. Engineer battalions inconsistently produce decision support matrices. When produced, friendly engineer events triggered by decisions are normally not clearly linked to BCT decisions and synchronized during the wargame. As a result, these decision support tools are of little value to the commander during execution.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Engineer battalions and company TOCs must develop and enforce the reporting requirements and timelines and create countermobility and survivability glide paths.

2. Improve on the use of decision support matrixes to support decision making.

3. Capture friendly mobility/countermobility/survivability (M/C/S) events triggered by BCT decisions in the BOS synchronization matrix or the BCT decision support matrix (DSM). Refer to Appendix A, **FM 34-130**, ***Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield,*** and Appendix H, **FM 101-5**, ***Staff Organization and Operations***.

(TA.4.2 Assess Situation)

TREND 43
SUBJECT: Mission Analysis

OBSERVATION (Mech): Units too often do not conclude their mission analysis process with a briefing to the commander.

DISCUSSION:

1. Functional representatives do not regularly complete the mission analysis process with a mission analysis brief to the commander. As a result, critical information is retained by each of the functional representatives and is brought out only when called for during wargaming.

2. The directed course of action (COA) that surfaces during the wargame process often has critical limitations.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Ensure the mission analysis brief is conducted per guidance in **FM 101-5, *Staff Organization and Operations***, Chapter 5.

2. The mission analysis brief can either be briefed to the task force XO/S3 or to the task force commander prior to his issuance of the directed COA.

(TA.4.2.1.1 Analyze Mission)

TREND 44
SUBJECT: Fire Support Mission Analysis

OBSERVATION (Light/Abn): The task force fire support officer's (FSO's) mission analysis lacks sufficient detail for the commander to issue guidance and for the staff to fully develop a course of action (COA).

DISCUSSION:

1. The only information usually provided is the essential fire support tasks (EFSTs) extracted from the brigade operations order (OPORD) and brigade fire support annex.

2. The task force FSO excludes the detailed information pertaining to the task force's responsibilities to execute the brigade's fire support plan, as well as the status of fire support assets necessary to accomplish each EFST.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. The TF FSO must begin his mission analysis by identifying assets available, specified and implied tasks, EFSTs, and fire support capabilities and limitations.
2. IAW the ***White Paper, Fire Support Planning for the Brigade and Below***, the FSO must provide the commander detailed information on the concept of the brigade's fire support plan and how the task force is nested into the brigade plan.
3. The FSO should develop a method for depicting the current capabilities and limitations of fire support assets in the task force. Items to address are: M981 fire support vehicles, task force mortar platoon status and ammunition on hand, company mortar section status and ammunition on hand, and current requests for information that will affect the mission.
4. The FSO should recommend EFSTs for the mission.

(TA.4.2.1.1 Analyze Mission)

TREND 45
SUBJECT: Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP)

OBSERVATION (Aviation): Battalions do not execute effectively in a time-constrained decision-making process.

DISCUSSION:

1. Staffs begin the MDMP with mission analysis, but do not adequately execute the remaining steps of the process. Following the mission analysis brief to the commander, the staff habitually returns to their separate work areas and completes the orders process without further staff integration. This limits synchronization in the plan, particularly between the S2, S3, and FSO.
2. Commanders habitually do not issue clear, finite guidance throughout the process to ensure the plan satisfies the higher commander's intent.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Battalion staffs must execute all steps of the MDMP to completion, with the commander
integrally involved from mission analysis to execution. This can be accomplished by including a "Plans" chapter in the unit tactical standing operating procedures (TACSOP) that discusses each step of the MDMP and clearly states each staff member's roles, responsibilities, and required products.
2. The battalion executive officer must establish and enforce a timeline and ensure that all staff members participate in the process.
3. In a time-constrained environment, staff members must clearly understand prioritization of planning products (TACSOP "Plans" chapter) and know which are "non-negotiable."
4. While some MDMP steps can be shortened in a time-constrained environment, course of action (COA) development and wargaming are critical to battlefield operating system (BOS) synchronization and must not be omitted/not completed to standard in order to meet a timeline.

(TA.4.3 Determine Actions)

TREND 46
SUBJECT: Integrating Liaison Officers (LNOs) into the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP)

OBSERVATION (Aviation): Aviation LNOs are not fully integrated into the BCT's planning process.

DISCUSSION:

1. LNOs provided to the BCT are very qualified to perform the mission, but are unable to provide the task force with the required information to support the BCT. The only contribution to the BCT MDMP is validation of the missions the BCT requested from the aviation task force.

2. The LNO does not provide the aviation task force with the basic information that the unit requires to execute the mission. Information, such as division support area (DSA)/brigade support area (BSA) locations, mission loads for CSS resupply missions, ambulance exchange point (AXP) and Level 2 medical support locations for CASEVAC missions, and forecasts for future missions based on the BCT planning process, are not provided in a timely manner.

3. By not being integrated into the BCT process, LNOs are relegated to last-minute planning efforts for missions requiring other BOS support. For example, the aviation task force is tasked to emplace an air Volcano. The only information the LNO provides is a location for the minefield. The aviation task force is then left to plan routes, coordinate for suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD), and determine the exact task/purpose of the minefield. Had the LNO been fully integrated in the BCT planning process, all those requirements would have been identified and synchronized by the LNO.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. LNOs must establish a fully integrated relationship with the BCT prior to arrival at the National Training Center.

2. The LNO must be aware of the BCT SOP and planning process and be able to participate as a player in the BCT MDMP process. The LNO must be aware of aviation task force capabilities (attack, cavalry, GS, medical lift) and combat power status to provide the BCT commander with an accurate portrayal of what aviation can do for the BCT.

3. The LNO must have continuous communication with the aviation task force to ease coordination requirements between the BCT and the task force.

(TA.4.3 Determine Actions)

TREND 47
SUBJECT: Air Defense Integration into the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP)

OBSERVATION (Brigade Staff): The air defense officer (ADO) lacks the necessary understanding of the MDMP and therefore is unable to conduct the proper coordination and provide the necessary input to effectively integrate the air defense artillery (ADA) battlefield operating system (BOS).

DISCUSSION:

1. The air defense (AD) plan is often developed without considering whether it can be logistically supported.

2. ADOs are not providing input into the development of the reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) plans.

3. Units do not use all available technology, such as Terrabase and air and missile defense work station (AMDWS), to enhance the development of the ADA plan.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Units must start with educating leaders on the MDMP process. Battery commanders, battery executive officers, and AD LNOs must clearly understand how to effectively integrate the ADA BOS into the entire process.

2. ADA battalions should develop leader-training programs that force battery leadership to demonstrate their understanding of this critical process. Battalion staffs can develop an MDMP scenario where the battalion staff operates as a BCT plans team.

3. The battalion executive officer or S3 can plan, supervise, and AAR the MDMP drill. Moreover, NCOPDs can be conducted to teach 1SGs and platoon sergeants (PSGs) how to integrate combat service support (CSS) planning into the MDMP.

4. Leaders must understand how the radars and night-capable AD systems can be integrated into the reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) plan.

5. Educate BCT battle staffs on ADA capabilities and further encourage a combined arms approach to warfighting. If the BCT leadership does not possess a fundamental understanding of what ADA brings to the fight, then internal staff dynamics will often result in the air defender's recommendations being pushed aside.

(TA.4.3 Determine Actions)

TREND 48

SUBJECT: Military Intelligence (MI) Company Asset Integration into the Planning Process

OBSERVATION (Brigade Staff): MI company assets are not integrated into planning the brigade scheme of maneuver or the reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) effort during the brigade military decision-making process (MDMP).

DISCUSSION: Brigade R&S and MI company planners struggle to provide adequate focus for ground surveillance radar (GSR) teams, signal intelligence (SIGINT) and counter intelligence on named areas of interest (NAIs), and priority intelligence requirements (PIR) to support the BCT R&S plan.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. The analysis control team (ACT) should draft a comprehensive MI company assets matrix to fully synchronize the MI company systems effort with the brigade scheme of maneuver and R&S plan.

2. The matrix should be developed during the brigade wargame and refined prior to the company OPORD.

3. The matrix should show the brigade's decision points and what actions each asset should take at that time or leading up to that event.

4. The R&S plan should be included with the MI company OPORD.

5. All actions must be thoroughly discussed at the company rehearsal so the teams are fully aware of their actions and what contingencies they must prepare for.

6. The ACT should be the focal point for all operations conducted by the MI company's assets.

(TA.4.3 Determine Actions)

TREND 49

SUBJECT: Integrating Casualty Evacuation (CASEVAC) into the Brigade MDMP

OBSERVATION (Brigade Staff): Units do not adequately integrate CASEVAC into the MDMP.

DISCUSSION:

1. The S1 does not prepare a casualty estimate for each mission, breaking it down by phase or critical points during the battle.
2. The S1 struggles to coordinate the combat health support (CHS) team during the brigade MDMP.
3. The result is that the medical planning cell is not able to allocate evacuation assets based upon an estimate or the brigade scheme of maneuver.
4. The composition of the ambulance exchange point (AXP) is not weighted, and nonstandard evacuation (air and ground) assets are not distributed based upon the task force maneuver plan or the casualty estimate.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. The S1 and CHS planning team should provide input for the mission analysis brief and receive the commander's guidance in person.
2. The S1 must analyze courses of action (COAs) to project personnel battle losses and determine how CSS provides personnel support during operations.
3. The S1 must coordinate the actions of the CHS team on how they can best support the brigade scheme of maneuver.

(TA.4.3 Determine Actions)

TREND 50
SUBJECT: Military Police (MP) Casualty Evacuation (CASEVAC) Planning

OBSERVATION (Brigade Staff): Preparation for casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) procedures is inadequate to support the missions of the MP platoon.

DISCUSSION:

1. The plan for CASEVAC issued during the majority of platoon operations orders (OPORDs) states that the brigade headquarters and headquarters company (HHC) or forward support battalion (FSB) will provide CASEVAC for the platoon, or the MP teams will perform self-evacuation.
2. MP squads routinely operate forward of the HHC and FSB with the maneuver units. This is especially the case when supporting brigade deliberate attack operations.
3. Self-evacuation is not possible when a vehicle is destroyed and/or casualties are required to be evacuated by litter.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. The CASEVAC plan should identify locations of all medical elements throughout the depth of the battlefield in which MP teams will operate. This should include locations of forward ambulance exchange points (AXPs), the battalion aid station (BAS), and air CASEVAC landing zones. The platoon sergeant (PSG) should attend the CSS rehearsal where this information is provided, and disseminate the information to his subordinate MP teams conducting missions.
2. As a contingency plan, the PSG should be prepared to provide non-standard CASEVAC for his personnel.
3. The platoon medic can be tasked to conduct prior coordination with medical units to determine available support.
4. Refer to **FM 8-10-4**, ***Medical Platoon Leader's Handbook, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures.***

(TA.4.3 Determine Actions)

TREND 51
SUBJECT: Integration of the Judge Advocate (JA) into the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP)

OBSERVATION (Brigade Staff): JAs are rarely integrated into any phase of the MDMP.

DISCUSSION:

1. JAs do not participate in the mission planning process. This lack of integration hampers their situational awareness of the battlefield and contributes to problems with information flow that is needed to accomplish the various missions required of the brigade combat teams.

2. When JAs are involved in the planning, they are able to increase battle staff awareness of legal and civil-military operation (CMO) issues.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Include the JA and legal clerks in home station command post exercise (CPX), situational training exercise (STX), and field training exercise (FTX) planning and training.

2. Ensure that the JA understands the MDMP and reviews the commander's guidance before it is issued. Include the JA in initial phases of the MDMP. The JA should review operation plans (OPLANs), operations orders (OPORDs), and fragmentary orders (FRAGOs) at the lowest level possible.

3. The JA should coordinate and be included with the brigade combat team (BCT) battle staff.

(TA.4.3 Determine Actions)

TREND 52
SUBJECT: S6 Integration into the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP)

OBSERVATION (Brigade Staff): The S6 is inadequately integrated into the MDMP.

DISCUSSION:

1. Inadequate integration of the S6 leads to underdeveloped, unsynchronized, and misunderstood signal plans that do not fully support the brigade/regiment throughout the width and depth of the battlefield.

2. Other staff members who rely on communications to execute their plans too often do not successfully coordinate signal requirements.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: The S6 and other members of the staff (XO, S1, S2, S3, S4, and FSO) must gain a complete understanding of signal matters as it relates to each staff function. This new understanding will lead to ensuring the S6 is completely involved in all phases of the MDMP. Ultimately, this will result in a coordinated and synchronized signal plan.

(TA.4.3 Determine Actions)

TREND 53
SUBJECT: Products Required for the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP)

OBSERVATION (Armor): Units seldom develop all the products required to support the MDMP.

DISCUSSION:

1. There are often no checklists developed to ensure the completeness of situation templates (SITEMPs).

2. There is usually only one SITEMP produced by the S2.
   a. No staff input during intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB).
   b. No detail in the SITEMP.
3. Event templates are not developed or used during the MDMP.
4. The staff only wargames one enemy course of action (COA).

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. The S2 must develop more than one SITEMP.
2. The SITEMP should be an integrated staff product.
3. Detail, detail, detail.
4. Depict all enemy combat multipliers.
5. Produce and use event templates.
6. Wargame multiple enemy COAs.

(TA.4.3 Determine Actions)

TREND 54
SUBJECT: Integration of the Signal Officer (SIGO) into the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP)

OBSERVATION (Armor): The SIGO is seldom integrated into the planning process.

DISCUSSION:

1. As a result of a lack of integration, signal support is not synchronized across the width and depth of the area of operations.
2. There is no synchronization of command and control (C2) node locations and movement to support the scheme of maneuver.
3. There is no synchronization of retransmission systems.
4. There is no synchronization of Force XXI and mobile subscriber equipment (MSE) systems.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Get the SIGO to the table.
2. Discuss each phase by BOS to integrate the signal plan.
3. If time does not permit detailed discussion, revisit the C2 plan.
4. Ensure adjacent unit coordination with other units and higher headquarters to provide redundancy.

(TA.4.3 Determine Actions)

TREND 55
SUBJECT: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Planning

OBSERVATION (Mech): NBC planning is neither an integrated nor coordinated effort.

DISCUSSION:

1. Task forces conduct planning for chemical defense, smoke, chemical reconnaissance, and decontamination in a vacuum.
2. Plans are often not coordinated with adjacent units or not disseminated to subordinate units.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: NBC must be integrated throughout the military decision-making process to ensure complete understanding by the commander, staff, and subordinate units.

(TA.4.3 Determine Actions)

TREND 56
SUBJECT: Integration of CSS into the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP)

OBSERVATION (Mech): Units typically develop courses of action (COAs) and wargame them without including a representative from the S1 or S4.

DISCUSSION: The battalion executive officer (XO), when present, focuses on the employment of the maneuver forces without considering what impact allocation of CSS assets will have on the fight. This becomes apparent when the unit is forced to conduct refueling operations at an inopportune time during the fight.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Establish in the standing operating procedures (SOP) who will be present during MDMP and enforce attendance.

(TA.4.3 Determine Actions)

TREND 57
SUBJECT: Casualty/Combat Health Support (CHS) Estimates

OBSERVATION (Mech): Units do not use casualty/combat health support estimates to plan medical support for the task force.

DISCUSSION: The end result is a reactive medical plan instead of a well-anticipated proactive plan.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. The medical platoon leader should know how the TF is task organized – what each of the supported elements are doing, when they will do it, and how they will do it.
2. He must correctly predict support requirements after analyzing the concept of operations, using the S1's casualty estimate, and by developing a combat health support estimate that determines number of casualties, medical assets required, and priority (by type and unit) requiring medical support.
3. He assesses support capabilities by understanding the requirements and asking the following questions:
   - What CHS resources are available (organic, attached/OPCON, and higher headquarters)?
   - When are CHS resources available to support the maneuver units?
   - How can resources be made available?

(TA.4.3 Determine Actions)

TREND 58
SUBJECT: CSS Integration into the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP)

OBSERVATION (Light/Abn): Task force planning rhythms often do not allow the inclusion of the S4/S1 in the MDMP.

DISCUSSION: Excluding CSS planners from the MDMP results in concept of support development after the task force order is issued. This does not allow the task force to conduct

appropriate support rehearsals or to infuse bottom-up refinement of the plan from company first sergeants.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. The task force executive officer must ensure that each battlefield operating system is adequately represented during the MDMP.

2. The S4/S1 must construct logistics/personnel estimates IAW **FM 101-5**, ***Staff Organization and Operations***. The infusion of these estimates into the MDMP will enhance the task force's ability to see itself logistically and contribute to the production of more realistic plans. These estimates further enable the TF to identify CSS and CASEVAC shortcomings, better position CSS assets and medical treatment teams, and develop plans for the use and C2 of these assets.

(TA.4.3 Determine Actions)

TREND 59
SUBJECT: Integrating Combat Health Support (CHS) into the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP)

OBSERVATION (Light/Abn): CHS planning and rehearsals are inadequate because of a lack of integration into the planning process.

DISCUSSION:

1. Medical platoon leaders are not adequately integrated into the MDMP or included in planning casualty estimates for the battalion task force.

2. The CHS plan is usually developed, coordinated, and synchronized long after the battalion task force maneuver plan is established. The result is a reactive medical plan rather than a proactive plan.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. The medical platoon leader should be involved in each step of the battalion task force's MDMP to properly develop the CHS plan.

2. He must predict support requirements IAW **FM 101-10-1/2**, ***Staff Officers Field Manual – Organizational, Technical, and Logistical Data (Volume 2),*** and develop a CHS estimate IAW **FM 8-55**, ***Planning for Health Service Support***.

(TA.4.3 Determine Actions)

TREND 60
SUBJECT: Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP)

OBSERVATION (Light/Abn): Task force staffs do not understand how to conduct the MDMP in a time-constrained environment.

DISCUSSION:

1. Generally, the task force executive officer (XO) allows the staff to conduct course of action (COA) development for one hour and then begins wargaming. At no time between commander's guidance and wargaming does the staff assemble to ensure they have a fully developed COA with all the required elements as highlighted in **FM 101-5**, ***Staff Organization and Operations,*** page 5-14.

2. The product of the wargame is actually a fully developed COA that has not been analyzed.

3. The task force combined arms rehearsal regresses into a wargame as subordinate leaders try to get clarification on issues that the staff should have resolved earlier in the MDMP.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Train the staff to properly conduct the MDMP in a time-constrained environment until it becomes a battle drill. Develop a staff training program at home station using the information in FM 101-5, Appendix K.

2. Develop a plans SOP focusing specific attention on the two most challenging steps of MDMP: COA development and COA analysis.

(TA.4.3 Determine Actions)

TREND 61
SUBJECT: Course of Action (COA) Development

OBSERVATION (Armor): COAs are too often developed during the wargame.

DISCUSSION:

1. The staff typically receives one directed COA from the commander and the wargame then becomes COA development of the commander's plan.
2. The plan has little or no flexibility and is often based on one enemy COA.
3. Commanders often become heavily involved in wargaming.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. The S3 must develop multiple COAs.
2. The staff must refine directed COAs prior to wargaming.
3. Commanders who give good guidance after mission analysis rarely need to be involved in the wargame.

(TA.4.3.2 Develop Courses of Action)

TREND 62
SUBJECT: Course of Action (COA) Development

OBSERVATION (Light/Abn): COAs are routinely incomplete and lack specificity as outlined in FM 101-5, *Staff Organization and Operations,* Chapter 5.

DISCUSSION:

1. Incomplete COA development leads to a chain reaction of shortfalls in the military decision-making process (MDMP). As a result, the immature COA undergoes significant revisions during the wargame. Because of the effort spent in refining the COA, the wargaming process fails to accomplish its intended purpose, as many critical events and decision points are not identified. The OPORD is then published before the plan has been fully synchronized, which becomes evident during the rehearsal as the commander and staff use the rehearsal to wargame their plan.

2. Participants depart the rehearsal with significant modifications to their plan and well-intended coordination. However, these late changes are not fully coordinated and disseminated within the task force. The result is a poorly synchronized execution at task force level.

3. COA development is a collective staff task that requires full battle staff participation. Whether refining a single directed COA or developing multiple COAs, the staff must ensure the COA meets the criteria outlined in FM 101-5: suitable, feasible, acceptable, distinguishable, and complete. Completeness of the COA is directly attributable to the integration of the complete battle staff.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Units should conduct additional home station staff training on COA development and refine their SOPs so that they are better prepared to develop a complete COA in a time-constrained environment.

(TA.4.3.2 Develop Courses of Action)

TREND 63
SUBJECT: Wargaming

OBSERVATION (FS): Instead of a wargame, the battalion conducts a synchronization drill without integrating an uncooperative enemy, the terrain, friendly maneuver forces, field artillery (FA) task organization, communications, and logistics.

DISCUSSION: This results in the staff not having a detailed plan or fully understanding through analysis the strengths and weaknesses of their chosen course of action (COA).

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Follow the deliberate wargaming process outlined in **FM 101-5**, ***Staff Organization and Operations***.

(TA.4.3.3 Analyze Courses of Action)

TREND 64
SUBJECT: Wargaming

OBSERVATION (Mech): The wargaming process does not consistently result in a synchronized scheme of maneuver.

DISCUSSION: A synchronized scheme of maneuver must be developed during wargaming and briefed to subordinate leaders during the task force OPORD.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Conduct the wargaming processes IAW **FM 101-5,** ***Staff Organization and Operations***, Chapter 5.
2. Gather all the tools necessary to conduct the wargame, such as the synchronization matrix and the technique to be used (box, avenue of approach, or belt), and ensure all staff members are present.
    a. Consider beginning the synchronization with the decisive point.
    b. Utilize the matrix to facilitate the process and allow input from all combat functions.
    c. Establish a timeline and stick to it. A technique is to slot a specific amount of time per event; for example, 30 minutes for the R&S event and 30 minutes for the main attack, or organized IAW each enemy COA.
3. The XO or the S3 must orchestrate the process and is responsible for controlling the timeline.
4. Adhere to the ACTION-REACTION-COUNTERACTION technique.
5. The commander should, at a minimum, check on the process, provide guidance, and ensure that the course of action (COA) still meets his intent.
6. Certain aspects of the operation, such as direct fire control measures, breach planning, and development of the decision support matrix (DSM), must be synchronized during this process and not addressed as an afterthought.

(TA.4.3.3. Analyze Courses of Action)

TREND 65
SUBJECT: Use of Section Standing Operating Procedures (SOP)

OBSERVATION (Brigade Staff): S2 sections frequently do not have an internal SOP.

DISCUSSION: The lack of an SOP results in soldiers having a vague understanding of their roles, duties, and responsibilities. This leads to duplication of effort in some areas, while other tasks are not accomplished.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Establish a section SOP that defines individual/soldier duty descriptions.
2. All section members should become familiar with this SOP and implement it during all training.
3. Update the SOP after every exercise.

(TA.4.4 Direct and Lead Subordinate Forces)

TREND 66
SUBJECT: Troop-Leading Procedures (TLP)

OBSERVATION (Brigade Staff): Although warning orders (WARNOs) and 5-paragraph operations orders (OPORDs) are provided in sufficient detail, FM retransmission teams deploy without situational awareness and proper preparation for the impending operation.

DISCUSSION: Signal soldiers are unprepared for the battle due to mismanagement of time coupled with a lack of understanding of troop-leading procedures.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Refer to **FM 101-5**, ***Staff Organization and Operations,*** and **FM 11-43**, ***Signal Leader's Guide,*** to assist in TLP and integration of the orders process.
2. Ensure the 1/3 - 2/3 rule is exercised to provide adequate time for teams to fully prepare for operations, and issue a detailed mission brief/order (including graphics).
3. Rehearse teams to ensure complete understanding of the plan (confirmation brief, map rehearsal, communications/technical rehearsal).

(TA.4.4 Direct and Lead Subordinate Forces)

TREND 67
SUBJECT: Time Management

OBSERVATION (Brigade Staff): Units often deploy without having refined their ability to maximize available time.

DISCUSSION:

1. Units do not rapidly establish timelines that include all the critical actions that must be completed prior to mission time (orders, rehearsals, PCC/PCIs, leader's recon, boresight, resupply, rest).
2. Leaders do not make liberal use of warning orders (WARNOs) to disseminate information.
3. Poor time management often results in crews being unable to sustain 24-hour operations. Specifically, ADA fire units are often asleep when enemy air is in sector.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Leaders at all levels need to practice troop-leading procedures (TLP) at all times.

2. Daily garrison activities provide excellent opportunities to become familiar with the TLP. This will significantly enhance the ability to maximize use of available time in the field.

3. Develop and use SOPs that account for the full scope of activities required of platoons/firing units prior to executing combat operations.

(TA.4.4 Direct and Lead Subordinate Forces)

TREND 68
SUBJECT: Time Management

OBSERVATION (Mech): Air defense platoon leaders continue to struggle with developing timelines.

DISCUSSION: The deficiency in time management hampers priorities of work, troop-leading procedures, pre-combat checks (PCC)/pre-combat inspections, and overall mission accomplishment.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Develop and distribute an initial timeline when publishing the warning order (WARNO) and refine this timeline throughout the planning process.

2. The platoon leader and platoon sergeant must adhere to the timeline and ensure that their subordinates comply to it.

3. Designate a "timeline coach" who keeps the platoon aware of the current time, time available, and current and future tasks at hand as designated by the platoon leader.

(TA.4.4 Direct and Lead Subordinate Forces)

TREND 69
SUBJECT: Duties and Responsibilities of Signal Personnel

OBSERVATION (Brigade Staff): Brigade S6s struggle to ensure that the liaison officer (LNO) and all signal section members contribute to the mission.

DISCUSSION: The LNO and signal section members' lack of knowledge (TLP, MDMP, tactical proficiency), inexperience, and understanding of their inherent duties and responsibilities seriously degrades the brigade S6's ability to properly plan the BCT's communications network.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Provide specific duties and responsibilities to each member of the team and ensure that all completely understand and are capable of accomplishing each duty/task.

2. Ensure that the MDMP and TLP are understood and what will be accomplished by whom during each phase.

3. Implement training that focuses on increasing tactical proficiency within the team.

4. Ensure that the S6 and signal battalion clearly delineate the duties and responsibilities of the LNO prior to deployment.

(TA.4.4 Direct and Lead Subordinate Forces)

TREND 70
SUBJECT: Crew Drill

OBSERVATION (FS): Reinforcing battalion fire direction centers (FDCs) does not develop functional crew drills.

DISCUSSION: The lack of a functional crew drill prevents FDCs from quickly and efficiently attacking targets, ensuring fires do not violate fire support coordinating measures (FSCMs), and analyzing target type and battery status to determine proper firing unit to engage targets. Without an established crew drill, FDC leadership cannot train their soldiers on individual roles during execution of fires.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. The FDC crew must standardize its crew drill and rehearse it.
2. Incorporate the crew drill into the unit tactical standing operating procedures (SOP).
3. The following is an example that units can modify to meet specific needs.

Crew Member	*Action*
Computer Operator/RTO	- Receives the call for fire (CFF). - Announces data to the FDC.
Recorder	- Records the CFF data in the fire mission log.
FDO/FDNCO	- Reviews the CFF data. - Plots the target on the firing capabilities map to check for FSCM violations, determine target altitude and determine which unit can range the target. - Analyzes the target for attack. - Determines the fire order. - Awaits the S3's clearance and approval of the CFF.
S3	- Approves or disapproves, and clears the CFF.
FDO/FDNCO	- Announces the fire order to the FDC, or ends the mission.
Computer Operator	- Makes the required entries in the message format.
FDO/FDNCO	- Physically verifies that the data entered by the operator are correct. - Authorizes transmission to the firing unit.
Computer Operator	- Transmits the fire mission to the firing unit.
Recorder	- Enters data into the fire mission log.
RTO FDO/FDNCO	- Sends the message to observer (MTO) as required. - Informs the S3 that the mission has been sent or ended.
Computer Operator/RTO	- Upon receipt of shot or the mission-fired report (MFR), announces the data to the FDC.
Recorder	- Completes entries in the fire mission log. - Decrements the ammunition count for the number of rounds or rockets fired.
FDO/FDNCO	- Announces MFR or shot to the S3. - Ends the mission as required.

TREND 71
SUBJECT: Logistics Package (LOGPAC) Timelines

OBSERVATION (Mech): Units are consistently challenged with meeting LOGPAC timelines.

DISCUSSION:

1. On average, LOGPACs are taking 7.5 hours from BSA departure to return.
2. First sergeants are allowed to maintain their LOGPAC for an average of five hours, whereas *the standard average is three hours*.
3. Results of not meeting LOGPAC timelines:
   a. Support platoons are rendered combat ineffective due to fatigue.
   b. Support platoons often miss bulk fuel and ammo draws.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: If support platoon leaders do not have the support of their 1SGs and the S4s, they should elevate the issue to the task force XOs and CSMs. Enforcing the three-hour standard allows the units more flexibility in preparing for and executing future operations.

(TA.4.4 Direct and Lead Subordinate Forces)

TREND 72
SUBJECT: Tracking Priorities of Work

OBSERVATION (Mech): The task force tactical operations center (TOC) frequently does not have a current status of completion of the priorities of work within the task force.

DISCUSSION:

1. This problem is more evident in defensive operations and improves during the rotation.
2. Contributing factors include:
   a. Poor time management.
   b. Lack of tracking systems.
   c. Inadequate information flow into the TOC from subordinates.
   d. Inadequate cross-talk between the combat functions within the TOC.
   e. Poor information management within the TOC.
3. The TOC, commander/S3, and subordinate elements often have a different status of priority of work completion.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Most task forces have generic offensive and defensive tracking charts in their task force tactical SOP (TACSOP). Task forces need to further develop the charts into mission-specific charts as early as the receipt of the brigade combat team (BCT) WARNO.
   a. The charts should be founded in the commander's priorities of work across all combat functions at task force level through company/team level.
   b. Include tasks to be completed, task priority, NLT time correlated to the task force timeline, and task completion percentages to facilitate updates on items such as obstacles and engagement area development.
   c. The information documented on the mission-specific charts enables the tactical operations center (TOC) to inform the commander when the unit is falling behind the glidepath and refocus additional assets to meet the commander's intent.

2. Refer to the **CALL Newsletter No. 95-7, *Tactical Operations Center (TOC)***, for additional information.

(TA.4.4 Direct and Lead Subordinate Forces)

TREND 73
SUBJECT: Company Priorities of Work and Time Management

OBSERVATION (Mech): Companies are unable to manage priorities of work and the timeline during the occupation of the defense in a constrained environment.

DISCUSSION:

1. Inadequate management of priorities of work and timelines is affecting engagement area development, direct fire planning, rehearsals, and overall conduct of the defense.
2. Leaders do not know their individual duties and responsibilities within the company's priorities of work as stated by the company commander.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Develop and institute a checklist as part of the company tactical SOP (TACSOP) for leaders to follow during defensive preparation.
2. Refer to **FM 7-10, *The Infantry Company***, Chapter 5.

(TA.4.4 Direct and Lead Subordinate Forces)

TREND 74
SUBJECT: Mortar Platoon SOPs

OBSERVATION (Mech): Platoon SOPs are frequently not complete.

DISCUSSION:

1. Mortar platoons do not manage time well, specifically at the squad level. Troop-leading procedures are conducted sporadically, rehearsals are incomplete, and priorities of work are different for all squads in the platoons.
2. Platoon SOPs do not define the standard for each task or how and when they will be conducted.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Develop a complete SOP. The SOP is the unit's guide for how it conducts business. From the SOP, units identify or establish the standard for how they will plan, prepare, and execute their mission.
   a. A complete SOP enables the platoon leadership to be less directive, thus allowing more time to conduct pre-combat checks and pre-combat inspections (PCC/PCIs) and accomplish tasks.
   b. A complete SOP identifies the task and standard for each type of mission and specifies the order in which those tasks need to be conducted.
2. Use FMs and TMs to develop the initial SOP and then further refine it for specific use at platoon level, revising and prioritizing TTP as appropriate.

(TA.4.4 Direct and Lead Subordinate Forces)

TREND 75
SUBJECT: Air Defense Platoon Troop-Leading Procedures (TLP)

OBSERVATION (Mech): Bradley STINGER Fighting Vehicle (BSFV) platoon leaders do not conduct TLP to standard.

DISCUSSION:

1. BSFV squads lack situational awareness due to inadequate OPORD briefs, rehearsals, and graphics, and late linkup with company/teams.

2. Inadequate time management by air defense platoon leaders results in hasty OPORDs being issued to BSFV squads. The OPORDs frequently are not in the standard 5-paragraph format and do not include a risk assessment.

3. Crews often do not receive all graphics.

4. Rehearsals are not being conducted.

5. The result is that BSFV squads usually conduct linkup operations well after company/teams have rehearsed, and ADA section leaders are not able to make face-to-face cross-talk with the element for which they are providing coverage.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Platoon leaders must follow TLP to standard, establishing and strictly adhering to the 1/3 – 2/3 timeline.

2. Delegate some tasks to NCOs within the platoon.

3. Develop portions of the platoon OPORD parallel with the planning process. Paragraph 3 can be developed during the wargame process. Paragraph 2 can be developed during mission analysis while cross-talk is being done with the S2.

(TA.4.4. Direct and Lead Subordinate Forces)

TREND 76
SUBJECT: Managing Soldier's Combat Load

OBSERVATION (Light/Abn): A majority of light infantry units at the NTC do not adequately manage the soldier's combat load.

DISCUSSION: Units often do not have a plan or adequate resources to transport rucksacks, and tend to carry an *approach march load* during missions rather than a lighter *fighting load*.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Use butt packs or assault packs to carry the essential fighting load, and identify resources to transport rucksacks containing non-mission essential equipment during missions.

2. See **FM 7-10, *The Infantry Company***, Chapter 8, and **FM 21-18, *Foot Marches***, for a detailed discussion on managing the soldier's combat load.

a. Infantry battalion supplies and equipment required to support the soldier are stored at one of three echelons: the combat load (managed at company level), the sustainment load (managed at battalion level), and the contingency load (managed at division and higher).

b. The combat load should be further managed in an *approach march load*, designed to sustain the soldier until resupply, and the *fighting load*, which includes only the minimum essential equipment, clothing, and ammunition the soldier must carry to fight the current mission.

(TA.4.4 Direct and Lead Subordinate Forces)

TREND 77
SUBJECT: Tactical Operations Center (TOC) Personnel Management

OBSERVATION (Light/Abn): Most TOCs do not have an effective system to manage personnel during continuous operations.

DISCUSSION: Personnel management challenges the TOC's leadership. Some of the challenges are:

- Duties and responsibilities are not clearly defined. A rough draft exists in most tactical standing operating procedures (TACSOP), but it does not cover enough specifics. The operations sergeant and battle captain are not clearly defined as in charge of the entire TOC, resulting in ineffective management of slice personnel. **CALL Newsletter No. 95-7**, ***Tactical Operations Center (TOC)***, Part III, has a good example of duties and responsibilities for TOC personnel.
- Radio telephone operators (RTOs) in the TOC are the not well trained. Task forces often have no clearly defined screening process for RTOs in the TOC, and the RTO Certification Program only focuses on communications equipment maintenance. During most battles, the task force XO has one handset to his ear and the battle captain or shift NCOs have the others. RTOs are only used to record incoming traffic on DA Form 1594. This results in the TOC leadership missing key pieces of information as they are reported into the TOC, as well as an inability to analyze information and integrate resources for the commander. RTOs generally are also untrained on the ability to properly eavesdrop on the task force command net.
- Duties and responsibilities between the TOC/TAC/command group are frequently unclear. As the campaigns progress, these areas of emphasis are better defined, but the C2 facilities still often work against each other. Also, although situation reports (SITREPs) between the two C2 facilities get better, no format exists to allow the TAC and TOC to share information quickly.
- Shift management is not effective, resulting in either too few personnel in the TOC or too many leaders present when rest plans could be in effect.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Develop set duties and responsibilities by duty position for all personnel in the TOC. Include combat function representatives and place these in the TOCSOP. Ensure all personnel understand that the battle captain is "The Man" in the TOC if the XO is not present, and empower the operations sergeant/SGM and S3 battle NCOs as the senior leadership for all sections. Define responsibilities for TAC personnel, and ensure those tasks can be performed if that C2 facility displaces forward.
2. Develop an RTO Certification Program in the task force that focuses on both tactical RTO tasks (send/receive message, record message on appropriate forms) and communications maintenance/procedures.
3. Allow RTOs to speak on the radio, record incoming message traffic, and fill out DA Form 1594. This will free the TOC officers and NCOs to properly control the task force fight.
4. Define the duties and responsibilities of both the TOC and the command group in the task force TOCSOP. Develop a standard SITREP for these facilities to pass information to each other without congesting the task force command net.
5. Develop an effective shift system. Recommend either three 8-hour shifts or a shift wheel for use in the TOC. Either system provides the most flexibility for the TOC during sustained operations.

(TA.4.4 Direct and Lead Subordinate Forces)

TREND 78
SUBJECT: Time Management

OBSERVATION (Light/Abn): Units often do not perform detailed time analysis.

DISCUSSION:

1. This results in either lack of a timeline or simply a rehash of the higher headquarters' timeline.

2. Units that do not conduct parallel planning with the battalion are unable to develop a warning order (WARNO) containing general guidance for a tentative plan that includes task and purpose for subordinate units and preparation guidance for pre-combat checks (PCC)/pre-combat inspections (PCIs) and rehearsals.

3. Units do not establish and enforce priorities of work as soon as possible, resulting in idle soldiers during daylight hours.

4. Commanders and platoon leaders are often engaged in other aspects of troop-leading procedures (TLP). This leaves little time to confirm that specific tasks issued in the timeline are accomplished.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Commanders and platoon leaders should reference their individual unit SOPs and checklists to develop the detailed timelines required. This will ensure that essential tasks are accomplished and allow junior leaders to accomplish tasks without specific guidance.

2. A realistic timeline must include critical events from the task force timeline, company critical events, and PCC/PCIs.

3. See **FM 71-1**, ***Tank and Mechanized Infantry Company Team***, pages 2-25, 2-26, 2-41, and 2-53, for further assistance in developing these timelines and for the responsibilities of the company command post (CP).

(TA.4.4 Direct and Lead Subordinate Forces)

TREND 79
SUBJECT: ADA Platoon Troop-Leading Procedures (TLP)

OBSERVATION (Light/Abn): ADA platoons have problems following the basic TLP.

DISCUSSION:

1. Basic timelines are not established in a timely manner allowing adequate time for the 1/3 – 2/3 rule. ADA teams often receive information on the mission late or not at all. This causes late linkups with maneuver units and seriously affects the platoon's ability to properly prepare for combat.

2. The platoon leader seldom conducts platoon rehearsals or team chief backbriefs.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Platoon leaders should develop and implement a training program that follows the eight steps of TLP.

2. Early development of a timeline, which includes key events (i.e., OPORD and rehearsal times) from the task force, battery, and platoon, will enhance execution for the platoon.

(TA.4.4 Direct and Lead Subordinate Forces)

TREND 80
SUBJECT: Warning Orders (WARNOs)

OBSERVATION (Brigade Staff): Leaders at both the platoon and squad levels do not maximize the use of WARNOs to initiate movement and provide information about future missions.

DISCUSSION: Utilization of WARNOs is critical to mission accomplishment while operating in a time constrained environment and fluid battlefield. Following the initial mission analysis of the higher headquarters OPORD, a detailed WARNO may provide subordinate leaders with initial information on the enemy situation and area of operations (AO) while stating the mission and intent of the next two higher levels.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Leaders must be proficient in the format and information required for a detailed WARNO and understand that they will not immediately have a 100-percent solution for mission execution.

2. Platoons should develop SOPs for how and when updates to the WARNO will be disseminated, but cannot wait until they have all of the information prior to disseminating it to their soldiers.

3. Refer to **FM 17-98**, ***Scout Platoon***, Appendix A.

(TA.4.4.1 Prepare Plans or Orders)

TREND 81
SUBJECT: MP Platoon OPORD

OBSERVATION (Brigade Staff): Platoon OPORDs lack the necessary detail in each of the five paragraphs, and platoon operational graphics are not routinely developed to support the written OPORD.

DISCUSSION:

1. Sub-unit tasks and purpose are not clearly defined; coordinating instructions are not well organized or complete; and plans for CASEVAC, decontamination operations, and logistical support lack required details.

2. Utilization and understanding of operational graphics is lacking. Graphics are not routinely refined to focus on the platoon area of operations.

3. Graphics are not disseminated down to the team level.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Require platoon leaders, PSGs, and squad leaders to give OPORDs under the observation of an evaluator who then gives feedback on content and presentation.

2. Use a detailed OPORD format taken directly from a field manual such as **FM 101-5**, ***Staff Organization and Operations***, or **FM 17-98, *Scout Platoon*,** to ensure all paragraphs are fully developed.

3. All soldiers must develop a complete understanding of graphic control measures and operational overlays.

(TA.4.4.1 Prepare Plans or Orders)

TREND 82
SUBJECT: MP Platoon Task and Purpose

OBSERVATION (Brigade Staff): Specific tasks and purpose for the MP platoon are not listed in the brigade base order under "Tasks to Subordinate Units."

DISCUSSION:

1. When the MP platoon leader integrates the capabilities of his platoon and identifies specific missions to support the brigade operation, they are not routinely published in the brigade order.

2. Many times an MP annex is written by the platoon leader and included in the brigade OPORD. This addresses the concept of the operation for the MP platoon, but the annex is rarely read by anyone other than MP squad leaders.

3. In brigade deliberate attack orders, when the military police conducted only maneuver and mobility support operations, the brigade orders routinely identified the MP as the rear area security element as a default statement. This results in confusion within the brigade, especially for the forward support battalion (FSB) who is expecting MP support based on the brigade OPORD.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. The brigade OPORD should list the specific tasks and purpose for the MP platoon in paragraph three, rather than assuming that the military police will always be conducting rear area security.

2. The MP platoon leader may better utilize his limited time by developing a detailed WARNO for his platoon as opposed to writing an annex for the brigade OPORD.

(TA.4.4.1 Prepare Plans or Orders)

TREND 83
SUBJECT: NBC Annex to the Brigade Operations Order (OPORD)

OBSERVATION (Brigade Staff): The NBC annex to the brigade OPORD does not provide the information necessary for successful NBC operations.

DISCUSSION: The brigade chemical staff publishes an annex that does not adequately communicate how the BCT will conduct NBC operations to support the fight. The annex lacks the specificity and detail needed to provide units with all information required for successful NBC defense and smoke operations. This results in confusion among subordinate units and less effective support by the supporting chemical company.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: The NBC staff should produce an NBC annex which is concise, but effectively communicates the who, what, when, where, and why of NBC reconnaissance, decontamination, and smoke support operations on the battlefield.

(TA.4.4.1 Prepare Plans or Orders)

TREND 84
SUBJECT: Signal Plans

OBSERVATION (Brigade Staff): Signal plans lack sufficient detail.

DISCUSSION:

1. Signal annexes lack sufficient detail to provide adequate support. Although annexes provide locations of retransmission and radio access unit (RAU) teams, the annexes do not explain:
   a. Possible problem areas/dead space.
   b. Triggers to use the retransmission frequency or hop set.
   c. Locations of other signal assets in the unit's zone (node centers and MSE relay teams).
   d. Movement plans of signal units/teams.
   e. Frequency jump plan for single channel operations.
   f. Detailed pre-battle communications exercise instructions.
   g. Priority of maintenance for signal systems.
2. S6s do not plan for overwhelming success or catastrophic failure (contingency communications). This leads to a signal plan that provides insufficient redundancy.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. The S6 must coordinate constantly with all staff members and utilize all available tools (terrain analysis systems, mobile subscriber equipment [MSE] commander, or battalion command [BATCON]/system control [SYSCON]) to ensure sufficient detail is provided and complete signal support is rendered to the unit.

2. Planning must be completed early and with consideration for overwhelming success and catastrophic failure.

(TA.4.4.1 Prepare Plans or Orders)

TREND 85
SUBJECT: Decision Support Matrix (DSM)

OBSERVATION (Armor): Units often do not build a flexible plan and are not using the DSM to execute.

DISCUSSION:
1. Units often develop a single course of action (COA).
2. Units do not use the DSM to synchronize BOS elements.
3. When used, the DSM is often a post-rehearsal product. This is too late in the process.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. Develop a flexible plan based on decision points (DPs).
2. Develop a DSM format suited to the unit and train it at home station.
3. Use the DSM to *drive* the rehearsal.

(TA.4.4.1 Prepare Plans or Orders)

TREND 86
SUBJECT: Direct Fire Planning

OBSERVATION (Armor): Units do not have a clear concept of how to develop a direct fire plan.

DISCUSSION:
1. Units are unable to clearly delineate where they desire to kill the enemy and then develop graphic control measures that will distribute, focus, and shift fires appropriately.
2. Plans are not developed throughout the depth of the battle space.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. Develop SOPs at all levels that include standard means for focusing fires while preventing fratricide based on the principals of fire control (**FM 71-1**, ***Tank and Mechanized Infantry Company Team***, Chapter 2).
2. Use terrain boards and field exercises to train the SOP.
3. The plan must address contact from the line of departure (LD) to the limit of advance (LOA).

(TA.4.4.1 Prepare Plans or Orders)

TREND 87
SUBJECT: Field Trains Participation in the Task Force Orders Process

OBSERVATION (Mech): Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC) commanders do not adequately participate in the task force orders process.

DISCUSSION: HHC commanders have little *input* to the task force orders process. It is not always feasible for them to attend the planning process in person, but they must develop a system whereby input is provided to the S4s and task force CSS planning cell.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. HHC commanders should have the responsibility for establishing a liaison with the forward support battalion (FSB) and brigade combat team (BCT) administrative/logistics operations center (ALOC). This liaison allows them access to the BCT's planning process in the rear and facilitates their ability to develop a CSS WARNO for issuance over the task force administrative and logistics (A&L) net.

2. The CSS WARNO benefits task force S4s and 1SGs. The CSS WARNO should be disseminated over FM in such a timely manner that it supercedes the S4's receipt of the BCT OPORD (hard copy) via normal S3 LNO channels.

(TA.4.4.1 Prepare Plans or Orders)

TREND 88
SUBJECT: Field Trains OPORDs

OBSERVATION (Mech): HHC commanders do not routinely issue an OPORD to field trains personnel.

DISCUSSION: The HHC commander's responsibility as a supporter, vice fighter, does not negate his responsibility to publish an OPORD for each and every mission executed by the task force.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. HHC commanders should participate in home station training model operation order drills to practice development of the field trains order. This can be accomplished most effectively during periods when the battalion participates in brigade-run exercises, as the forward support battalion (FSB) will most certainly participate as a CSS node and produce an order of their own.

2. The HHC commander's OPORD must have a *broad dissemination* that includes:
   a. Support platoon.
   b. DFAC.
   c. HHC maintenance.
   d. S1 NCOIC.
   e. S4 NCOIC.
   f. Company headquarters section.

3. The HHC commander's OPORD should be a *hybrid* of sorts, which includes information from the task force maneuver order and the FSB support order, as well as elements of their own field trains defense (and save plan). HHC commanders must continue to improve and refine their own order's process, emphasizing significant information regarding the maneuver concept of the operation and the logistician's concept of support.

4. HHC commanders should take this exercise to the next level of development by constructing a sand table and briefing subordinates.

(TA.4.4.1 Prepare Plans or Orders)

TREND 89
SUBJECT: Unit Maintenance Collection Point (UMCP) Displacements

OBSERVATION (Mech): UMCPs do not have adequate displacement, jump, or save plans.

DISCUSSION:

1. When the tactical situation dictates that a UMCP should jump or displace, the UMCP is incapable of taking displacement action in a timely manner.

2. No measures are taken to increase the UMCP readiness condition based on enemy and friendly situations. Although triggers are sometimes established for UMCPs to escalate from a "green" to a "red" status in terms of preparedness to move, they are rarely, if ever, disseminated, and they are not based on a true estimate of the enemy's rate of movement or reconnaissance assets in zone/sector. And no real battle tracking is occurring in the UMCP, so any triggers that are established are almost useless.

3. Upon closure to a new location, no "save" plan is conducted. No alternate locations or routes to these locations are reconnoitered by map or in person. There is no established tow plan that identifies each vehicle to be towed and the vehicle that would tow it. This inadequate planning frequently results in the UMCP being overrun during penetrations.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Develop and define readiness conditions for the UMCP, such as REDCON Red/Amber/Green. Post this status and ensure that all personnel in the UMCP understand the current readiness level and when it upgrades or downgrades. Set the readiness status on pre-established triggers that are based on enemy and friendly situations and capabilities. *Track the situation* and *change the readiness condition* as depicted by triggered changes in the enemy and friendly posture.

2. Upon arrival into any new location, conduct a reconnaissance of routes in and out and of alternate locations within the area that would provide needed concealment while remaining centrally located to support the task force.

3. Prior to each battle, inventory all vehicles in the UMCP and establish a tow plan based on the vehicles that can move under their own power and those that cannot. Brief the plan to the operators, ensuring the plan is constantly updated as the status of vehicles changes. This requirement can be formatted into a checklist and placed in the maintenance SOP. Add the checklist to the priorities of work or priority of tasks upon arrival at the UMCP.

4. The unit should train UMCP displacement, to include gunnery training, during home station training.

(TA.4.4.1 Prepare Plans or Orders)

TREND 90
SUBJECT: Decision Support Template (DST)/Decision Support Matrix (DSM)

OBSERVATION (Mech): Task force staffs too often do not develop a DST or DSM to assist the commander in key decision points during the operation.

DISCUSSION: Decision points are sometimes discussed during the wargame process, but no products are developed.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Develop a DST or DSM during the military decision-making process (MDMP) per guidance in **FM 101-5, *Staff Organization and Operations***, Annex H.

(TA.4.4.1 Prepare Plans or Orders)

TREND 91
SUBJECT: Tactical Operations Center (TOC) Displacements

OBSERVATION (Mech): Units need to improve their TOC displacement procedures.

DISCUSSION:

1. The task force signal officer (SIGO) is often not adequately involved in the displacement plan to ensure new sites are feasible for communications to the company/teams and brigade combat team.

2. The displacement plan is not synchronized with the task force scheme of maneuver. As a result, the command and control (C2) node for the task force is not set during critical events in the scheme of maneuver.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Per guidance in **FM 71-123,** ***Tactics and Techniques for Combined Arms Heavy Forces: Armored Brigade, Battalion Task Force, and Company Team***, page1-48, command posts (CPs) may displace as a whole or by echelon. Displacement as a whole is normally done for short movements, with communications maintained by alternate means and minimal risk of degrading CP operations.

2. CPs normally displace by echelon. A portion of the CP, called a Jump CP, moves to the new location, sets up operations, and takes over operational control of the battle from the main CP. The remaining portion of the CP then moves to rejoin the Jump CP. The Jump CP consists of the necessary vehicles, personnel, and equipment to temporarily take over CP operations while the remainder is moving.

(TA.4.4.1 Prepare Plans or Orders)

TREND 92
SUBJECT: Company-Level Operations Orders (OPORDs)

OBSERVATION (Mech): Company orders usually do not contain enough detail to allow subordinate leaders to properly prepare their plans.

DISCUSSION:

1. Within paragraph one, commanders do not define the enemy composition or order of battle, strengths, weaknesses, current location, activities, most probable course of action, and most dangerous course of action.

2. Paragraph three often lacks a clear task, purpose, and end state for the company and subordinate units. Also lacking is a detailed scheme of maneuver that addresses the direct and indirect fire plan, movement formations and techniques, and actions on contact.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Refer to **FM 71-1**, ***Tank and Mechanized Infantry Company Team***, Appendix A.

2. Continue to work JANUS exercises at home station to improve the quality of the final product.

3. Use the parallel planning process to push information to subordinates as it becomes available. FM 71-1, Chapter 2, discusses the three warning orders issued during troop-leading procedures prior to the OPORD.

(TA.4.4.1 Prepare Plans or Orders)

TREND 93
SUBJECT: Direct Fire Planning

OBSERVATION (Mech): Companies too often do not successfully plan or brief a viable direct fire plan.

DISCUSSION:

1. Units normally plan for target reference points (TRPs) and assign responsibility for them, but do not complete the direct fire planning process.

2. Units often do not develop triggers for their fires or establish engagement and disengagement criteria and priorities for each weapon system.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Implement the principles of direct fire control as stated in **FM 71-1, *Tank and Mechanized Infantry Company Team***, Chapter 2, into the planning process and the company tactical SOP (TACSOP). Units that follow this guidance can ensure that targets are properly serviced within the engagement area and that ammunition is not wasted on targets that are out of range or previously engaged by another system.

(TA.4.4.1 Prepare Plans or Orders)

TREND 94
SUBJECT: Direct Fire Planning

OBSERVATION (Mech): Company commanders and platoon leaders do not develop detailed direct fire plans for offensive operations.

DISCUSSION:

1. Companies create viable direct fire plans for the objective area and support by fire (SBF)/assault by fire (ABF), but do not develop direct fire plans throughout the maneuver space.

2. Lack of detailed direct fire plans with adequate direct fire control measures during offensive operations results in a lack of focused scanning and direct fires. This limits the company's ability to quickly destroy an unexpected enemy. By not developing a direct fire plan for the approach, the controlling of direct fire has to be talked through and achieved through lengthy and sometimes confusing FM transmissions once actions on contact are complete. This often prevents the company from achieving mass and lethality at platoon and company level.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Planning of direct fires and control measures should address the eight principles of fire control as discussed in **FM 71-1, *Tank and Mechanized Infantry Company Team***, Chapter 2.

2. These direct fire plans must be rehearsed by phase at company and platoon rehearsals just as movement and indirect fires by phase or event are rehearsed.

(TA.4.4.1 Prepare Plans or Orders)

TREND 95
SUBJECT: Task Force Fragmentary Orders (FRAGOs)

OBSERVATION (Light/Abn): Task forces do not issue effective FRAGOs during execution.

DISCUSSION:

1. Task force commanders issue clear guidance to companies during execution, but the TOC and TAC do not capture his guidance.

2. The TOC often fails to synchronize resources for the commander after his decision.

3. No 5-paragraph FRAGOs are issued, no means to track subordinate element understanding exists, and not all BOS function representatives provide input to ensure smooth execution.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. When there are major changes to the TF scheme of maneuver, issue a complete 5-paragraph FRAGO.

2. The battle captain should conduct a huddle with all combat function representatives, brief the commander's decision, then give a time limit for representatives to provide feedback.

3. Place all gathered information on a blank FRAGO format, read the FRAGO over the task force command net, and receive acknowledgment from all subordinates.

(TA.4.4.1 Prepare Plans or Orders)

TREND 96
SUBJECT: Company-Level Operations Orders (OPORDs)

OBSERVATION (Light/Abn): Company OPORDs include only a vague paragraph four, and platoons are not issued combat service support (CSS) overlays.

DISCUSSION:

1. Company-level OPORDs do not include sufficient detail in paragraph four (service and support) to allow platoon sergeants (PSGs) to conduct effective CSS operations.

2. OPORDs lack locations of battalion ambulance exchange points (AXPs), locations of and procedures for emergency resupply, controlled or restricted supply rates on ammunition, plans for refueling operations, and priorities of maintenance.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Company commanders should write paragraph four IAW **FM 7-10**, ***The Infantry Company***, and **FM 101-5,** ***Staff Organizations and Operations***.

2. At a minimum, paragraph four should address Class I, III, V, and medical and maintenance priorities and evacuation.

3. Platoons should be issued a complete CSS overlay to allow PSGs to assume the 1SG or XO's role if necessary.

(TA.4.4.1 Prepare Plans or Orders)

TREND 97
SUBJECT: Rehearsals

OBSERVATION (Aviation): Companies and battalions often do not conduct rehearsals or, when conducted, are not to standard.

DISCUSSION:

1. Primary reasons for inadequate rehearsals are no discussion of the BCT and task force schemes of maneuver, absence of key personnel, and lack of key terrain relief to adequately portray the proposed battle area.

2. Aviation rehearsals rarely include action-reaction-counteraction.

3. Company rehearsals are rarely conducted due to company commanders' beliefs that the battalion rehearsal satisfies the requirement of a company-level rehearsal. By attending only the battalion rehearsal, aircrews do not discuss key company events such as formation departure from the tactical assembly area, bump plan, and key actions in the objective area. If companies do execute a rehearsal, it is more of a backbrief format without any discussion of enemy actions.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Commanders at all levels must set the standard for rehearsals. Commanders must have a clear vision of the end state for the rehearsal and rehearse until all members of the team understand the plan.

2. A standardized terrain model kit is a useful tool and reduces setup time.

3. Commanders must properly allocate time for rehearsals and closely guard this time to ensure that rehearsals are not bypassed.

4. Companies and battalions should routinely conduct rehearsals at home station. It is critical for subordinates to see the rehearsal standard and to work tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) that best facilitate the team's understanding of the mission.

5. Once the unit has established and validated its TTP, they must be incorporated into the unit standing operating procedures (SOP).

6. Commanders and battalion staff should attend company-level rehearsals. This allows the company to get questions answered immediately and ensures that the company understands its mission within the overall battalion plan.

(TA.4.4.1.1 Develop and Complete Plans or Orders)

TREND 98
SUBJECT: MI Company Rehearsals

OBSERVATION (Brigade Staff): Company commanders either do not conduct rehearsals or do not conduct them to standard.

DISCUSSION:

1. Company rehearsals must be conducted. Rehearsals help soldiers visualize and synchronize the concept of the operation.

2. MI companies struggle with putting rehearsals in their timeline. The lack of an MI company rehearsal is detrimental to the synchronization of both movement within the company and the BCT's scheme of maneuver.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Rehearsals should be attempted during daylight hours, with a full terrain board and with as many soldiers as possible. All team leaders should be present at an MI company rehearsal.

2. All players should be on the rehearsal board at the same time. Building a larger rehearsal board will help facilitate this.

3. With regard to the actual terrain board, the following are some TTP that have been successful at the NTC:

- Use 1/4 or 3/8 colored nylon rope for graphic control measures. It will not blow away in the wind, is smaller than engineer tape, and is easier to see than 550-foot cord.
- Use wooden blocks to replicate units. Most rehearsals at company level do not use 5"x8" cards that blow away.

(TA.4.4.1.1 Develop and Complete Plans or Orders)

TREND 99
SUBJECT: ADA Rehearsals

OBSERVATION (Brigade Staff): Platoons and batteries routinely struggle in conducting effective rehearsals.

DISCUSSION:

1. Units lack basic knowledge of how to conduct a rehearsal.

2. Battery rehearsals are conducted only about 20 percent of the time. When conducted, they are usually done without all key leaders present and lack sufficient detail to adequately synchronize the overall air defense concept to support the BCT scheme of maneuver.

3. The executive officer is normally tasked to play the uncooperative OPFOR air commander, but generally has little knowledge of the threat because the liaison officer (LNO) has done all the planning for the mission.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Leaders need to become familiar with the different types of rehearsals and what resources are needed to execute them.
2. Units must ensure that the rehearsal is included on the timeline and that ALL key leaders are present.
3. Rehearse the rehearsal. Standardized scripts for key leaders should be crafted and incorporated into the battery SOP.
4. The LNO can normally coordinate to have one of the assistant S2s (NCO/officer) attend the battery rehearsal to ensure that understanding of the air threat is tied to the enemy commander's ground scheme of maneuver.
5. The battery commander should conduct his rehearsal prior to the combined arms rehearsal.
6. Incorporate the overall BCT timeline (i.e., ADA rehearsal, FS rehearsal, combined arms rehearsal, CSS rehearsal) during home station training.

(TA.4.4.1.1 Develop and Complete Plans or Orders)

TREND 100
SUBJECT: NBC Rehearsals

OBSERVATION (Brigade Staff): NBC reconnaissance, decontamination, and smoke support are not adequately rehearsed.

DISCUSSION:

1. NBC and smoke operations are not given adequate attention during brigade combined arms and CSS rehearsals.
2. Coordination to ensure that everyone knows the plan and is ready to execute their portion of it is not conducted between task force and brigade chemical staffs.
3. As a result, there is no common picture of how the brigade will conduct NBC operations.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. The brigade should adequately address NBC and smoke operations in its combined arms and CSS rehearsals.
2. Chemical staffs should conduct FM rehearsals prior to mission execution to ensure everyone knows the plan and is prepared to execute their tasks. These rehearsals can be conducted on the chemical company frequency. Participants should include the BCT and task force chemical officers, chemical company commander, decontamination and smoke platoon leaders, and the NBC reconnaissance element leader.

(TA.4.4.1.1 Develop and Complete Plans or Orders)

TREND 101
SUBJECT: CSS Rehearsals

OBSERVATION (Brigade Staff): Brigades struggle with effective rehearsals.

DISCUSSION:

1. Leaders are not sure how to conduct a proper CSS rehearsal. As a result, units come to the rehearsal conducting backbriefs and wargame positions of their ambulance exchange points (AXPs), forward aid station (FAS), main aid station (MAS), and other key CSS assets.
2. Battalion/task forces, separate troops, and companies do not bring their task force graphics or CSS annexes.
3. Units identify tentative positions for their unit maintenance collection points (UMCP), combat trains command post (CTCP), FAS, MAS, and other logistical assets with little understanding of the brigade scheme of maneuver or enemy templated positions.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Require that representatives from all units, including the air LNO, attend and brief their casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) plan.
2. Require company-sized units that are dependent upon area support to attend the CSS rehearsal prepared to brief all aspects of Classes III, V, medical and maintenance (35MM).
3. Develop a rehearsal script that includes an agenda, a response sequence, an actions checklist (friendly and enemy), and a sequence of events.
4. During the rehearsal it is important for the unit to act out and verbalize their actions at that point in time. If no action is taken, then the unit states "no change."
5. Refer to **FM 101-5**, ***Staff Organization and Operations***, Appendix G, Rehearsals.

(TA.4.4.1.1 Develop and Complete Plans or Orders)

TREND 102
SUBJECT: MP Rehearsals

OBSERVATION (Brigade Staff): Platoon and squad rehearsals are not effective in translating the tactical plan into visual impressions understood by all soldiers.

DISCUSSION: None.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Develop an SOP for rehearsal types and techniques. **FM 101-5**, ***Staff Organization and Operations***, discusses the different types of rehearsals.
2. Include "Conduct rehearsals" as part of the home station training program.
3. At a minimum, an FM radio rehearsal should be conducted to ensure synchronization of the tactical plan and verify that the plan is understood and can be executed by all soldiers in the platoon.

(TA.4.4.1.1 Develop and Complete Plans or Orders)

TREND 103
SUBJECT: Time Management

OBSERVATION (Brigade Staff): The signal company often struggles with time management and does not achieve the 1/3 planning and 2/3 preparation rule.

DISCUSSION:

1. During several missions throughout each rotation, this results in incomplete planning and minimal time to execute coordination, conduct rehearsals, and perform proper PCC/PCIs.
2. Remote sites did not habitually receive OPORDs, graphics, and other key information in time to conduct critical coordination and rehearsals.
3. These factors contribute to equipment loss and casualties during missions.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Utilize the tactical local area network (TACLAN) system to distribute critical information.
2. Develop timelines and priorities of work at the platoon level.
3. Continue to refine effective and timely methods of receiving higher headquarters' OPORDs and graphics.
4. Develop SOPs that ensure WARNOs, OPORDs, graphics, and other critical information are distributed timely and down to the individual level.
5. Continue to train all leaders on troop-leading procedure (TLP) with a heavy emphasis on time management.
6. Conduct additional training with the brigade and utilize all field training exercises to improve these areas.

(TA.4.4.1.1 Develop and Complete Plans or Orders)

TREND 104
SUBJECT: Rehearsals

OBSERVATION (Brigade Staff): Rehearsals are not always conducted or, when conducted, lack significant mission details.

DISCUSSION:

1. Rehearsals are critical to ensuring plans are understood and situational awareness is attained.
2. Signal companies should conduct both technical and tactical rehearsals including: map rehearsals, remote team rehearsals, sand table rehearsals, line of sight (LOS) link rehearsals, troubleshooting rehearsals, NBC, quick reaction force (QRF), indirect fire.
3. Remote teams do not always coordinate their movements and force protection with units in sector. Rehearsals with these units will prevent fratricide and increase force protection.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Continue to focus on conducting detailed rehearsals.
2. Use all training exercises to conduct troop-leading procedures (TLP), including rehearsals. Platoons can use operations orders (OPORDs), map overlays, and sand tables for both tactical and technical rehearsals.
3. Train on scenarios deploying remote teams into the mission, and conduct rehearsals to facilitate coordination with other units in the battle space.

(TA.4.4.1.1 Develop or Complete Plans and Orders)

TREND 105
SUBJECT: Rehearsals

OBSERVATION (Armor): Task forces do not conduct rehearsals to standard.

DISCUSSION:

1. Units do not confirm the plan at the rehearsal.
2. Rehearsals are often a "rehash" of the OPORD or a backbrief.
3. Subordinates do not gain a spatial and temporal appreciation of the operation.
4. Units do not visualize accomplishment of their task and purpose at the rehearsal.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Units must conduct rehearsals to standard.
2. Subordinates must do the talking – stating their task/purpose/orientation/actions.

3. Commanders and S3s must avoid reviewing the OPORD.
4. S2s must replicate an uncooperative enemy.

(TA.4.4.1.1 Develop and Complete Plans or Orders)

TREND 106
SUBJECT: Time Management

OBSERVATION (Armor): Task forces are not setting or adhering to an established timeline.

DISCUSSION:
1. The 1/3 - 2/3 rule is not enforced in the planning timeline.
2. Staffs are not trained to meet specific requirements in the time allotted.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. The task force S3 or XO must establish a realistic timeline and enforce it.
2. Make maximum use of parallel planning.
3. Units must train the timeline prior to arrival at NTC.
4. Exercise the orders process at home station under the same conditions as at NTC.

(TA.4.4.1.1 Develop and Complete Plans or Orders)

TREND 107
SUBJECT: CSS Rehearsals

OBSERVATION (Armor): CSS rehearsals are rarely conducted to standard.

DISCUSSION:
1. Plans are not well distributed.
2. Paragraph four is rarely briefed in detail at the task force OPORD.
3. Information is not disseminated to those who need to know.
4. The rehearsal becomes a briefing.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. Develop ways to distribute the CSS plan through WARNOs, logistics release points (LRPs), and combat trains command post (CTCP) OPORDs.
2. The S4 must share information with the CTCP as soon as he gets it, and the S1 must act.
3. Use the task force combined arms rehearsal site whenever possible to lower rehearsal overhead.

(TA.4.4.1.1 Develop and Complete Plans or Orders)

TREND 108
SUBJECT: Field Artillery (FA) Battalion Tactical Rehearsals (FA Rock Drill)

OBSERVATION (FS): At the beginning of a rotation, units consistently display only a mediocre understanding of how to conduct adequate rehearsals; specifically, the battalion tactical rehearsal.

DISCUSSION: None.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Incorporate rock drills as part of the battalion SOP. The SOP should address preparation requirements as well as the structure of the event.

The battalion should continue to maintain a standard rock drill/rehearsal kit to assist in quick terrain model set-up. To assist with critical decision points (DPs) for the staff and commander, the battalion should use a decision support template (DST) and/or synchronization matrix during the rock drill to keep it organized and to verify the plan.

(TA.4.4.1.1 Develop and Complete Plans or Orders)

TREND 109
SUBJECT: CSS Rehearsals

OBSERVATION (CSS): Rehearsals are more of a backbrief than an actual rehearsal.

DISCUSSION: CSS rehearsals will ensure a complete understanding from support base to foxhole on how logistics support will flow.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Refer to **FM 101-5**, ***Staff Organization and Operations.***

(TA.4.4.1.1 Develop and Complete Plans or Orders)

TREND 110
SUBJECT: Task Force CSS Rehearsal

OBSERVATION (Mech): The CSS team too often does not execute a CSS rehearsal to ensure the CSS support plan is synchronized with the maneuver plan.

DISCUSSION: None.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Establish a training plan that will ensure that standards in both communication and execution of the rehearsal are understood. During each training exercise, ensure the unit executes rehearsals that will facilitate this learning.
2. The HHC commander must come to the rehearsal prepared to brief his role and the assets he has available for each phase of the battle. If the task force XO is not present, the HHC commander must be prepared to assume the XO's duties as a quality control mechanism over the S4's facilitation.
3. The HHC commander must assist the S4 in the development of action checklists that clearly delineate what the company 1SGs and specialty platoon PSGs must brief. These checklists will help streamline the CSS rehearsal. Refer to **CALL Newsletter No. 98-5, *Rehearsals***.
4. All participants must be in attendance during execution of the CSS rehearsal, even when the task force has attachments during a particular mission. Each company/team 1SG or specialty platoon PSG must come to the rehearsal with an understanding of the CSS support plan and be prepared to brief their particular issues/concerns and how they will utilize task force CSS assets during mission execution.

(TA.4.4.1.1 Develop and Complete Plans or Orders)

TREND 111
SUBJECT: Timeline for Tracking Logistics Operations

OBSERVATION (Mech): Task forces have difficulty producing a timeline for critical events in logistical support.

DISCUSSION:

1. Task forces seldom develop a timeline to track key maneuver and CSS events in the preparation of combat units for an operation.

2. Without a timeline that depicts when certain critical actions will occur, the task force CSS leadership cannot track the status of the task force in all areas of service or support.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. The task force XO and S4 should create a timeline that allows the CTCP/FTCP and task force CSS leaders to track significant logistics operations within the task force. The timeline's purpose is to establish checkpoints to track critical CSS events to ensure the commander's intent is met for the logistical posture of the unit prior to crossing the line of departure (LD) or the NLT defend time. The timeline is a finalization of the concept of support and will allow the S4 and combat trains command post (CTCP) to track service support assets and ensure that the plan is synchronized with the maneuver timeline.

2. The timeline should include:
   a. Logistics release point (LRP)/LOGPAC times.
   b. Task force CSS rehearsal.
   c. Brigade combat team CSS rehearsal.
   d. Task force maneuver rehearsal.
   e. Bulk supply draw times from the forward support battalion (FSB).
   f. Tactical refuel or refuel on-the-move times.
   g. Linkup and establishment times for the Class IV point.
   h. DTGs for task organization changes that could alter needs of the task force and will require advance requests for different types of Class V and Class III, such as the addition of a smoke platoon or the attachment of ADA assets.

(TA.4.4.1.1 Develop and Complete Plans or Orders)

TREND 112
SUBJECT: CSS Rehearsals

OBSERVATION (Mech): Task forces rarely allow time in the task force mission planning and preparation timeline for its CSS leadership to properly prepare for and execute a productive CSS rehearsal.

DISCUSSION:

1. CSS rehearsals often lack a structured agenda.

2. CSS planners seldom have the opportunity to properly synchronize task force logistical assets in support of the fight.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. The CSS rehearsal must be taken as seriously as the task force maneuver rehearsal to ensure that logisticians can properly support the task force.

2. Set the time for the CSS rehearsal when the battalion confirms the time of the maneuver rehearsal. The battalion must then reserve that established block of time for the CSS rehearsal and not pull key players away from the rehearsal to conduct other activities.

3. As soon as possible, company commanders must ensure their 1SGs have an understanding of the task force plan and the company/team's tasks and scheme of maneuver. With this understanding, the 1SG can develop a plan to support his company/team well before he departs for the CSS rehearsal.

4. The following key players for a CSS rehearsal must be present and must have an understanding of the maneuver and logistic plans in order to brief their portion of the plan:

a. S4.
b. S1.
c. BMO.
d. HHC commander.
e. Task force XO.
f. CSM.
g. 1SGs/subunit NCOs.
h. Medical platoon leader/PSG.

5. The rehearsal must follow a published agenda to ensure timely completion and proper coverage of all critical maneuver and CSS events.

6. Add tools for conducting the CSS rehearsal to the battalion's SOP.

7. For more information on developing a structured rehearsal format, refer to **CALL Newsletter 98-5, *Rehearsals.***

(TA.4.4.1.1 Develop and Complete Plans or Orders)

TREND 113
SUBJECT: Medical Platoon Timelines and Troop-Leading Procedures (TLP)

OBSERVATION (Mech): Medical platoons are unable to establish a platoon timeline and conduct TLP before a combat operation.

DISCUSSION:

1. Medical platoon leaders do not issue warning orders (WARNOs).

2. Platoon leaders do not establish timelines with priorities of work or delegation of duties to be performed while they are involved with the task force military decision-making process (MDMP).

3. This results in pre-combat checks and inspections, rehearsals, and coordination not being achieved or not conducted to standard.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Medical platoon leaders must understand what TLP is and how to implement it within their platoons.

(TA.4.4.1.1 Develop and Complete Plans or Orders)

TREND 114
SUBJECT: CSS/CHS Rehearsals

OBSERVATION (Mech): Units do not conduct successful CSS/CHS rehearsals or rock drills.

DISCUSSION:

1. CSS rehearsals are either briefed by the S4 or not conducted at all.

2. Key CASEVAC players/nodes do not recite specific tasks/triggers.

3. Time/distance analysis and support relationships are not clearly defined or enacted.

4. Critical coordinating instructions are usually not addressed and often result in a desynchronized operation.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Responsibilities and movement triggers must be clearly understood by each CASEVAC node and conveyed at the rock drill.

2. First sergeants/casualty collection point (CCP) managers should discuss in detail: CCP locations, casualty treatment, transportation from point of injury to platoon and/or company CCP, reporting, and contingency planning.

3. Medical platoon leaders should discuss similar details from CCP to battalion aid station (BAS).
4. Level 2 support must be coordinated and committed at the BCT CSS/CHS rehearsal.
5. FM communication must be rehearsed at every level.

(TA.4.4.1.1 Develop and Complete Plans or Orders)

TREND 115
SUBJECT: Company and Platoon Rehearsals

OBSERVATION (Mech): Company and platoon rehearsals are often inadequate.

DISCUSSION:

1. Company rehearsals vary in quality and can be conducted full force rather than reduced force given the time available.
2. Platoon rehearsals are often cancelled due to timelines that require key leaders to be at task force level rehearsals.
3. Commanders seldom allocate the necessary amount of time and resources to planning and executing company/team rehearsals.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Use warning orders (WARNOs) to give guidance to platoons on specific rehearsals.
2. The commander must determine and communicate the type of rehearsal to be conducted.
3. Rehearsals should be conducted under the same conditions that the plan will be executed.
4. Rehearsals must include all elements participating in the mission.

(TA.4.4.1.1 Develop and Complete Plans or Orders)

TREND 116
SUBJECT: Company Rehearsals

OBSERVATION (Mech): The degree of thoroughness and understanding of rehearsals is limited to the backbrief type.

DISCUSSION:

1. The commander typically uses the rehearsal as a means to ensure subordinates understand their part in the larger plan and the tasks they must execute.
2. Rehearsals are not used to confirm that subordinate unit actions are synchronized with the actions of other subordinate units.
3. Company/team rehearsals need to be combined arms rehearsals. Rarely are all battlefield operating systems (BOS) integrated into the rehearsal.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Continue to refine company and platoon rehearsals at home station.
2. All company leaders should read **CALL Newsletter No. 98-5**, ***Rehearsals,*** to gain further understanding as to what a successful rehearsal should achieve.
3. Refer to **FM 71-1**, ***Tank and Mechanized Infantry Company Team***, Chapter 2, for guidance on conducting rehearsals.

(TA.4.4.1.1 Develop and Complete Plans or Orders)

TREND 117
SUBJECT: Graphics

OBSERVATION (Mech): Graphics are rarely posted on maps.

DISCUSSION:

1. Maneuver and fire support graphics are rarely posted on maps. Scouts feel that graphics clutter the maps and prevent them from seeing the terrain.

2. When maneuver graphics are not posted, the platoon cannot talk common graphic control measures with the task force. This is especially important when scouts provide route intelligence to the lead company/team. If scouts report by grid, the commander must translate from grid to graphics. The same holds true with fire support graphics. Acquire-to-fire time is significantly reduced if the target is called for by its assigned target number as opposed to a grid mission.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Have all NCOs post graphics on their maps. Learn to report in relation to the maneuver graphics. If seeing the terrain is important, then acquire a second map solely for navigational purposes or have the capability to flip up the graphics overlays.

(TA.4.4.1.1 Develop and Complete Plans or Orders)

TREND 118
SUBJECT: Scout Platoon Rehearsals

OBSERVATION (Mech): Scout platoon rehearsals are often inadequate.

DISCUSSION:

1. Rehearsals conducted are often merely backbriefs to the platoon leader from the truck commanders. While a form of rehearsal, it usually lacks in the key areas of fire plans (observer, trigger, engagement method, and criteria), actions on contact, and contingency plans if an observation post (OP) is rendered combat ineffective.

2. The task force rarely conducts a specific rehearsal for the reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) plan and does not ensure that scouts/OPs understand their routes, locations, named area of interest/targeted area of interest (NAI/TAI) coverage, reporting requirements, and call for fire procedures.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. See **CALL Newsletter No. 98-5, *Rehearsals***, for rehearsal techniques.

2. Incorporate actions on contact into the SOP. Also describe actions in the OPORD and visualize the operation. Rehearse actions on contact for the specific mission.

3. Focus on the main effort of the platoon and the critical tasks to be accomplished. Each section should understand the mission of the other sections.

4. Conduct an R&S rehearsal with all OPs to ensure the commander's intent is understood.

(TA.4.4.1.1 Develop and Complete Plans or Orders)

TREND 119
SUBJECT: Engineer Unit Dissemination of Graphic Control Measures

OBSERVATION (Engineers): Graphic control measures are not being disseminated in a usable form to the lowest level.

DISCUSSION:

1. Most engineer units lack an effective functional means of transmitting and utilizing graphics. The difficulty with most current methods observed is that units do not take into account the needs of the user at the lowest level. The squad leader and platoon leader is often handed a brigade TOC-sized overlay, far too large and unwieldy to be managed in a track commander's hatch or the passenger seat of an HMMWV. This could be reduced by some fairly simple measures at the company TOC level.

2. Many soldiers do not know the meanings of the symbols on their overlays or how to properly use them.

3. Many units do not accurately copy graphics, often resulting in units driving into known obstacles and minefields.

***TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES*:**

1. Units should use the same scale maps at all levels for the dissemination of graphics.

2. Establish a workable map size for the lowest-level user to handle in his work area. A good size is 24" x 18". Make mapboards from plexiglas or other suitable transparent material, and establish standardized reference points ("bolt holes" or "tic marks") so that the maps may be placed on these mapboards in the same place, every time.

3. The engineer battalion TOC should evaluate the terrain of the operational area and pre-register all likely map subsections.

4. Prepare overlays from the higher headquarters' graphics to cover each map subsection. Sections should overlap so that a leader need not refer to two separate overlays more than necessary.

5. Conduct training on graphical control measures until all involved leaders and soldiers are fully prepared to use them.

6. Take great care in the reproduction of graphics.

a. Train one or more soldiers to be experts at this task. Help them understand the importance of their work, and ensure they have the tools necessary to do a good job.

b. Many units neglect to plan for or provide sufficient office supplies to their subordinate units. Every platoon should have a field supply of acetate and alcohol pens available, including unit templates and rulers, to ensure accuracy in copying graphics.

7. Unit troop-leading procedures (TLP) should include a pre-combat inspection (PCI) by the unit commander to ensure subordinates' graphics are correct. Graphics can mean the difference between life and death or success and failure on the modern battlefield.

(TA.4.4.1.1 Develop and Complete Plans or Orders)

TREND 120
SUBJECT: Fire Support Rehearsals

OBSERVATION (Light/Abn): Task force fire support rehearsals are rarely conducted or are incomplete.

DISCUSSION: None.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. IAW **FM 101-5, *Staff Organization and Operations,*** and **CALL Newsletter No. 98-5**, ***Rehearsals***, the fire support rehearsal must be conducted prior to the task force combined arms rehearsal and incorporate the task force mortars, brigade air liaison officer (BALO) or enlisted terminal attack controllers (ETAC), and any dedicated field artillery (FA) assets. This maximizes the benefit of the integration into the combined arms rehearsal.

2. Following the task force combined arms rehearsal, the fire support element (FSE) must conduct a fire support technical rehearsal. The technical fire support rehearsal verifies that

the fire support assets organic to the task force are able to accomplish their task and purpose from their planned position areas.

3. The FSE should use nested rehearsals and integrate fires into the task force rehearsal. Integrate both fire support and technical rehearsals into task force SOPs. Ensure the agenda, time of execution, and required attendees are listed in detail.

(TA.4.4.1.1 Develop and Complete Plans or Orders)

TREND 121
SUBJECT: Combat Service Support (CSS) Rehearsals

OBSERVATION (Light/Abn): **Task force support rehearsals generally resemble CSS OPORD briefs or confirmation briefs rather than support rehearsals.**

DISCUSSION: Key CSS operators often arrive for the support rehearsal with little or no knowledge of the task force concept of support, and therefore have not conducted adequate CSS planning at the company and specialty platoon level.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. **FM 101-5**, ***Staff Organization and Operations,*** Appendix G, and **CALL Newsletter No. 98-5**, ***Rehearsals,*** are excellent sources to assist units in CSS rehearsal SOP development.

2. All CSS planners and operators must arrive at support rehearsals with a map, graphics, CSS matrix, and note-taking material. A recorder must be designated to annotate changes to the plan.

3. Units must establish, review, and train the format so that the attendees clearly understand their required contributions.

4. CSS warning orders (WARNOs) are essential to ensure rehearsal attendees have a clear understanding of the concept of support before support rehearsal execution.

(TA.4.4.1.1 Develop and Complete Plans or Orders)

TREND 122
SUBJECT: Task Force Rehearsals

OBSERVATION (Light/Abn): **Task force rehearsals are inadequate.**

DISCUSSION: There are three main reasons for inadequate task force rehearsals:

- Rehearsals are not properly sequenced. Due to poor time management, subordinate rehearsals sometimes follow the task force combined arms rehearsal (CAR). The task force CAR should be the culminating rehearsal once subordinate combined arms and support rehearsals are complete (**CALL Newsletter No. 98-5**, ***Rehearsals***, page I-9). Often, subordinate units and task force BOS representatives conduct their first rehearsals after the task force CAR. Issues identified during these late rehearsals are then not addressed or fixed, resulting in an incomplete, unsynchronized plan.
- Most task forces do not have a rehearsal SOP addressing the use of a published script IAW **FM 101-5**, ***Staff Organization and Operations***, page G-7. Failure to use a script generally results in the task force CAR devolving into a backbrief, and the rehearsal takes much longer to complete.
- Support rehearsals fail to achieve their assigned purpose (FM 101-5, page G-2). Fire support technical rehearsals typically are not conducted, so the task force fails to synchronize all available observers and fire support assets with the scheme of maneuver. Required attendees at task force CSS rehearsals either do not come or are unprepared. CASEVAC is usually not properly addressed or rehearsed.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Review **FM 101-5, *Staff Organization and Operations,*** Appendix G, and **CALL Newsletter No. 98-5, *Rehearsals,*** for detailed TTP on conducting rehearsals.

2. Develop a rehearsal SOP that addresses the proper sequencing of task force rehearsals, as well as the script for each of the major task force rehearsals (CAR, fire support tactical and technical rehearsals, and CSS rehearsal).

3. Refine the TF rehearsal SOP to provide guidance on each type/technique of rehearsal to allow the commander flexibility based on time available.

(TA.4.4.1.1 Develop and Complete Plans or Orders)

TREND 123
SUBJECT: Company-Level Rehearsals

OBSERVATION (Light/Abn): Companies often conduct backbriefs in lieu of an actual rehearsal.

DISCUSSION:

1. Companies improve their rehearsals throughout their rotation. However, many times the companies only conduct backbriefs rather than an actual rehearsal. This prevents the level of synchronization that is necessary to conduct combined arms operations.

2. Companies do not focus on how they will fight the enemy. This causes companies to lose control and situational awareness at critical points on the battlefield.

3. Control measures to ensure tactical patience on the part of the platoon in contact are not rehearsed or established. As a result, platoon leaders, eager to get into the mission, do not always develop the situation before charging into the fight, and commanders do not maintain enough control over the platoons. This results in companies being "piecemealed" into the mission and not massing the necessary combat power to overwhelm the enemy.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Companies should train at home station to conduct platoon- and company-level rehearsals.

2. Each participant in the rehearsal should come prepared to brief his portion of the mission.

3. The company leadership should review **CALL Newsletter No. 98-5**, ***Rehearsals,*** and **FM 71-1**, ***Tank and Mechanized Infantry Company Team,*** pages 2-38 to 2-40, for guidance on conducting rehearsals at the company level.

(TA.4.4.1.1 Develop and Complete Plans or Orders)

TREND 124
SUBJECT: Scout Platoon Rehearsals

OBSERVATION (Light/Abn): **Platoons continually deploy without conducting proper rehearsals.**

DISCUSSION: None.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. The platoon needs to develop an SOP with generic rehearsals. This will allow the junior leaders to be prepared to execute missions on short notice.

2. Priorities of work need to be established and enforced every time a unit occupies an assembly area.

(TA.4.4.1.1 Develop and Complete Plans or Orders)

TREND 125
SUBJECT: Decontamination Operations

OBSERVATION (Brigade Staff): Units do not adequately plan and prepare for decontamination operations.

DISCUSSION: Brigade staffs do not plan and coordinate support requirements for decontamination operations. Thorough decontamination support requirements include water, engineer, traffic control, security, personnel decontamination station (PDS), CASEVAC, augmentee, and ADA coverage. Operational decontamination support requirements include water, traffic control, security, PDS, CASEVAC and ADA coverage. Brigade orders do not task units to provide support. In addition, little coordination is done to ensure support is effectively executed.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Bridges should conduct decontamination training that integrates all support requirements during pre-deployment training.
2. Units should be tasked in the brigade OPORD to provide all the support necessary to conduct successful decontamination operations. After the order is published, the brigade staff should continue to conduct coordination to ensure that units understand their tasks and are prepared to execute the mission.

(TA.4.4.1.2 Coordinate Support)

TREND 126
SUBJECT: Civil Military Operations (CMO)

OBSERVATION (Brigade Staff): Civil military operations (CMO) lack command focus and emphasis.

DISCUSSION: Because BCTs often either ignore requests for assets or are not prepared to task critical assets, CMO teams are often unable to accomplish their mission.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Give overall responsibility for the CMO to a senior staff officer, such as the BCT executive officer or S3, to ensure that the BCT and subordinate commands support the CMO mission.

(TA.4.4.3 Provide Command Presence)

TREND 127
SUBJECT: HHC Commander's Role as the Rear Area Engineer

OBSERVATION (Engineer): The engineer battalion HHC commander does not fulfill his responsibility as the rear area engineer to plan, coordinate, and execute the mobility/survivability BOS in the brigade rear area.

DISCUSSION: Typically, the HHC commander's primary focus is in running the engineer battalion rear command post and supporting the battalion. This leaves the forward support battalion (FSB) commander and staff to plan engineer operations in the brigade rear area without the HHC commander's considerable expertise. The HHC commander should assist the FSB staff with terrain analysis, obstacle planning for the brigade support area, planning survivability work for critical combat service support (CSS) assets, and ensuring CSS elements understand obstacle lane/bypass marking system – tasks which are similar to any other task force (TF) engineer. The HHC commander is essentially the logistics TF engineer.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: The HHC commander should delegate tasks to his subordinates to ensure that his responsibilities to support the engineer battalion as well as rear area survivability are fulfilled. He should assume the role as the FSB engineer, much in the same way that a line company commander does with a TF. The commander should participate in the FSB orders process and publish an engineer annex to FSB operations orders (OPORDs), to include a survivability matrix. The key to success is the development of a close training relationship between the HHC commander and the FSB staff prior to deployment.

(TA.4.4.3 Provide Command Presence)

TREND 128
SUBJECT: Rules of Engagement (ROE)

OBSERVATION (Brigade Staff): Soldiers are initially unclear on the use of force against civilians who commit crimes in their presence.

DISCUSSION:

1. Most BCTs conduct training focused on the law of war and ROE prior to their rotation and prepare ROE soldier's cards for this mission.
2. Throughout the rotations, the BCT's troops are confronted by assaults by civilians on the battlefield (COB) on other COB. In most cases, however, the soldiers do nothing to control the situation until after a COB is injured.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Sustain use of mission-specific ROE cards.
2. Allocate time on the training schedule for the judge advocate (JA) – or commanders – to conduct additional vignette training on the ROE for enemy and civilians.

(TA.4.4.4 Maintain Unit Discipline)

TREND 129
SUBJECT: Military Police Pre-Combat Checks/Pre-Combat Inspections (PCC/PCIs)

OBSERVATION (Brigade Staff): PCC/PCIs are not routinely conducted as a formal process in preparing for combat at the team, squad, and platoon levels.

DISCUSSION: None.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. A standard checklist should be developed for conducting PCC/PCIs at the team, squad, and platoon levels.
2. Include PCC/PCIs in the platoon timeline.

(TA.4.4.4 Maintain Unit Discipline)

TREND 130
SUBJECT: Pre-Combat Checks/Pre-Combat Inspections (PCC/PCI)

OBSERVATION (Brigade Staff): PCC/PCI are not completed to standard.

DISCUSSION:

1. Although the signal sections possess comprehensive checklists, PCC/PCI are not completed to standard (and at times not at all).
2. Leaders do not ensure that the retransmissions teams are fully prepared to execute the mission.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: The entire section must learn how to conduct PCC/PCI IAW applicable unit SOP and guidelines. This can be accomplished by aggressively ensuring that training programs address this subject and it becomes routine in the field or in garrison training.

(TA.4.4.4 Maintain Unit Discipline)

TREND 131
SUBJECT: ADA Pre-Combat Checks (PCC)/Pre-Combat Inspections (PCIs)

OBSERVATION (Brigade Staff): Units routinely struggle to conduct complete PCC/PCIs.

DISCUSSION:

1. Checklists are often incomplete. Lists do not include criteria defining what makes equipment operational (e.g., radio checks complete – not just turned on; identification, friend or foe [IFF] programmed – not just available; digital link established).
2. Sufficient time to conduct detailed PCC/PCIs is not incorporated into the platoon/battery timeline.
3. The competence/experience level of each crew/team is normally different. Therefore, it may take a leader of one vehicle longer to conduct PCIs as opposed to that of another.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Units should refer to ADA FMs for PCC/PCI checklists (**FM 44-43, *Bradley Stinger Fighting Vehicle Platoon and Squad Operations***; **FM 44-44, *Avenger Platoon, Section, and Squad Operations;*** and **FM 44-48, *Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Sensor Platoon***).
2. Information on IFF; forward area air defense (FAAD); command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I); and any other special equipment particular to the unit should be included on all checklists.
3. Ensure that PCC/PCIs are included on timelines.

(TA.4.4.4 Maintain Unit Discipline)

TREND 132
SUBJECT: Pre-Combat Checks and Pre-Combat Inspections (PCC/PCIs)

OBSERVATION (Brigade Staff): Technical (vehicle, generator and signal systems) PCC/PCIs are usually conducted to standard, but tactical PCC/PCIs are often left incomplete.

DISCUSSION: PCC/PCIs for a signal company cover both technical and tactical preparations. Companies usually develop standardized PCC/PCI checklists prior to deployment and distribute these throughout the company. Tactical PCC/PCIs needing improvement include situational awareness information, convoy routes, and coordination with adjacent units. Companies struggle with and do not prepare accurate load plans for vehicles drawn during reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI). Some PCC/PCI standards are not always maintained, including proper grounding of power generation and electrical equipment.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Enforce company PCC/PCI standards through training and leader development. Hold key leaders accountable for proper pre-combat inspections.
2. Continue to improve time management to ensure enough time is available to conduct both technical and tactical PCC/PCIs.

3. Continue to maintain high standards of vehicle, generator, and signal systems' preventive maintenance checks and services (PMCS).

(TA.4.4.4 Maintain Unit Discipline)

TREND 133
SUBJECT: Timely Turn-In of Supply Disks

OBSERVATION (Mech): Units often turn in their supply disks after the brigade combat team (BCT) suspense, or do not turn them in at all.

DISCUSSION:

1. When the task force does not meet the established BCT suspense for turning in supply disks, the result is an inaccurate 026 report. An inaccurate 026 report provides an inaccurate maintenance picture to the BCT and task force commanders.
2. When the task force XO or his designated representative attends the BCT maintenance meeting, the list of "down" equipment on the 026 report initiates a request for the required repair part for the combat vehicle. When the supply disk is not turned in, the request for the repair part is not initiated, and the task force loses 24 hours in processing the part request.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Most BCTs have an established time for disk turn-in. The task force XOs, maintenance officers, and maintenance technicians are familiar with the process, so it is not a training shortfall; it is a discipline issue. Commanders must take an active interest in the status of their repair parts flow – especially on days the BSA or his UMCP moves to a new location – and must enforce turn-in times.

(TA.4.4.4 Maintain Unit Discipline)

TREND 134
SUBJECT: Engineer Unit Preparation for Combat

OBSERVATION (Mech): Engineer units frequently do not complete essential preparation for combat tasks.

DISCUSSION:

1. Critical preparation for combat tasks is often not identified.
2. Critical indicators are not well defined for subordinate units.
3. There is rarely a timeline established or enforced for completion of preparation tasks.
4. Shortcomings are not being identified or are being identified too late to overcome them.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Units must establish a standard set of preparation for combat indicators or criteria. The indicators might not cover all aspects of preparation, but are used to determine the preparation status of subordinates.
2. The critical preparation tasks must be clearly defined by the commander, to include a timeline for completion. The TOC must track these indicators to assist the commander and identify shortcomings in time to be corrected.
3. The preparation for combat indicators can drive those items inspected during the commander's pre-combat inspection (PCI) of the unit. Some potential preparation for combat indicators are:

HAS THE SUBORDINATE UNIT:

- Boresighted/test fired weapons systems (small arms, crew served, Volcano, RCU, MICLIC)?
- Distributed and posted graphics?
- Issued the OPORD and conducted backbriefs?
- Conducted rehearsals (mounted and combined arms where applicable)?
- Completed Class III/IV/V upload?
- Conducted PCC/PCIs?
- Conducted risk assessment and implemented controls?

(TA.4.4.4.4 Maintain Unit Discipline)

TREND 135
SUBJECT: Pre-Combat Checks and Inspections (PCC/PCI) by ADA Platoons

OBSERVATION (Light/Abn): Platoons experience significant problems because of inadequate PCC/PCI.

DISCUSSION:

1. Examples include vehicles having insufficient supplies on hand, radios missing hand microphones, a team having no compass on hand, shortages of sandbags to construct survivability positions, personnel having NBC equipment shortages (i.e., MOPP gear), and soldiers failing to conduct weapon maintenance.
2. Platoon leaders and platoon sergeants do not follow up on the execution of priorities of work.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Platoons should develop a PCC checklist using **FM 44-44** ***Avenger Platoon, Section, and Squad Operations,*** or follow their Platoon Leader Handbook.
2. Section sergeants should conduct inspections of critical equipment as part of platoon final combat preparations.

(TA.4.4.4.4 Maintain Unit Discipline)

TREND 136
SUBJECT: MI Company Electronic Warfare (EW) Execution Matrix

OBSERVATION (Brigade Staff): The lack of an EW execution matrix results in electronic support (ES) and electronic attack (EA) being unsynchronized with the BCT's scheme of maneuver.

DISCUSSION:

1. MI company planners struggle to provide adequate focus for signal intelligence (SIGINT) on named areas of interest (NAIs), specific orders and requests (SOR), and specific information requirements (SIR) that support the BCT reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) plan and to answer the BCT commander's priority intelligence requirements (PIR).
2. The MI company does not ensure that the baseline deployment supports the BCT with proper electronic support positions.
3. Effective triggers for ES and EA missions and EW baseline jumping are not developed.
4. Air insertions are conducted without the support of non-lethal fires.
5. Units do not leverage ES to find (by direction finding [DF]) enemy recon positions in the rear area that have successively infiltrated through their counterreconnaissance screens.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. The ground surveillance operations center (GSOC) should draft a comprehensive EW matrix during the BCT wargame to fully synchronize the EW effort with the brigade's scheme of maneuver and R&S plan. The matrix should show the brigade's decision points and what actions each asset should be conducting at that time or leading up to that event.
2. This matrix should be refined prior to or during the company OPORD.

(TA.4.4.5 Synchronize Tactical Operations)

TREND 137
SUBJECT: Influencing the Close Fight

OBSERVATION (Brigade Staff): Brigade combat teams (BCTs) struggle with defining their role in the deep fight and how to set conditions by synchronizing lethal and non-lethal fires and close air support (CAS) for the close fight.

DISCUSSION:

1. The key to this struggle is identifying how to find and track the enemy throughout the depth and width of the battlefield.
2. The brigades tend to plan the reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) fight well, but experience problems during R&S execution.
3. BCTs do not check subordinate unit compliance with the brigade plan and do not track the status of the commander's critical information requirements (CCIR). Their planning does not establish clear linkages between priority intelligence requirements (PIR)/named areas of interest (NAIs) and decision points (DPs).
4. The staff has great difficulty in identifying and tracking triggers to assist the commander in shaping the battlefield with his combat multipliers to deny, modify, or encourage a course of action (COA).
5. BCTs depend mainly on combat observation lasing team (COLT) platoons to execute their R&S plan and never fully integrate and synchronize all available assets to find and track the enemy. Consequently, brigades often fight the close fight with enemy forces at or near full strength when the enemy can be attritted or destroyed through the development and execution of an effective deep fight using artillery and close air support (CAS).
6. IAW **FM 101-5**, ***Staff Organization and Operations,*** page 5-23, the commander and staff should develop a synchronization matrix and a decision support template (DST) as a result of the wargame. However, decision support matrices (DSMs) produced as the result of a wargame lack clear enemy and friendly criteria to make a decision and are rarely used. Wargames are mostly unproductive and would be more effective in refining the above products if they followed a more disciplined process. Many staff elements come to the wargame without prepared products or tools and are not aware of the COA being wargamed.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: BCTs should review their procedures for wargaming and evaluate the effectiveness of their DST. Units should look at FM 101-5 for assistance in wargaming and should strive to practice this portion of the military decision-making process (MDMP) at home station.

(TA.4.4.5 Synchronize Tactical Operations)

TREND 138
SUBJECT: Mobile Subscriber Equipment (MSE) Network Plan

OBSERVATION (Brigade Staff): The MSE network plan is not always synchronized with the brigade's maneuver plan.

DISCUSSION: Fragmentary orders (FRAGOs) and operations orders (OPORDs) often lack sufficient technical and tactical details, resulting in decreased situational awareness and leaders having insufficient time to conduct troop-leading procedures. Dissemination of this information does not always get down to the remote team level, resulting in destruction or ineffective employment of key remote systems.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Synchronize the MSE planning cycle with the brigade's timeline. Conduct concurrent planning with brigade.
2. Develop methods to continue to train the signal battalion LNO and provide him the tools to ensure MSE assets are included in the MDMP.
3. Develop a system to quickly disseminate information, including FRAGOs, OPORDs, and graphics, down to the soldier level. Utilize the most efficient method (TACLAN, TACFAX) to get information from brigade down to the signal company and platoon level.
4. The orders development process used at NTC by each company should be continually trained at home station to increase proficiency.

(TA.4.4.5 Synchronize Tactical Operations)

TREND 139
SUBJECT: Synchronization of Fires and Maneuver

OBSERVATION (Armor): Fire support is rarely integrated into the task force wargame.

DISCUSSION:

1. Task forces are not developing a scheme of fires with adequate triggers.
2. Observation plans are not synchronized with the scheme of maneuver.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. The task force S3/XO and fire support officer (FSO) must ensure integration of fires.
2. Jointly develop adequate triggers based on time and space, relation to terrain and enemy, and the task force scheme of maneuver.
3. Develop both the scheme of fires and the observation plan.

(TA.4.4.5 Synchronize Tactical Operations)

TREND 140
SUBJECT: Synchronization of Fires and Maneuver – Scheme of Fires

OBSERVATION (Mech): Task forces and squadrons frequently have difficulty arranging activities supporting essential fire support tasks (EFSTs) in time and space during the wargaming process.

DISCUSSION: None.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. The S3 and fire support officer (FSO) must ensure the complete integration of fire support into the wargaming process of the military decision-making process (MDMP).
2. The FSO must advise the task force commander and S3 when they ask fire support to execute unrealistic tasks.
3. The end state must produce a plan that includes an executable scheme of fires, an observation plan, all targeting functions, and refinement submitted to brigade.

(TA.4.4.5 Synchronize Tactical Operations)

TREND 141
SUBJECT: Planning and Coordinating Air Defense of a Battle Position

OBSERVATION (Mech): Bradley Stinger Fighting Vehicle (BSFV) platoons do not adequately integrate with company/teams to perform their secondary role of ground defense.

DISCUSSION: BSFV squads usually do not integrate into the direct fire plan of the company/team battle position that they support. Consequently, they do not coordinate for sector sketches, target reference points (TRPs), trigger lines, or assigned sectors.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: BSFV squads integrate by coordinating with company/team commanders and platoon leaders. Squads should receive assigned sectors, trigger lines, and a task and purpose to be achieved at the TRPs. With this information, BSFV squads will have recognizable triggers for efficient self-defense fires and, if necessary, can enhance the company/team direct fire plan in a ground role.

(TA.4.4.5 Synchronize Tactical Operations)

TREND 142
SUBJECT: Integration of Light Forces in the Defense

OBSERVATION (Light/Abn): Heavy and light forces often have a resistance to cross-attach subordinate units.

DISCUSSION: During defensive operations, brigades tend to keep their light infantry pure with the task to defend restrictive terrain. This limits the brigades' options and simplifies the enemy's reconnaissance tasks. Once the enemy division reconnaissance locates the light infantry, they quickly locate the heavy units and their engagement areas. When heavy and light forces are task organized, it is more difficult for the enemy to determine where to attack, and the brigade benefits from the capabilities of combined arms task forces.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Commanders and staff officers must develop a greater appreciation of the capabilities and limitations of both light and heavy forces and how to maximize combat power through integration of these forces. Review doctrinal considerations as outlined in **FM 71-2**, ***The Tank and Mechanized Infantry Battalion Task Force,*** and **FM 7-20**, ***The Infantry Battalion***. See tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) in **FM 71-123**, ***Tactics and Techniques for Combined Arms Heavy Forces: Armored Brigade, Battalion Task Force, and Company Team***.

(TA.4.4.5 Synchronize Tactical Operations)
